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INTRODUCTION 
The  information  here  presented  has  been 
pthered  during  the  last  twelve  years,  chiefly 
from personal investigation of large corporations 
through  contact  with  their  officers  and  work- 
men, their opponents, dealers in their goods, and 
also from such printed  statistical data as seemed, 
on  the whole,  to  be  trustworthy.  The chief 
opportunity  has  been  in  the  investigation  car- 
ried  on  by  the  United  States  Industrial  Com- 
mission  during  the  past  year,  though it  should 
be  understood  that  the  Commission  is  in  no 
way responsible  for opinions here expressed.  It 
has  been  intended  to present mainly  facts,  and 
the judgments  of those who, from their intimate 
connection with  the corporations  under  discus- 
sion,  either  as  members,  rivals,  or  otherwise, 
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are  thoroughly  conversant  with  the  facts  re- 
garding  them.  Besides  the  information  so 
often  courteously  given by  business  men,  Pro- 
fessors Hull and Powers of Cornell University, 
and  the  author's  wife  have  kindly  read  the 
text  and  offered  many  most  valuable  sugges- 
tions. 
The  book is  intended  to be a brief compen- 
dium  of  industrial  conditions,  so  far  as  they 
affect  industrial combinations particularly  or are 
affected by them, together with some opinions re- 
garding the influences which have brought about 
present  conditions,  and  the  probable  trend  of 
future development.  Some judgments  regarding 
possible remedies for evils which have arisen in 
connection with  these  combinations  are offered 
in conclusion.  This study is not intended  pri- 
marily for the student of economic theory.  As a 
brief  impartial statement of facts and principles, 
it is hoped  that it will prove useful to the many 
busy  men who  have  not  the leisure  needed  to 
gather the material, but who, wishing to do their 
duty  as  citizens  intelligently,  will  welcome  a 
brief compendium which may to a certain degree 
serve them as a basis for judgment.  It is hoped 
to make in the not  distant  future a more  com- 
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plete  study,  which  shall  embody the results  of 
European experience and which shall deal more 
fully with the whole problem of monopoly. 
Considering  the  nature  and  purpose of  this 
book, it has not been thought best to cite author- 
ities for many of the statements made.  When- 
ever they are  taken  from the testimony  before 
the  United  States  Industrial  Commission,  Dr. 
Durand's  admirable index to that report  will be 
available to all who care to verify  the citations. 
In many  cases,  however,  information given has 
been  confidential  in its nature,  though  on  that 
account no less trustworthy.  Such information 
has dealt  at  times  with  practices  that  in some 
way  have  come  under  public  condemnation, 
such as  promoter's  rewards,  freight discrimina- 
tion~,  commissions  to bank  officers,  and  stock 
speculations.  In  other  instances  it  has  con- 
cerned  the  basiness  of  special  combinations, 
and  has  formed  the  basis  for judgments when 
the facts  themselves  were  matters  of  only pri- 
vate concern. 
The  appendix  contains  some  documents 
which  may  prove  helpful  in  enabling  read- 
ers  to  make  more  definite  and  specific  their 
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needed.  The admirable  summary  of  conclu- 
sions  made  by  Judge  Howe,  the  permanent 
Chairman of the Chicago Conference on Trusts, 
regarding certain  suggested  methods for the so- 
lution  of  the  trust  problem,  is  a  noteworthy 
document as  presenting what were in effect the 
opinions  which  could  be  agreed  upon  by  sub- 
stantially all the membership of that great Con- 
ference,  representing  so many  conflicting views 
and interests.  The  Report of the United States 
Industrial Commission  is  a most carefully con- 
sidered  expression of  opinion and recommenda- 
tions by a non-partisan body  of men, made after 
an  investigation  extending over  a year's  time. 
Though  it  does  not  claim  to be  final,  never- 
theless  it  was  the result  of  most careful  study 
and  deliberation,  and  is  entitled  to the promi- 
nent position which has been given it by  think- 
ing  men  of  all  classes.  The Proposed  New 
York  Companies'  Act:  1900,  drafted to carry 
out  the suggestions  made  in  Governor  Roose- 
velt's message regarding Trust legislation,  is  the 
one formulation into  a  definite bill of the opin- 
ions of many persons who  have thought it pos- 
sible to  separate  sharply between  the good and 
evil  arising  from  the  modern  organizations  of 
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capital,  2nd  who  are  ready  to  encourage  the 
while checking the tendencies toward evil, 
D 
,-hiefly  through  compelling  the  corporations to 
carry  on  their  operations  much  more  than  at 
present  under  the  public  eye.  While  in  its 
preparation  the  author was  assisted  by  several 
lawyers  and  business  men,  he  took  alone  the 
responsibility of  determining  just  what  the bill 
should  contain,  and  has,  therefore,  in  con- 
densing  part  of  it  and  in  determining  what 
portions  of  it  should  be  printed  in full,  felt at 
liberty to make some slight  modifications in the 
bill  as  reported by  the Judiciary  Committee of 
the  New York  Senate.  The summary of  the 
plans  of  Mr. Coler  and  Mr. Bryan  are given 
like the others in  their own words without the 
arguments which accompanied them.  The in- 
sistence of  so many prominent  investigators of 
the subject  upon  publicity  as  a remedy for the 
evils  of  industrial  combination  makes  it  the 
more to be regretted  that  there  is  only one put 
into  the  form  of  a  bill.  Were the  others  in 
like form,  the points of likeness  and  difference 
could  be  more  readily seen,  and  the  best  sug- 
gestions from each more easily chosen. 
The  purpose  of  the  book  forbids  giving 
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much  space  to  exact  definitions  and  classi- 
fication,  but  under  the  word "  Trust,"  as ex- 
pressed in the title, are included especially those 
organizations of capital which have been called, 
whether wisely or  not, "  Capitalistic  Monopo- 
lies. "  Neither  railroads  nor  telegraphs  nor 
other  public  service  corporations  are  especially 
considered;  but,  in  general,  "  Trusts " are 
taken to mean  manufacturing corporations with 
so great capital and  power that they are at least 
thought by the public to have become a menace 
to  their  welfare,  and  to have,  temporarily  at 
least,  considerable monopolistic power. 
An  effort  has  been  made  to  cxplain  these 
Trusts, and not to rest content with calling them 
the  product  of  evolution,  and  assuming  that, 
therefore, they are both inevitable and in the long 
run  helpful  rather  than  harmful.  In a  letter 
written but a few days before his death, the late 
Gen. Francis A. Walker,  commenting upon this 
fatalistic attitude of some of his friends who were 
satisfied to call Trusts the product of evolution, 
remarked  that  he  supposed  the  modern  train 
robber was merely a normal development of the 
old-fashioned,  commonplace  highwayman,  and 
continued : cc Some evolution is worthy  of only 
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condemnation.  Some evolutionists ought to be 
hanged."  With that view of economic evolu- 
tion,  as something requiring further explanation 
before  being  either  approved  or  condemned, 
the book has been  written. 
The first two or three chapters, which discuss 
the  modern  business  conditions  leading  to the 
formation of combinations, necessarily show their 
favorable  side and  the evils  of  the  competitive 
system  most  strongly ;  later chapters,  depicting 
their  methods  of  work  and  their effects,  show 
most clearly the evil in them. 
It  is  hoped  that  the  prejudices  which  are 
common to all  have not  prevented a reasonable 
degree of  fairness  in  seeing  and depicting both 
sides of  this  question, the  good  as well  as the 
evil.  While  it  is  probable  that  the  book  has 
been written  chiefly from the view point  of  the 
economist, it has been the intention not to ignore 
that of the publicist and of the citizen, who think 
of  the  practical  as well  as  of  the desirable  in 
legislation, and who keep in mind the social and 
moral  as well  as  the  business  welfare  of  the 
people. Competition : Its Nature 
CHAPTER  I 
COMPETITION :  ITS  NATURE 
It is  impossible  to understand  why there has 
been of late so strong a tendency toward the for- 
mation  of  industrial  combinations, unless  one 
first sees clearly the economic conditions out of 
which  they have  arisen.  A brief  study of  the 
competitive  system  is  therefore  placed  in  the 
foreground. 
It has  been  a  common  assumption  among 
economic writers  that  competition  is  free,  and 
that there  is  no element of combination among 
dealers  or  manufacturers.  Most  writers,  of 
course,  have been  well aware of the fact that in 
actual business  dealings  this  assumption  is not 
true, but  it  has seemed  wise  to make it and to 
take it as a basis for argument in their deductive 
reasoning.  Too many  of them,  unfortunately, 
in their conclusions  have  forgotten that  it  was 
mere assumption, made for logical reasons.  The 
most vigorous opponents of  industrial combina- 
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tion have,  in like manner,  tacitly at least,  often 
made the same assumption; but it is  so far from 
the truth  in  the  actual  business  life  of  to-day 
that its  adoption  is  certain to lead to misunder- 
standing regarding the nature of industrial com- 
bination. 
The "  friction "  of competition  is  most read- 
ily  noticed  in  the  retail  trade.  Careless  cus- 
tomers,  ignorant of prices,  call for goods which 
please them,  and  often  purchase without  striv- 
ing to get the lowest price.  Others, from habit 
or feelings of friendship, deal regularly with one 
merchant without comparison of his prices with 
those  of  his  rivals.  The convenient  location 
of  his store,  or his pertinacity  in soliciting cus- 
tom, often enables a dealer to sell for more than 
the  lowest  market  price,  so that  competition, 
from the point of view of price,  is far from be- 
ing free,  or at least from being efficient. 
A more or  less  formal  understanding  among 
dealers also checks the  freedom of competition, 
and,  in fact,  introduces an element of combina- 
tion  quite  similar  in  kind,  though  less  in  im- 
portance,  than  that  found  among  large  manu- 
facturers.  In many  small  cities  there  exist 
butchers'  associations,  grocers'  associations, 
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associations  of  hardware  dealers,  of  druggists, 
etc.  Usually  without  formal  contract  these 
organizations  substantially  maintain  a  general 
level of  prices  throughout the city,  besides  fur- 
nishing to all  of  the  different  members the op- 
portunity  of  reading  trade  papers,  of  learning 
the  condition  of  the  wh3!esale  markets,  and 
calling to their  attention  other matters of com- 
mon  interest.  In  such  cities  and  villages  a 
trader  from  the  outside,  particularly  if  he  at- 
tempts to peddle  his goods fiom house to house, 
is  sure to be  met with  united  action  of all the 
dealers.  Industrial combination has begun. 
Even  without  these  associations,  grocery 
stores,  dry-goods  houses,  butcher  shops,  and 
other  retail  mercantile  estab!ishments  in  the 
same neighborhood  usually have the same prices 
for  similar  goods.  Occasionally  one  will  cut 
the price  of  some  article which  he employs as 
a  leader  to attract  customers  to his store,  and 
this  will  be  counteracted  by  a  similar  cut  on 
that or other single  articles  by his competitors. 
The main line  of  prices,  however,  under usual 
conditions, remains  substantially the same with- 
out  vigorous  competition.  There  is  a  tacit 
friendly understanding  that living rates shall be 
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maintained, and these rates will enable the most 
to make good  profits. 
At times,  indeed,  in  order to avoid the name 
of monopolist,  a  large  dealer  in  a small village 
may  even  encourage  nominal  competition.  It 
is  not  uncommon  for  a  large  general  store to 
furnish goods at considerably less than the usual 
retail price to some small dealer on the outskirts 
of the town,  who,  while  asking the same p~ice 
as the large dealer, can still reserve profit enough 
to keep himself in business, and yet to appear in 
apparent competition with a rival.  In one case 
which was noticed in  a Western State, a wealthy 
man who had  established  large stores in several 
villages  for  the  supply of  their  inhabitants  as 
well as of  mining  and  lumbering  camps in the 
vicinity,  found it advisable to take active meas- 
ures to bring into each of  the villages one,  and 
in some cases more than one, small dealer, whom 
he  supplied  with  goods  at  wholesale  rates,  in 
order that apparent  competition might be main- 
tained and real competitors be discouraged from 
beginning  business. 
Of course it is evident that in retail trade,  as 
in  the  case  of  large  manufacturing establish- 
ments,  if  one merchant goes too far in the way 
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of securing high profits by what  are  considered 
unfair means, or of extending his trade by lower- 
ing prices,  the tacit understanding will no longer 
hold  but  will  develop  into  vigorous  hostility, 
shown by actual cutting of prices to rates ruinous 
for the less skilful. 
These  understandings  are  not  so  common 
among  wholesale  traders  or  manufacturers ; 
neither is there so great  a  probability of widely 
varying prices for certain classes of goods being 
secured  by  different  dealers  in one community. 
The margin  of  profit  is  less  in  the  wholesale 
trade;  purchasers and salesmen  both  are  much 
better  informed  regarding the state of the mar- 
ket ; each separate sale being, relatively speaking, 
large,  is  more  important.  For  these  reasons 
and others, the competition is much more nearly 
free,  but  the element of  combination suggested 
still exists. 
Among manufacturers,  the  nature  of  the in- 
dustry itself  is of much importance in determin- 
ing  the  character  of  the  competition  and  the 
trend toward combination.  If the goods manu- 
factured are of  a  kind whose quality is  uniform 
and  may be  easily tested,  competition  becomes 
almost  solely  a  matter of  price.  Especially is 
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this true  if  the  article  is  one  which is  sold  in 
large  quantities.  Salt  in  many  States  has  its 
quality  tested  by  a  government  inspector,  and 
is  always  sold  under  the  grades  thus  fixed. 
The quality  of  sugar  is  easily  determined  by 
the  polariscope  test,  and  all  large  buyers have 
the test made.  Spirits, in like manner,  are sold 
on the basis  of  proof  spirits  or of pure spirits, 
as the case  may be,  and  the test  of any special 
stock  is  easily  made.  Similar  statements  may 
be made regarding  refined  petroleum.  Among 
such goods,  if  competition  exists,  it  must be a 
competition in price. 
On the  other  hand,  if  the  quality  of  goods 
cannot  be  easily  tested,  and  especially  if  the 
goods  are  sold  in  small  quantities,  which  can 
readily be put into packages for the use of retail 
customers,  brands  and  trade-marks  are  usually 
adopted  by  manufacturers.  In  such  cases, 
competition  does  not  become  necessarily  one 
which  forces  prices  down,  but  may  readily be 
simply a contest in advertising.  Most buyers do 
not test the quality of Pears'  soap to see whether 
it  is  better  than  that  of  a  rival  brand.  Its 
manufacturers are not  likely to cut the price in 
order to increase its  sale.  It pays better to in- 
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crease the expense of  advertising.  The Royal 
Baking Powder  may be  perfectly  pure,  but the 
housewife who  insists  upon  using  it  has prob- 
ably  never  tested  it  in  comparison  with  other 
brands.  She  has  been  attracted  by the adver- 
tisement,  has  found  the  baking  powder  satis- 
factory,  and  insists  upon  buying  it.  It is  a 
noteworthy  fact that  the largest  of  the  earlier 
industrial  combinations  in  the  United  States 
were  those  among  the manufacturers  of petro- 
leum,  salt,  sugar,  and  spirits,  goods  of  which 
the  quality  is  uniform,  and  is  tested  by  large 
buyers.  Combinations among manufacturers of 
articles  sold  chiefly  under  trade-marks  known 
by retail buyers  are of comparatively late devel- 
opment.  In the first case, a combination would 
be  made  to  prevent  a  cut  in  prices;  in  the 
second,  to save the costs of advertising. 
If the amount of capital which must of neces- 
sity be invested in a fixed  plant  for the success- 
ful production of any class of goods is large, the 
nature of  the competition differs materially from 
that of an industry in which a small amount of 
fixed capital is  sufficient to enable one to work 
to  good  advantage.  In the  first  instance  the 
number  of  competitors  is  likely  to  be  much 
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smaller than in the latter.  The  loss arising from 
a  temporary  suspension  of  manufacture is very 
much larger, both absolutely and relatively, since 
it  usually  involves  greater  loss  to  machinery, 
more of a break  in a complete  organization  of 
workingmen  in different departments,  which  it 
may take much time to bring together again into 
harmonious working order, a break with a larger 
circle of customers who are more difficult to re- 
gain ; and,  in consequence, competition in these 
industries,  if it becomes fierce, is  likely to bring 
disaster to the industry as a whole. 
From  three  to  five  millions  of  dollars  are 
required  to build  and  run satisfactorily a sugar 
refinery.  In the whole United States, only some 
forty  sugar refineries  were  in  existence  before 
the formation of  the Sugar Trust in  1887.  It 
was  not  easy for  a  sugar  refiner  who  felt  the 
pressure  of  competition  to close  his  establish- 
ment for  the  time  being  and  later  to start  up 
again.  He  might better for an interval carry on 
the business at a loss.  Competition among the 
refiners  finally  became so fierce that  some eigh- 
teen of  them  had  gone into bankruptcy before 
combination  into  the  Trust  finally  abated  for 
the time the fury of the contest. 
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An industry which  requires  but small capital 
to  carry  it  on,  will  encourage  hundreds,  or 
more likely thousands  or  tens of thousands,  of 
individuals to engage  in  it.  The  great variety 
of  circumstances  surrounding  them,  and  the 
great  differences  in  individual  skill of  the nu- 
merous  competitors  make  it  likely  that  some 
few will  be  continually on the verge  of  bank- 
ruptcy,  and that from  time to time  individuals 
will  be  falling  over under the pressure of com- 
petition.  The elimination of these least skilful 
or least fortunately situated  competitors,  whose 
manufacturing is carried  on at the greatest cost, 
does not produce any wide-spread  depression in 
business,  but serves rather to  elevate the general 
average of skill in the industry.  While the in- 
dividual  unfortunates  may  perhaps  be  sympa- 
thized with  in  their  misfortunes,  their  loss  is, 
after  all,  a  gain  to  industrial  society,  since 
thereby  the  plane  of  production  is  raised.  It 
is the consideration mainly of  industries of  this 
type  that  has  given  rise  to theories of normal 
price,  a marginal price,  etc.,  as a safe basis for 
economic reasoning, and many writers in speak- 
ing  of  competition  think  of  this  kind  only. 
Attention  will  be  called  later to differences  of 
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the two kinds of competition, or, rather, of com- 
petition  among industries  of  these  two  kinds, 
in the effects  on prices. 
On the  other  hand,  industries  that  must be 
conducted on a  large  scale with  enormous cap- 
ital  naturally call  into  the  business  only a few 
highly  skilled  managers.  The circumstances 
and skill of the  different competitors map be so 
nearly  equal  that  competition  will  eventuate, 
not in  the  elimination  of  some  few  while  the 
majority are  still  making  profits,  but  rather  in 
a depression of the entire business,  so that only 
the very  few most  skilful  or best  situated  will 
be  making  any  profit  at  all,  while  the  others 
still struggling  along  may be  losing  money  for 
a long period before they finally yield.  Indeed, 
the  result  may well  be  that  for a considerable 
length of time all will be running at a loss; and 
such  competition  among so many strong rivals 
often produces at the end shoddy goods,  reckless 
financiering, and speculative methods in business 
which  are  a  menace  to  business  prosperity. 
Competition of this nature, resuIting in a general 
depression of business,  or in  the bankruptcy of 
a large  portion of those engaged  in the industry, 
with the consequent  losses  to their creditors,  is 
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not  immediately  at  least  an  economic  gain  to 
society,  although  prices  may  be  low,  but  is 
rather on the whole an industrial  loss,  although 
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one  must  not  forget  that  as  yet  it is  in  these 
struggles  that  captains  of  industry  pass  their 
cadetship.  It is  in  this  class  of  industries,  in 
which the amount of  fixed  capital in the plants 
must of  necessity be large,  and the competition 
of  necessity  fierce,  and  generally turning  upon 
price,  that  combination  is  not  merely  more 
11kely  to be  found,  but  is  probably more  nearly 
justified,  than  in  the  case  of  those  industries 
whose  successful  management  requires  invest- 
ment of but a comparatively small capital. 
CHAPTER  I1 
THE WASTES  OF COMPETITION 
Contrary to the popular opinion,  competitive 
prices  are frequently, if not usually, high prices. 
In  industries of the kind  mentioned  in the pre- 
ceding chapter in which competition turns almost 
solely upon price,  the competitive price will nat- 
urally be  low;  but in the other cases  in which 
the cost of  selling becomes an important  factor 
in  determining the  price,  competitive prices are 
certain to be high as compared with the cost of 
manufacture.  So, too, if there is much loss from 
production on a small scale,  prices will be high 
as compared with what they might be if carried 
on in  great establishments, although this added 
cost may or may not be a matter of a competitive 
waste.  One ought not to lose sight of the dis- 
tinctions  between  production  on  a  great  scale 
and production under monopoly,  and the wastes 
of competition as compared  with  those  of  pro- 
duction  on a  small  scale.  Both  tend  toward 
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Of course  it  is  not  the  intention  to assert 
that  competitive  prices,  even  in  these  indus- 
tries  in  which  one  may  contrast  competition 
and monopoly,  are always as high  as  monopoly 
prices,  although  that  might  in  many  cases  be 
true if  one  speaks  of  actual  prices  instead  of 
using both expressions in  a technical sense.  It 
is  probable  that  ladies'  hats  and  other  articles 
in the choice of  which fashion,  personal  tastes, 
and the skill of salesmen enter largely as factors, 
sell for higher prices under a competitive regime 
than would  be  possible  if  a monopoly-even  a 
legal  monopoly-were  given  to  one  establish- 
ment.  As will  be  noted  later,  however,  such 
industries cannot readily be  monopolized, unless 
one wishes to speak of  personal  skill or taste as 
a kind of monopoly.  Before noting the special 
wastes of competition  which  often  make com- 
petitive  prices high,  one  should  note  that  it  is 
intended in this connection to compare the actual 
prices received  in  the  market  with the  cost  of 
manufacture,  not with the cost of production and 
sale in the market. 
Manufacturers  frequently say  that  the chief 
difficulties  to be overcome  in business are those 
of securing a market rather than those of manu- 
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factwing.  This ordinarily means that, in order 
to  make  sales  in  competition with their rivals, 
it  is necessary  to take  much  care  and to go to 
great  expense  in  order  to bring  their goods  to 
the attention and  the  favor  of  their customers. 
If,  through combination among different  manu- 
facturers, this competitive bidding of one against 
the other could be obviated,  it  is  evident that a 
large part  of this expense could be saved. 
Wherever  it  is  necessary  for  merchants  to 
make selection of  goods  in order that they  may 
suit the  tastes  and  needs  of their customers,  it 
is  desirable  usually for  them  to see  the  goods 
before making purchases.  Under those circum- 
stances  either the  merchant  himself must visit 
the manufacturer  or jobber  or else an agent of 
the manufacturer must visit the merchant.  Of 
late years  it  has  become  customary for travel- 
ling  salesmen  with  samples  of  goods  to visit 
merchants,  in order  to afford  them this oppor- 
tunity of  seeing goods before purchasing, and of 
selecting those which are likely to suit the tastes 
of  their  customers.  If  one  manufacturer  of 
muslins or hats  sends  a  travelling  salesman to 
visit the retail dealers  throughout a certain sec- 
tion of the country, rival manufacturers must in 
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some similar  way bring  their goods to the per- 
sonal attention  of  the  merchants,  or  else  sales 
will be  lost.  The result  is  that  several sales- 
men from  as many different  houses travel over 
the  same  routes  and  show goods  to the  same 
merchants.  If a combination among the manu- 
facturers  in  the  same  line  can  be  made,  one 
salesman  could  show  all  of  the  goods  of  the 
combination  to all  of  the  different  merchants 
substantially as well as the entire number could 
do before  the  combination  was  made.  When 
the  American  Steel  and  Wire  Company  was 
formed, it was on this account found  possible to 
dispense with the services of nearly two hundred 
salesmen.  When one of the later whiskey com- 
binations  was  formed,  about  three  hundred 
travelling salesmen could  be spared without the 
business being in any way neglected. 
Moreover,  when  competing  salesmen visit  a 
merchant it is often  true that the  more  plausi- 
ble  or  skilful  salesman  succeeds  in  taking the 
order,  although  his  goods  may  possibly  be  in- 
ferior to those of his rival.  The  best salesmen, 
therefore,  are  often  thoroughly trained, experi- 
enced men who command high  salaries.  When, 
however,  owing to the formation  of a combina- 
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tion,  the  merchant  has  but  one  manufacturer 
from whom  to buy,  it  is  not necessary that  he 
become  a victim  of  eloquent persuasion.  It is 
sufficient  if  he  see  the  different lines of goods 
with  prices  attached,  and  take  his  choice.  A 
much  less  skilful salesman,  therefore,  provided 
he  be  honest  and  diligent,  can do the business 
thoroughly well.  The manufacturer  may now 
employ  a  salesman  for  a  thousand  dollars, 
whereas against  competitors it might have  been 
profitable  to pay  five  thousand  dollars for suc- 
cessful  service.  The stimulus which  it  is  so 
necessary for travelling book agents or clerks in 
retail stores to furnish to their customers is much 
less needed  in selling to a dealer.  His purchase 
depends mainly upon  the  demands  of  his  cus- 
tomers,  and  therefore often upon his own skill 
as a salesman. 
Competition  also  increases  the  necessity  of 
frequent visits.  In  some portions of the North- 
west,  within a few  years,  it  was customary for 
the wholesale druggists to send salesmen through 
the  country every six  weeks  or two months to 
show goods and take orders for specialties, sam- 
ples  of  which  it  seemed  necessary  to exhibit. 
Orders  for  standard  goods were regularly  sent 
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to  the  manufacturers  or  wholesalers  by  mail. 
AS  competition  sharpened,  and  the  travelling 
salesmen  of  some firms  began  to make  more 
frequent  visits,  once  a  month  or  once  every 
three weeks,  it became necessary for their com- 
petitors  to follow,  until  finally,  in  certain  10- 
calities, it  had  become customary for  travelling 
salesmen to visit  the retailers  as often  as every 
two  weeks.  The retailers themselves,  having 
become  accustomed  to  these  frequent  visits, 
grew gradually into the habit of reserving orders 
to give to the salesmen instead  cf sending them 
by  mail,  and  the  enormous  expense  of selling 
thus  brought  about  increased  largely  the  cost 
of  the  goods  to  the  retailer  and  consumer, 
though it is probable  that  the vigorous struggle 
for competitive profit  pushed  new  and at times 
useful goods on the market. 
The amount  of  loss coming from this often 
misdirected  energy  can, of  course,  be  merely a 
matter of conjecture in most cases.  Mr. Edson 
Bradley,  Vice-President  of  the Distilling Com- 
pany  of  America,  and  President of  the Ameri- 
can Spirits Manufacturing Company, estimates, 
in his testimony before the United States Indus- 
trial Commission,  that,  in the sale  of  alcoholic 
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liquors in this country,  somewhere between the 
distiller and the consumer at least $40,000,000 
a year are lost.  He thinks that this is lost pri- 
marily in  the attempt  to secure trade,  and that 
the  result  is  simply a  higher  price to the con- 
sumer.  Part of this waste comes from the wages 
paid to travelling salesmen and from their travel- 
ling  expenses;  and from that  source  alone  his 
combination saves $1  ,ooo,ooo  a year. 
The cost of  advertising  in papers and maga- 
zines,  by  show  windows,  "  landscape  decora- 
tions,"  and  other  means,  adds  greatly  to  the 
cost  of  putting  goods  into  the  hands  of  the 
consumer.  The  price of  a  single full-page  in- 
sertion  in  such  a  magazine  as the "  Century 
Magazine,"  "  McClure's  Magazine,"  "  Har- 
per's  Magazine,"  the "  Cosmopolitan,"  and 
others,  is at least  two to three hundred dollars; 
yet every one knows  that  it is scarcely possible 
to open  any of  the  popular  magazines  in  any 
civilized country without  seeing on  one  of  the 
best  advertising  pages  some  smiling  face  with 
the  inquiry, "  Have  you  used  Pears'  soap ? " 
Other soap manufacturers fill  other pages with 
advertisements  no  less  attractive or expensive, 
and  the amount  thus  spent  in  competitive ad- 
"7 The Trust  Problem  The Wastes of  Competition 
vertising  must  clearly  cost  millions  of  dollars 
per  year. 
Some  firms  push  the  sales  of  their  wares 
largely  through  the  offering  of  prizes  of  vari- 
ous  kinds.  For  $10  one  may  secure  a  box 
of  soap,  which  at  the  retail  price  would  cost 
$10,  and  in  addition  may  receive  a  rocking- 
chair,  a  bedstead,  a  writing  desk,  a  lamp,  a 
baby carriage,  or other article to suit the buyer's 
needs,  of  which  the  retail  price would  also be 
$10.  It is true  that  instead of  the  prize  one 
may take more  soap,  but  the  prize  was,  origi- 
nally at least,  the attractive  feature.  A  short 
time  ago a  manufacturer  of  spices  advertised 
that for $37.50 a customer might receive spices 
of  which the retail price would be $37.50,  and 
in  addition  a  premium of  a  forty-dollar  clock. 
For $25  might  be  secured twenty-five  dollars' 
worth  of  spices,  and  a  twenty-nine-dollar 
Waltham  watch,  with  many  other  similar 
offers.  In all  these  cases,  not  merely was the 
quality of  the  goods  advertised of the best,  but 
the  premiums  were  also  of  standard  makes, 
whose value could not be questioned. 
It should not be forgotten that all this adver- 
tising  does  not  increase  proportionately  the 
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amount of soap or spices consumed.  If it did, 
the advertising could scarcely be  considered  an 
economic loss.  The  purpose of the advertising 
is not chiefly to persuade customers to buy more 
soap or spices,  but to use Pears' instead  of Col- 
gate's,  or Ivory soap instead of Babbitt's,  or one 
favorite  brand  of  spices  instead  of  another. 
Such  expense of  advertising  must,  of  course, 
add greatly to the cost of  the goods to the con- 
sumer.  It is  probably  not  too  much  to  say 
that  in  many lines it  would  be  possible,  if the 
competitive advertising were  rendered  unneces- 
sary,  to furnish  as good quality of goods to the 
consumers,  permit  them  to pick  their  brands, 
and  charge them  only  one-half  the prices  paid 
at  present,  while  still  leaving to the  manufac- 
turer  a  profit  no  less  great  than  that  now 
received.  The men now employed in the work 
of  advertising  might  well  put  their  efforts  to 
better  use  in  the  service  of  the  consumers. 
High  as  is  the  artistic quality of some  of  the 
advertising,  its educative effect  would doubtless 
be  reached  in other ways at less cost. 
The anxiety to make  sales  in  time of sharp 
competition  leads also,  in many cases,  to exten- 
sion  of  credits  beyond  what  is  wise,  and  the 
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manufacturer,  fearing  to lose  a  customer,  will 
often fail to exercise due diligence in the collec- 
tion of debts owed  him.  A large combination, 
having control of a large  proportion  of  its class 
of  goods in the market,  can readily  avoid  these 
difficulties,  and Trust managers testify that their 
losses  from  bad  debts  have  been  very  greatly 
lessened through combination. 
Whenever competitive  business  is carried on 
through many establishments,  each working on 
a small scale,  and  particularly when  the indus- 
try is one  in which  many qualities of  goods of 
a  somewhat  similar  nature  are  manufactured, 
the buyer  is  often  put  to considerable expense 
in going  from  one manufacturer  to another in 
order  to  secure  the  variety  of  qualities  which 
will  satisfy  his  needs.  A  large  establishment 
which carries substantially all the leading quali- 
ties  in  stock,  and  which  can  thus  supply  the 
demands  of  any  customer  without  trouble  to 
himself  beyond  the  presentation  of  his  order, 
will readily secure  trade which would otherwise 
be lost.  This ease  in  securing orders is often 
a great source of saving to a combination.  The 
Distilling Company of  America  found it advis- 
able  to  purchase  several  of  the  leading brands 
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of  rye whiskeys  in  order that customers might 
supply  themselves not only with alcohol,  spirits, 
and standard grades of  corn whiskeys,  but also, 
leaving  the  establishment,  with a  suf- 
ficient number of  the finer brands of rye whis- 
keys,  so that all  their  needs in these directions 
would  be met. 
A  similar  advantage  comes  from  keeping  a 
stock so large that the largest order can be filled 
at once.  It has  been  estimated  by some con- 
versant with the sugar business that the Ameri- 
can  Sugar  Refining  Company,  on  account  of 
its  ability to supply any customer  with  all  the 
sugar that he can  require  at  any time,  is  able 
frequently  to  secure  one-sixteenth  of  a  cent 
more  per  pound than  some of  its competitors, 
they being compelled to go one-sixteenth  below 
the regular market  price in order to effect a sale. 
These two  advantages  apply,  of  course,  to 
department  stores  and  to  any  large  establish- 
ment,  but  they strengthen the tendency toward 
control  of  the  market  in  many  cases,  even 
though  monopoly has not been reached. 
Large sums of money are frequently spent by 
competitors  in  the  payment  of  cross  freights 
which  might  readily be  saved  by combination. 
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When the Michigan Salt Association was formed 
some years ago for the special purpose of effecting 
sales through a single agency, it acted as the sales 
agent for  salt wells  on both  the  east  and west 
sides of the State of Michigan.  Orders for salt 
to supply Chicago and the West were filled regu- 
larly from the salt-manufacturing  establishments 
on Lake Michigan, while those for Detroit, To- 
ledo,  Cleveland, and the East, as far as salt was 
shipped  in  that  direction,  were  supplied  from 
those on Lake  Huron  and  the St.  Clair River, 
a saving thus being made of the shipment of salt 
across the State  of  Michigan  by  rail  or around 
the State by boat  through  the Straits of Macki- 
naw.  This saving in freights was great enough 
to make  a  profit  for  those  in  the Association, 
when the sale  of  salt  to be  shipped  the  longer 
distances  at  the  same  prices  would  inevitably 
have resulted in a loss. 
In like manner,  the  Standard  Oil Company, 
with its  large  refineries  at Bayonne,  N.  J., on 
the  Atlantic  seaboard,  and  others  at  Whiting, 
near Chicago, aside  from any question of freight 
discrimination,  is  enabled  to  secure a great ad- 
vantage over many of  its rivals who have but a 
single  refinery  from  which  all  orders  must be 
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shipped both  East  and  West.  The Tin Plate 
and  Steel Companies,  when organized into large 
combinations,  made  similar  saving  in  cross 
freights,  Mr.  Gates,  of the American Steel and 
Wire Company, estimating their saving at more 
than  $~OO,OOO  a  year,  while  other  manufac- 
turers name also large savings.  It will be noted 
that this  advantage  comes  particularly to those 
manufacturers whose  goods  are  bulky,  so that 
the  freight  forms  an  essential part  of  the  cost 
to  the  consumer.  Manufacturers  of  ribbons, 
watches,  or other expensive  and highly finished 
goods,  while  able  to obtain  a  slight  advantage 
in  this direction,  would  yet  find  freight  but  a 
small part of their expense. 
For some  years  before  the formation  of the 
old Whiskey Trust, the capacity of the existing 
distilleries was  far  more  than was  necessary  to 
supply  the  normal  demand  of  the  country  at 
profitable  prices.  In consequence,  agreements 
were made from time  to time among nearly all 
the leading distillers to restrict the output.  One 
year  each  distiller  pledged  himself  to run  his 
plant at only 40 per  cent.  of  its  full  capacity. 
Another year the  agreement limited the output 
to only 28  per cent. of the full capacity.  After 
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the formation  of  the Trust, out  of  more  than 
eighty distilleries  which  joined,  all  were  closed 
with  the  exception  of  twelve  of  the  largest, 
best  located,  and  best  equipped,  which  ran  at 
their full capacity; and the output of  these was 
equal  during the  first  one or two years  to the 
entire  output  of  all  of  the  distilleries  which 
had  been  running before.  Of course it is true 
that,  owing  to the  pressure  of  competition,  a 
good  many  of  the  distilleries  had  been  shut 
down  before  the Trust was  organized.  It is 
nevertheless  probable  that  no other  source  of 
saving was  so great  as that which  came  from 
running  the  best  distilleries to their  full  capa- 
city  and  all  the  time.  Mr.  Havemeyer,  in 
connection  with  the  Sugar Trust,  calls  atten- 
tion  emphatically  to  this  waste  of  excessive 
competition.  Before  the  organization  of  that 
Trust,  about  forty  sugar  refineries  had  been 
running,  but  none  of  them  could  work  to 
their  full  capacity and  all  of  the time,  and,  as 
has  been  said,  as  a  result  of  the  competition 
some  eighteen  went  into  bankruptcy.  The 
Trust was formed,  and  shut down or even dis- 
mantled several of the refineries which it bought. 
It then ran the rest to their full capacity all of 
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the  time,  and  in  this  way,  Mr.  Havemeyer 
thinks,  the  greatest  saving  of  the  Trust was 
made.  At  present,  when  five  or  six  inde- 
pendent  refineries  are  running  in  competition 
with  the  American  Sugar  Refining  Company, 
it is thought by  the  combination  that it derives 
a  somewhat similar  advantage.  In most  cases 
the rivals,  owing  to  the  fluctuations in prices, 
are not able to run to their full capacity,  and in 
many cases run only part of the time.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Trust, supplying  some go per 
cent.  of  the  market,  adopts  a  somewhat  more 
thrifty  policy.  Substantially  all  of  the  refin- 
eries,  with the exception of the largest and best 
equipped one in Brooklyn,  are run to their full 
capacity  all  of  the  time.  In this one refinery 
the  sugar  combination  places  its  most  skilful 
men,  and  through  the  operation  of  that  one 
establishment fits  its  supply to the demands of 
the  market.  This is  most  carefully  watched 
from  day to day,  and every possible method of 
avoiding waste and loss from  the restriction of 
output,  which  at  times  becomes  necessary,  is 
employed.  The loss  from  a  partial  output is 
thus  confined  to the  one  establishment  which 
forms but a small proportion of the total capac- 
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ity of the  organization, whereas  in the case of 
its rivals  the loss  applies  to the  entire  capital 
invested  when on!y  one refinery is  under  con- 
sideration.  It has been estimated that this sav- 
ing to the American  Sugar  Refining  Company 
is as high at times as one-eighth cent per pound, 
a margin sufficient in itself to give a large profit. 
It is  interesting  to  note  that  the  new  sugar 
combination  just  formed,  in  June,  1900,  to 
compete  with  the  American  Sugar  Refining 
Company, gives this saving as the chief  reason 
for  its  formation.  This waste  of competition, 
then,  which  comes from the inability  of  adapt- 
ing one's  plants and output to the needs of  the 
market  without  excessive  loss,  can  be  partly 
saved  by  combination of  many  manufacturing 
establishments  in  one industry under one man- 
agement. 
When one  establishment,  in  order to supply 
the needs of its customers, manufactures several 
different grades or qualities of goods, it becomes 
necessary frequently to change  the  machinery, 
and even to stop  it  at  times while  changes are 
made from one class  of  work to another.  For 
example,  the  President  of  the  American  Steel 
Hoop  Company,  Mr.  Guthrie,  says  that  he 
manufactures  from  eighty-five  to  ninety  dif- 
ferent  sizes  and  kinds  of  goods.  If  these 
goods  were  manufactured  in  one or two estab- 
lishments,  there  would  be  frequent  changing 
of  the  rolling  machinery  in  order  to  fill  any 
one large order which  called  for  many different 
sizes.  Under  the  present  circumstances,  a 
large order calling for  different classes of  goods 
may  be  distributed  among  the  different  m~lls, 
each one adapted for  the manufacture of a par- 
ticular class.  In this way changes of the rolls 
are  largely avoided, and the delays are  obviated 
which would result  in  large waste  of  time  and 
energy,  provided  the  competitive  system,  or 
the system of  small independent mills,  were in 
vogue.  Mr.  Guthrie's  opinion  is  that  this 
saving  alone  amounts  to  from  a  dollar  to  a 
dollar and a half per ton in manufacture.  The 
leather combinations find that they have avoided 
similar wastes  by  manufacturing  in  one  estab- 
lishment certain special grades of shoes to which 
special kinds of  leather can be  sent,  instead of 
having  each establishment  separate the  leather 
for itself and manufacture many different grades 
of  shoes.  This waste  of  competition--or  if 
one prefers in this case to say of  subdivision- 
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which  can  be  avoided  by  combination,  of 
course varies largely with the different  kinds of 
manufacture, but in some the waste is  doubtless 
very  great.  The saving  in  a  large  establish- 
ment does not of necessity imply monopoly. 
The head  of  one of  the  largest stores in the 
country  was  not  long  since  showing  a  friend 
through the  establishment.  To  inquiries as to 
wages  of  different  employees,  the  reply  was: 
This man  receives  $~o,ooo  per  year;  that 
one  receives  a  salary  of  $15,000  per  year," 
and  so  on,  as  the  heads  of  various  important 
departments  were  pointed  out.  When  the 
friend remarked that  it  must  be difficult to pay 
dividends  if  such  enormous  salaries  were  paid 
to so many men, the manager replied:  "  There 
is nothing so cheap as brains;  they must be had 
at  any price."  Every  person  who  deals with 
large affairs  in  any profession  or trade or walk 
in  life  recognizes  the  fact  that  nothing  is  so 
rare  as  excellence.  Whether  the  work  be 
manufacturing, or transportation, or merchandiz- 
ing,  or teaching,  or law,  the  fact  is the  same. 
'The  first-class  man  is  exceedingly rare,  and is 
cheap  at  almost  any  price.  The great  mer- 
chant princes,  like Stewart,  or Field,  or Wana- 
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maker ;  the great manufacturers,  like Carnegie, 
or Rockefeller,  or Havemeyer,  are  possible un- 
der  present  circumstances  because  such  talent 
for managing,  whether for the  public  good  or 
ill, is rare; and when it is found, the opportuni- 
ties  for  its  employment  readily  come,  as  they 
do  to  the  great  lawyer  or preacher.  Without 
ignoring  the  fact  that  the  competitive  system 
plays a noble  part  often  in  selecting for indus- 
trial society the great leader,  it  is  still true that 
one of  the chief wastes of  competition is found 
in the fact  that  the  separate establishments are 
rnostly in the hands of mediocre men, who,  un- 
able  to effect  the  savings  that  come  from the 
most  skilful  organization  or  from  a  judicious 
forecast  of  the  market,  lose  money  for  their 
stockholders  without  any  saving  to consumers 
from low prices. 
Great skill  in  management  is  by  no means, 
as many seem to think,  the mere taking advan- 
tage of  an  opportunity to cheat  a  customer or 
hoodwink  a  competitor;  but  it  frequently,  if 
not  generally,  results  in  an  absolute saving of 
energy which  comes  from  the  more skilful or- 
ganization of labor,  and adaptation of ways and 
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gether  numerous  establishments  of  the  same 
kind,  is enabled  to  select the most  skilful men 
to place  in  charge,  and  thus  ~racticall~  an en- 
tire industry can be managed with the same skill 
as a single establishment.  While it is of course 
true  that  one  man  cannot  give  his  personal 
attention to the  details of a very large business, 
so that at  times,  doubtless,  in  the combination 
there  is  a  certain waste  that  comes  from  lack 
of detailed  inspection  by the chief  owner,  it is 
nevertheless true that this waste is in most cases 
comparatively little.  The man  of  really  great 
executive ability knows so well how to organize 
his business that men of inferior capacity work- 
ing  under  his  system, even though  only  upon 
salaries,  are enabled to do better and more care- 
ful work by far than  the  same men in an inde- 
pendent position,  where they are unable to con- 
sult to advantage  men  more  skilled  than they. 
One  chief gift of a great executive is the power 
to  select  and  direct  subordinates.  The skill 
of  Grant  as  a  general  was  shown  not  more 
in the planning of  battles than  in  the selection 
of  his  chief  commanders,  and  in  his  power 
to discern  wherein  they  could  be  trusted,  so 
as  thus  to  inspire  each  to  his  best  efforts. 
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The same skill  is shown by  a great  captain  of 
industry. 
This advantage  of  management  by  the  best 
talent is a matter also of the proper distribution 
of talent.  Some man in his independent estab- 
lishment  may  have  been  peculiarly  successful 
on account of  his  skill as a salesman;  another, 
on  account  of  his  organizing  ability;  a  third, 
on account of  his  special  technical knowledge, 
and so on.  If  these variow  competing  estab- 
lishments are united  into one,  to each man can 
be given the  department  for which  he is pecu- 
liarly  adapted,  and  in  that way the joint  estab- 
lishment gets the advantage of the peculiar skill 
of each. 
Manufacturing establishments  are sometimes 
embarrassed  by  the  difficulty  of  securing  a 
proper supply of raw material  at the exact time 
when it is needed, and  in  proper quantities and 
qualities.  On  the other hand,  miners or other 
producers  of  raw  material  are  also  frequently 
embarrassed  in  finding  a  sure  market for their 
product.  In  consequence of these facts,  many 
combinations  like the  Federal  Steel  Company 
(the organization  of which with its peculiarities 
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been made,  not of those who are competitors in 
the same line of manufacture, but rather between 
the producers of raw material and the manufac- 
turers of the finished product,  in order that these 
requirements  of  demand  and  supply  may  be 
readily met,  and  the course of  production  from 
the raw material through to the highest  finished 
product  may  be  carried  on  without  delay  or 
unnecessary  friction. 
A very large establishment often finds it  prof- 
itable  to  manufacture  some  by-products  from 
its  waste  material,  which,  owing  to the  extra 
capital  needed,  or to an insufficient  quantity of 
waste material, its smaller rival must either lose 
entirely  or  part  with  at a  disadvantage.  The 
Izrgest oil refineries at times make as much profit 
from by-products  as from their  illuminating oil. 
It would  seem  that  if  there  is any real eco- 
nomic  function  of  combination  of  capital, 
whether  it  has  attained  monopolistic  power  or 
not,  it  is  this:  saving  the  various  wastes  of 
competition,  in great part  by providing  for  the 
direction  of  industrial  energy  to the  best  ad- 
vantage.  Under  wastes  of  competition  may 
be understood  also  those of subdivision in pro- 
duction  or production  on a small  scale;  under 
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also  mere  aggregation  of  capital. 
But  these  separate  meanings  should  be  distin- 
pished, as is done later.  In this way only can 
it  be  made  possible  for  the  general  public  to 
secure articles of  consumption at  an  absolutely 
low price  on  the  basis of  a low cost of  manu- 
facture.  How  far  combinations  thus far have 
permitted  the  public  to gain  these  advantages, 
and how far they have themselves selfishly taken 
advantage of  their superior productive power to 
the  detriment  of  the public,  will be considered 
elsewhere. Favors  to  Industrial  Combinations 
CHAPTER  I11 
FAVORS  TO INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS 
Many writers and  thinkers on the subject of 
industrial combinations  are  of  the opinion that 
they  are  usually  brought  into  existence  by 
special favors,  and  that,  at any  rate,  whatever 
monopolistic  power  they  possess  is  secured in 
this  way.  It is  even  the  contention  of  some 
that unless the industries themselves are natural 
monopolies,  such  as  railways  and  the  tele- 
graphs,  or unless they are granted  some  special 
legal  privileges,  such as patents  or  copyrights, 
it  is impossible for  them to secure monopolistic 
power without some special favnrs shown them. 
'The  protective  tariff  is  probably  most  fre- 
quently cited as a special favor to  an industry that 
brings into existence monopolies.  The  dictum of 
Mr. Havemeyer,  the President of the American 
Sugar Refining  Company,  in  his testimony be- 
fore the  United  States  Industrial  Commission, 
that "  the mother  of  all  Trusts is the customs 
tariff law,"  has found ready acceptance by large 
of  thoughtful  people.  Mr.  Have- 
rneyer's  contention is that a high tariff, by mak- 
ing the  protected  industry  very  profitable,  will 
tempt much capital  into  that  special field.  In 
many cases,  the establishments,  on account  of 
the  high  profits,  will  be  placed  carelessly  in 
unfavorable  locations.  In other instances,  for 
the  same  reason,  men  who are  not  skilled  in 
the  industry  will  be  ready  to  engage  in  it. 
The  promise of high profits having thus tempted 
many rivals into the field, the pressure from this 
home  competition  becomes  severe,  and  inves- 
tors  feel themselves cheated of  their anticipated 
profits.  With  the  profits  thus  in  sight,  or 
even perhaps with the memory of large profits in 
the immediate past  to stimulate them, they more 
readily  combine,  not  primarily  for the sake of 
reducing expenses, but rather for the purpose of 
reaping from consumers a  large reward through 
high  prices.  It is  beyond  question  true  that 
several  of  our largest  combinations  have been 
formed in  industries protected to a considerable 
extent against the  pressure  of  foreign competi- 
tion by  the high protective tariff.  Indeed, Mr. 
Havemeyer himself  acknowledged that,  had the 
sugar industry at the  time  of  the formation of 
45 The  Trust  Problem  Favors  to Industrial  Combinations 
the Trust not  been  so  protected that there was 
promise of  a  high  profit  without  foreign com- 
petition,  he would not  have  risked  his property 
in the combination, which of necessity included 
also  many  of  those  establishments least  favor- 
ably situated for cheap production. 
The  situation is, however,  not so exceptional 
as is  often  thought.  Even  in  unprotected in- 
dustries in which  the  United  States  has an ad- 
vantage,  the  same  principle  of  high  profits  in 
the earlier days,  lower profits  from the pressure 
of competition,  and  the consequent temptation 
to  combination  exists.  If one considers what 
the effect would  probably be  of the removal of 
the protective  tariff in  an  industry in  which a 
combination  exists,  one  can readily  see  that, 
while the  public  might  be  benefited,  the result 
would  hardly  be  the  prevention  of  monopoly. 
If the  combination,  as  is  ordinarily  assumed, 
were  stronger  than  the  few independent  com- 
petitors  still  in  existence  in  the  country,  the 
first effect of the removal  of  the tariff would be 
the  ruin  of  the  independent  producers.  Pro- 
vided the industry were dependent entirely upon 
the  tariff  for  its  existence,  the  removal  of the 
tariff would of course kill the Trust, but would 
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at the same time kill  the entire industry.  The 
pestion of the wisdom  of supporting an indus- 
try by  the tariff  is  not  in  question.  It might 
be  wise to kill  a certain  industry,  but  it should 
be borne in  mind  that  those who  advocate  the 
removal of  the tariff for the sake of  destroying 
the  Trusts do  not  ordinarily contemplate such 
an outcome.  The  removal of the tariff, whether 
the  industry  were  dependent  upon  it  or not, 
would  certainly destroy the  rivals  of  the Trust 
before  the  Trust itself  would  go out of  exist- 
ence.  In either case,  however,  the consumers 
would,  beyond  question,  for  the  time  being, 
enjoy lower prices. 
It is also  true  that  the  removal of the tariff 
in  many  instances  by  strengthening the  com- 
  et it ion  from  foreigners  would  simply  bring 
about  an  international  combination.  At pres- 
ent there exists an international thread combina- 
tion.  Chairman Gates  of  the American  Steel 
and Wire  Company testified  before  the  Indus- 
trial  Commission  that,  during  the  summer  of 
1899,  while  abroad,  he  had  several  meetings 
with German wire manufacturers,  who are also 
combined,  for the purpose  of  seeing  if  it were 
not  possible  and  advisable  to form  an interna- 
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tional combination for the manufacture of wire, 
since  the  Germans  at  present  are  the  most 
serious  competitors  of  the  Americans.  The 
plan  suggested  was  for  the  two  countries  to 
divide the world's markets  in accordance with a 
fixed percentage,  and  to agree upon an increase 
in price.  The difference  of  opinion  as to the 
percentage  of  the  markets  which  should  be 
allowed  to the Americans-Mr.  Gates demand- 
ing  fifty,  while  the  Germans  were  willing  to 
grant at the outside  not  more than forty-five- 
and further differences  of  opinion regarding the 
increase in price-he  being content with an in- 
crease of $10  per  ton,  the Germans wishing to 
secure one of  $30-finally  made  him  distrust- 
ful, and resulted in the breaking off of the nego- 
tiations.  The mere  fact,  however,  that  two 
powerful,  even virtually  monopolistic, combina- 
tions in two leading countries could in this way 
have  progressed  so  far  in  negotiation,  makes it 
perfectly  evident  that the pressure which  might 
be brought  to bear  by the  removal  of tariff ob- 
structions,  or,  in  other  circumstances, by  the 
imposition  of tariff burdens,  might readily result 
in an international combination of  some form. 
Probably even without such pressure interna* 
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tional  combinations are in prospect  for the near 
future.  Nearly all of  the larger manufacturers 
have now their agents  abroad;  sales,  especially 
in iron and its products, are made continually in 
all  foreign  countries;  and  it  would  not  be  at 
all difficult in most cases to enter upon negotia- 
tions for combination.  It is  true that it is not 
many years since the great  copper syndicate of 
Paris,  which  seemed  for  the  time  to control 
substantialiy  the  entire  output  of  the  world, 
made a most  humiliating  failure;  but  such ex- 
periences ordinarily serve but to point out weak- 
nesses  in  a  certain  plan  and  to suggest better 
methods for the future. 
Freight  discriminations  in  behalf  of  favored 
shippers  are  very  frequently cited  as  a  chief 
cause for the formation and  rapid growth of in- 
dustrial combinations.  There can be no doubt 
that  such  discriminations  have  frequently been 
made in favor of large shippers,  whether manu- 
facturers,  buyers  of grain,  shippers  of  dressed 
meats,  or others.  In fact,  in  many lines  of 
business,  it has probably  been  true that no per- 
son who  did  not  receive  some rebate from the 
printed  tariff rates,  or other favor from the rail- 
roads,  could  remain  in business,  as such draw- 
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backs or other favors were  so frequently given. 
There is  reason to believe also that this evil still 
exists to a very great degree,  Within  the  last 
year  prominent  shippers  have  expressed  the 
opinion,  based  apparently on  their  own experi- 
ence,  that  rebates  were  regularly  paid  at  the 
present  time  by  the  railways  to a  few of the 
largest shippers, and that in this way the smaller 
dealers  were  compelled  to  sell  their  goods 
directly to the  larger.  Others have  not  hesi- 
tated to say in private that their shipments were 
regularly  made  by  special  contract,  and  that 
practically  no  attention  was  paid  to schedule 
rates.  Shippers,  railway  officials,  special  stu- 
dents who are particularly well acquainted with 
the problems  of  interstate  commerce,  all assert 
that such  discriminations  exist  in  favor of the 
larger  shippers,  and  that,  as  yet,  no successful 
remedy has been found for the evil. 
The enormous and dangerous  power  of  the 
railways,  by  giving  special  rates  in  favor  of 
shipments  to  one  town,  in  building  up  that 
town at  the expense of  its  neighboring  rivals, 
or in  pouring wealth  into the  lap  of  one great 
shipper or manufacturer,  while bringing by the 
same process ruin to his competitors, can hardly 
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be  overestimated.  The fact that  such discrimi- 
nation has been considered by our highest courts 
and  ablest  writers  contrary to  public  policy  as 
well as to good  morals does not  lessen  materi- 
ally the difficulty of the problem. 
There can be  no question  that  the  largest 
shippers  are  able  in  many cases  not merely to 
lessen labor for the railways,  but  also to render 
more  secure  their  profits,  their steadiness  of 
shipment,  and  certainty  of  pay.  Moreover, 
they  can  in  many  cases  render  direct  service 
to  the  railways  in  the  way  of  adapting  their 
shipments  more  or less  to  the  conditions  of 
traffic  so as to accommodate the railways,  and 
in  cases  of  agreements  more  or  less  formal, 
among different roads, they can act as eveners of 
traffic.  Many of these services, some of which 
are  perfectly  legal  and  proper  in  their nature, 
would  seem  to  justify  some  sort  of payment, 
and  it  is on the basis  of  such benefit  received 
that  the  railroads  attempt  to justify  their  dis- 
crimination~  from an ethical  as  well  as from a 
business standpoint.  Such justification  might, 
too,  in  many cases  be complete,  were the rail- 
road dividends alone under consideration ;  but if 
the public weal is threatened  by monopoly thus 
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created, and if individual ability and effort, how- 
ever well directed, are thus secretly rendered use- 
less,  there  can hardly be justification from  the 
social  point of  view.  In interstate matters,  of 
course, since the passage of the Interstate Com- 
merceLaw in 1887, such discriminating practices 
are clearly  illegal,  and they have generally been 
considered as contrary to public policy;  but that 
they are granted, and that business is done largely 
on that basis,  is  scarcely  a  matter of question. 
That such discriminations, too, usually favor the 
large shipper,  giving him  at times monopolistic 
power,  and  increasing  his monopolistic  power, 
if such already exists,  is beyond  doubt. 
Inasmuch  as  such  discriminations  are  con- 
trary to law,  it  has  been asserted by several of 
the  larger  combinations,  such  as the  Standard 
Oil Company  and  the American  Sugar  Refin- 
ing Company,  that  it  is  even  better  policy for 
them, to say nothing of  the moral aspect of the 
question,  to live up  to the law strictly,  and see 
to it that their rivals  are forced to do the same, 
than to run  any risk  of  being  caught in illegal 
practices.  This is  especially  true  where  the 
shipments  are  very  numerous  and  are  made 
from  widely  separated  points,  so that  evasions 
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of the  law would  almost certainly be detected. 
One  scarcely  needs  to  add  that  their  rivals 
believe  that  their  practice  hardly  agrees  with 
their avowed policy. 
Aside,  however, from violations of the Inter- 
state Commerce Law, the large combinations at 
times get  freight  advantages which  add  greatly 
to their power.  It seems to be established that 
the  Standard  Oil  Company  receives  decided 
advantages from the location of its refineries at 
Bayonne,  New Jersey,  when the  nature of the 
freight  rates  on oil  shipped  into  that  territory 
is taken into consideration.  Shippers of goods 
from Western  Pennsylvania  or Ohio to points 
in  the  New  England  States  are  usually  given 
Boston  rates on most articles; but on petroleum 
the rate  is  arbitrary,  a  local  rate  usually being 
added  to  the  through  Boston  rate.  On that 
account the rivals of the Standard Oil Company 
whose  refineries  are  located  in Western Penn- 
sylvania or Ohio find it  impossible  to compete 
at  many  points which  they  couId  easiIy supply 
at  profitable  prices,  provided  that  Boston 
freight rates were charged.  The Standard Oil 
Company,  by  bringing  its  oil  to East  Boston 
in  tank  steamers  from  its  refineries  on  the 
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seacoast, can distribute throughout New England 
at only the local rates,  thus  securing so decided 
an  advantage  that  it  is  able  to  control  the 
oil  market  throughout  that  territory.  In like 
manner,  by having  very large  refineries  located 
at Whiting,  near Chicago,  it  is  able  to  supply 
the South and West at lower rates than its rivals, 
who ship from Western Pennsylvania or Ohio, 
the rates from  the  immediate  neighborhood  of 
Whiting  being  apparently  much  lower  than 
those  from  localities  where  rival  refineries are 
located.  It may pay exactly the  same rates as 
its  competitors pay  when  shipments  are  made 
over  the  same  routes;  but,  owing  to the  fact 
that  its  refineries  are  more  advantageously 
located,  it not only secures a great advantage in 
the saving of cross freights,  but it can also save 
through  favors  in  rate  making.  It  is  not 
thought  by  many  that  there  is  any direct  dis- 
crimination when  oil  is  shipped  over  the  same 
route,  but the railroads  seem  to have  arranged 
their rates in such a way that they work decidedly 
to the advantage of a company situated as is the 
Standard  Oil  Company.  The arrangements 
made, too, are so different from those that obtain 
in other lines of goods that they give color to the 
belief held by so many  that the railroads and the 
Standard Oil  Company are working,  in certain 
cases,  practically  in  partnership.  It is  prob- 
able that a careful  study of  the freight rates on 
other classes  of  goods  controlled by other very 
large  shippers  would  reveal  similar  arrange- 
ments.  Especially  may  one  fairly  make  this 
assumption  when  specific  cases  of  favoritism 
that  are illegal  in  form as well as in  spirit  are 
openly acknowledged  both  by  the railroads  and 
by  shippers. 
The distinction  should  not  be  overlooked 
between  the  proper  and  legitimate  advantages 
derived  by  large  shippers  and  combinatiolls 
through  better  facilities  for  handling,  adapta- 
tion  of  trade  to  circumstar.ces  and  markets, 
savings  in  cross  freights,  etc.,  and  those  arbi- 
trary discriminations, whether technically illegal 
or  not,  by which  a  railroad  may at will  build 
up  or  ruin  a  special  locality  or  any  single 
shipper without regard to his care or skill. Combination  and  Monopoly 
CHAPTER  IV 
COMBINATION  AND  MONOPOLY 
There is  much  difference  of  opinion  as  to 
whether or not the large combinations of  cap- 
ital of the present day are to be considered  mo- 
nopolies;  and since the  decisions of  the courts 
regarding combinations are based largely on their 
views  regarding  monopoly,  the  question  has  a 
decidedly practical  aspect.  When a  monopoly 
is found to exist, there seems to be also a differ- 
ence of  opinion  as  to the  force  by which  the 
monopoly is retained.  Of  course circumstances 
are likely to differ in the different cases.  Some 
of  the  larger  combinations  have  succeeded  in 
obtaining control  of  practically  all  of the valu- 
able patents  in  certain  lines of  manufacturing, 
thus giving them a legal monopoly which would 
be  protected  by the  courts.  Practically all of 
the barb wire made in the country at the present 
time,  as  well  as  the  wire  fencing,  is  in  the 
hands  of  the American  Steel  and  Wire Com- 
pany,  because  that  company  owns  all  of  the 
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valuable  patents,  with  one  or two  exceptions, 
in those lines of manufacturing. 
No one  questions the  fact that the so-called 
industries of increasing returns "  or "  natural 
monopolies,"  such  as  the  railways,  the  tele- 
graph~,  the  telephones, the  street railways,  gas 
and electric-lighting  plants,  etc.,  do,  as  a mat- 
ter of fact,  in most cases  possess  a real monop- 
oly.  It is,  of  course,  true  that  this monopoly 
is probably in no instance entirely without some 
competing force in operation against it.  A gas 
company  may  supply all  of  the gas  used  in  a 
city,  but  some  of  the  more  thrifty  individuals 
will  use wax candles or kerosene lamps instead 
-a  kind of competition which may often mate- 
rially  affect the dividends of  the gas companies. 
There may be  but  one  street railway company 
in a city,  but  if  its  prices  are  high,  or  if they 
are  even  at  the  ordinary  rate,  there  is  always 
more or less competition  from  carriages,  omni- 
buses,  and bicycles.  In all of  these instances, 
however,  the  fact  that  there  is  more  or  less 
business  carried  on by  others  does not  prevent 
the  existence  of  what  is  properly  called  a 
monopoly. 
Most of  the instances which have been cited 
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of  the  savings  of  the  wastes  of  competition 
which come  from  the  combination  of different 
establishments,  have  dealt  with  organizations 
that are neither  legal  monopolies "  nor "  nat- 
ural  monopolies,"  as  those  expressions are or- 
dinarily understood, but are simply combinations 
with  a  very  large  capital;  although  in  some 
cases,  like the  Standard  Oil Company,  which 
controls  pipe  lines, there  may  be  united  with 
them  some  natural  monopoly,  or they may re- 
ceive  some  special  favors,  such  as  those  just 
mentioned of  freight discrimination or of favor- 
able tariffs, which may  aid them in maintaining 
their  position.  The advantages of  freight  dis- 
crimination~  and tariffs  are to be found  also  in 
the  case  of  nearly  all  large  manufacturers  or 
shippers,  even  though  they have not been  able 
tc secure what may be considered a monopolistic 
control of the market. 
It is even sometimes asserted that the posses- 
sion of very large capital is  in itself never suffi- 
cient to secure a monopoly in any industry, while 
the popular opinion clearly is that practically all of 
the so-called  Trusts, whether recipients of these 
special favors or not, possess monopolistic power, 
and are properly called monopolies.  Any differ- 
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ences of opinion that arise over such a question 
are  usually differences  coming  from  misunder- 
standings regarding terms.  Late decisions of the 
courts and the common usage of  later days jus- 
tify the use of such expressions-which,  strictly 
speaking, are often self-contradictory-as  ''  par- 
tial monopoly,"  "  temporary monopoly,"  "  vir- 
tual monopoly,"  etc.  It should be kept in mind 
that these expressions  themselves  call attention 
to the difference between those conceptions and 
that of,  let  us  say,  a  legal  monopoly.  In the 
case of the  legal monopoly,  the monopolist has 
absolute control of  the market,  and may forbid 
under penalty of law any competition whatever. 
The monopoly price,  then,  will be fixed on the 
basis  of  the  greatest  net  returns to the manu- 
facturer.  In determining  this  price,  the  cost 
of  production  for  our  purpose  here  being  as- 
sumed  to  be  constant, the  manufacturer  takes 
into  account  mainly  two  factors,  the  number 
of sales that can be  made,  and  the price,  or,  to 
put  the  matter  in  another  way,  the  effect  of 
price upon  the  demand.  Will the net  returns 
be  greater with  more  numerous  sales  at lower 
prices,  or  with  fewer  sales  at  higher  prices ? 
The  question of competition does not enter into 
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the problem.  Only the  demand  need  be  con- 
sidered. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  seems to be generally 
conceded  (at  any rate  the  courts  and  popular 
usage  concede  it) that it  is  proper nowadays to 
use the word ''  monopoly "  even when the ele- 
ment of competition is not entirely eliminated.  A 
manufacturer who controls,  let  us  say,  90 per 
cent. of the output of any product is enabled to 
put  prices  considerably  higher,  for  the  time 
being,  than could  any one  of  ten  active  com- 
petitors,  each one of whom controlled not much 
more than  10  per cent. of  the  output, or than 
fifty  competitors,  no  one  of  whom  controlled 
more than 3 or 4 per cent. of the output.  The 
manufacturer  with  go  per  cent.  of  the output 
must,  for  the  time  being,  supply  a  very  large 
majority  of  would-be  purchasers.  If he  puts 
his  price  above  former competitive  rates,  even 
to a  considerable  degree,  it  will  still  be  true 
that a majority of the customers must buy from 
him,  since  the other sources  of  supply are not 
sufficient  to  meet  their  needs.  To  be  sure, 
exorbitant  prices  cannot  be  held  for any great 
length of  time without  calling competitors  into 
the field;  but, in many instances,  a rival power- 
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ful enough to make really  effective  competition 
could not  build  and equip  a  new plant,  costing 
possibly  some  millions  of  dollars,  short of two 
or three years.  While  one may grant that un- 
der those circumstances the monopoly would be 
only  temporary,  it  clearly  seems  proper,  as  it 
certainly is common,  to say that  the  manufac- 
turer possesses,  at least temporarily, a monopoly. 
He certainly is exercising and can exercise for a 
considerable length of time a really monopolistic 
power.  It is also,  however,  true that in  fixing 
prices  so as to secure  under  the  circumstances 
the greatest net returns, he has to take into con- 
sideration  this  third  factor-that  of  potential 
competition-which  does  not  enter  into  the 
~roblem  when  the  monopoly is legal  in its na- 
ture. 
He may  find  it  best  to secure  the  greatest 
returns possible for  only a short time,  knowing 
that,  if he follows that course,  competitors will 
comparatively  soon  force  him  to  lower  his 
prices.  Perhaps  the best example of a  tempo- 
rary  monopoly  following  this  plan  is  to  be 
found  in  the case of the Wire Nail Pool, which 
existed  in  the  years  1895-96.  The  Pool 
was enabled  to increase the prices rapidly  from 
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$1.45 per hundred to $I.  80,  to $2.15,  to  $2.65, 
to  $2.85-where  it  held  them six months-to 
$3, for two months, and finally to $3.15, where 
it  held  them six  months  more before the break 
came.  By  the  end  of  that  time,  after  some 
eighteen months of  monopoly,  competitors  had 
succeeded in providing facilities for manufacture, 
so that the Pool  was broken, and prices fell back 
to a competitive rate,  although not quite so low 
as they had  been before the organization  of  the 
Pool.  Indeed,  in this case, the boldness  of the 
Pool  managers in  pushing  prices  so  very high 
doubtless extended the time of  their monopoly. 
Competitors  enough  to break  the  Pool  would 
have arisen sooner, had not each one anticipated 
its  speedy collapse on account of its high prices 
promising enormous profits.  Each believed that 
some one else must very soon enter the field. 
On the  other  hand,  it  may be  that  the  so- 
called  capitalistic  monopoly  may  consider  it 
wiser  to attempt  to  secure  its  returns  perma- 
nently.  In  that case, while it may perhaps keep 
prices somewhat above former competitive rates, 
it must keep them low enough so that the temp- 
tation for competitors to enter the field will not 
be great,  and it must be able  to put them with- 
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out absolute loss lower than it would be ~ossible 
for  an  rival  to  manufacture  and sell. 
~t  probably be granted by all that an or- 
ganization controlling for the time being go per 
cent.  of  the  output  of  any product, by  putting 
its  down,  can  compel  its  few  rivals  to 
follow;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  it  may  put 
prices up  above  former  competitive  rates,  and 
,-an  still for  a  considerable length of time con- 
trol sales, inasmuch as the other sources of sup- 
ply cannot fill the demand.  If its competitors, 
controlling  only  10  per  cent.  of  the  output, 
put  prices  up,  they  will  make  practically  no 
sales,  inasmuch  as  the  combination  can  sup- 
ply  on  short  notice  the  entire  market;  while, 
on the other  hand,  if  they  put  prices down be- 
low the  market  rate,  the  combination will  not 
be compelled  to follow in  all  places,  inasmuch 
as  the  competitors  cannot  supply  the  entire 
market.  It need  meet their prices only in their 
own localities.  In fact,  it  is  not  infrequently 
the case that the small competitor, owing to the 
fear  of  customers  that  he  may not  be  able  to 
supply  their  orders,  will  be  compelled  to  seli 
very  generally  at  something  below  the  market 
rate  as  fixed  by  the  combination.  Late testi- 
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mony,  given  before the Industrial Commission, 
as  has  been  previously  stated,  seems  to  show 
that  some  of  the  competitors of  the American 
Sugar Refining  Company have  during  the past 
year,  for a considerable  part  of the time,  been 
compelled to sell at one-sixteenth  of  a cent  per 
pound below the market rate. 
Will  now  experience  justify  the  contention 
that  mere  possession  of  great  capital  will  give 
substantially no monopolistic  power permanent 
in  its  nature,  unless  some  element  of  legal or 
natural  monopoly  or some special favor, such as 
comes  from  the  tariff  or  from  discriminating 
rates on railroads, be also secured  ?  Of course 
this question  cannot  be  settled  absolutely  on a 
basis of fact until after more years of experience; 
but certain advantages come from the possession 
of  large capital which clearly under our present 
system  of  laws  tend  toward  monopoly;  and, 
so far as we have  a basis of experience in fact, 
that  experience  seems to justify  the belief  that 
n~onopoly  within  certain  limits  (i.e.,  monopoly 
as the word  is  at  present used,  meaning unified 
control  enough  to  hold  competitors  well  in 
check, as evidenced  by  the power to put prices 
higher than  former competitive rates  while still 
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excluding  nearly  all  competitors),  as  has  been 
intimated,  may be  secured  simply  by  the  pos- 
session  of  large  capital.  This power  to  get 
hipher  rates  depends  generally  upon  the ability 
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to  put  on  the  market  without  loss  at 
lower rates,  if need be,  than can its rivals. 
A large combination, controlling from 75 per 
cent.  upward  of  the  output, with its  manufac- 
turing plants  favorably located  in different sec- 
tions  of  the  country,  would  certainly  have  a 
decided advantage in  freight  rates,  especially if 
its  products  were  bulky,  over  any  competitor 
who would  set up in business,  unless that com- 
petitor were to enter  the contest with  substan- 
tially  equal  capital.  If  such  a  rival  entered 
the  field,  there  would  be  in  operation  manu- 
facturing  plants  which,  on  the  whole,  could 
readily supply  one-half  more  product  than  the 
country needed.  It may readily be granted that 
if capital were  on  hand  to be invested  in such 
large amounts, the new organization could force 
the old combination to sell at former competitive 
rates or lower.  Those, however,  who take the 
position  that potential  competition will prevent 
prices  from going at all  above former competi- 
tive  rates,  overlook the  fact  that new capital is 
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not at all likely to be  invested  under  such cir- 
cumstances, unless the profits of the combination 
are put very high  indeed.  The reason for it is 
perfectly  evident.  It is absolutely certain that, 
if competition of that kind is tried, prices will be 
forced down not merely to the normal competi- 
tive  rates  among  small  manufacturers,  but  far 
below that, and those investing their capital for 
purposes  of  competition  are  certain  to  make, 
instead of  the  high  profits of the existing corn- 
bination,  very low profits or none at all. 
The same situation  exists,  regarding  the ad- 
vantages of  a large  organization with  branches 
in  different parts of the country in the possibility 
of its lowering prices to cost or lower in special 
localities,  for the sake of forcing out its smaller 
rivals,  while  keeping  prices  elsewhere  above 
competitive rates  among  small  manufacturers. 
This power  of  destructive  competition  alone, 
which  may depend  solely upon its large capital 
shrewdly  invested,  is  sufficient  to  enable  it 
to  crush  out  any  small  rival.  On the  other 
hand,  if  a  rival  powerful  enough  to meet  its 
cuts  in  substantially all  markets were  to enter 
the contest,  it would  be with  the absolute cer- 
tainty that,  instead  of  securing  high  prices and 
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the consequent high  profits of the existing com- 
bination,  the  result  must  inevitably be  a com- 
petition  so  fierce  that  prices  would  be  forced 
below  usual  competitive  rates,  and  profits 
would  entirely  disappear.  If  it  be  suggested 
that such competition  might be started with the 
idea of  selling  out to the combination,  the fact 
still remains that this enlarged  combination,  or- 
ganized with the certainty that it would  possess 
plants  sufficient  to  supply  considerably  more 
than the  normal  demand  of  the country at re- 
munerative  rates  for a period  of  years,  would, 
in  all probability,  make low  profits  on the total 
capital invested.  If it attempted to make high 
ones,  its  prices would  need  to be  put  so high 
that  still  other  competitors  would  enter  the 
lists,  and  in  course  of  time  a  reorganization 
must take place  which  must  result in great loss 
of capital.  This ultimate  result will make the 
first strong would-be  competitors wary. 
This same line  of  argument  applies to prac- 
tically  all  of  the  advantages  that  are  to  be 
secured  by  a large industrial plant.  The only 
difference  between the  large  business  and  the 
capitalistic  monopoly  is,  after all,  one  of  size 
and power  which  come from capital.  A large 
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manufacturing  establishment  which  does  not 
supply  more  than  10 per  cent. of  the  output 
of  the  country  may,  perhaps,  as  regards  the 
division  of  labor  in  the  manufacturing  plant 
itself,  be  able  to manufacture  as  cheaply  as  a 
great combination  which  controls  go per cent. 
of  the  output.  On the  other  hand,  in  many 
lines  of  industry,  it  does  not  have  the  same 
facilities  for  marketing  its  product,  owing  to 
increased  cost  of  transportation  and  a  relative 
increase in  the cost  of  advertising.  Its power 
of  competition  is  also  smaller,  since  it  cannot 
so readily make cuts in  special localities against 
small  competitors while  keeping  up  its  prices 
elsewhere,  and since,  also,  supplying  so small a 
part of the market,  it cannot get its prices even 
temporarily  above  normal  competitive  rates. 
Neither can it secure the numerous other advan- 
tages of a great combination which have already 
been cited. 
This element of  fear on the part of the small 
would-be  competitor,  who  knows  that  he  can 
be  crushed  out,  is  the  influence  which  keeps 
him  from  investing  his  capital  until  the com- 
bination  is  securing  considerably  more  for 
its product than competitive rates  among small 
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manufacturers.  The certainty  which  keeps 
the large would-be  competitor out,  even  when 
prices  are  considerably  above  such  competitive 
rates,  is  that  after  he  has  entered  the busi- 
,,,ss  the  existing  combination  must  force 
the  competitive  fighting  so  hard  that  profits 
will  entirely disappear  during  the contest;  and 
the  knowledge  that  if  a  combination with  the 
is  made,  it  must  be  with  so  large 
a capital and so much  surplus productive capac- 
ity that even for a goodly time in the future the 
profits  must  be  comparatively  low,  or  more 
probably  non-existent;  while  the  endeavor  to 
make profits would push prices up again  which 
might tempt in  new rivals. 
The only competition that is likely to  prove 
effective,  if any does,  is that from another great 
combination in a collateral  line of  work.  For 
example,  a great steel  combination might effec- 
tively  add  to its  plants  some  tin-plate,  mills. 
This movement has already begun,  both in the 
way of  competition and of combinations which 
attempt to include all steps of manufacture from 
the mine to the  highly  finished  product.  Such 
combinations will  probably  extend still  further; 
but this fact does not change the principles laid 
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down.  It  simply  points  to  larger  consolida- 
tlons. 
It will thus be  seen that we may  make prop- 
erly  a  distinction  between  merely  large capital 
and capital large enough to give an organization 
a virtual monopoly.  It also  seems certain that 
the  sources  of  savings  of a great combination, 
added  to this  fear  of  the  attacks by  great cap- 
~tal,  are sufficient,  in spite of potential competi- 
non,  to enable  a  large  combination  to secure 
permanently  under existing laws  profits  consid- 
erably above those which could be secured under 
a competitive  system of  smaller men,  although 
not so high as might readily be secured by  a legal 
monopoly or by a natural monopoly.  This fact 
seems to justify the use of the expression ''  cap- 
italistic monopoly,"  although of course one may 
readily concede  that  the  power of monopoly  In 
this  case  is  not  so  complete  as  in  the others. 
One  may grant still further that experience so 
far  does  seem to show that these larger combi- 
nations have ordinarily pushed their prices so far 
above  usual  competitive rates that other  capital 
has  entered  the  field  and  pushed  prices  from 
time to  time back to, or often below,  former eom- 
petitive rates.  On  the whole, however, the fact 
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that,  during  the  twelve  years of  its  existence, 
the  American  Sugar  Refining  Company  (with 
capital stock  not a little  watered,  if one judges 
on the basis of cost of reproduction and running 
cash  capital) for more  than  nine of these years 
has  been  able  to keep  its  margin  between 
raw  and  refined  sugar  considerably  above  the 
former  competitive  margin,  and  has  paid  divi- 
dends of  7  per cent.  on its preferred  stock and 
12  on  its  common  stock,  while  laying  up  a 
seems  to  show  that  its  large  capital 
has  secured  more  than  former  competitive 
prices,  and that  it  has had  certain monopolistic 
power.  The nature  of  competition  between 
large  competitors  as compared with that among 
small rivals is considered at length in the chapter 
on Prices. 
The assertion made that the Sugar Combina- 
tion  has  also  received  special  favors  from  the 
railroads  may or may not be true.  It certainly 
has  not  been  proved,  while  the other reasons, 
and  the  undeniable  facts regarding the increase 
in  the  margin between raw and  refined  sugar, 
as shown in  the chapter on Prices,  furnish  suf- 
ficient  cause for the high  dividends.  A some- 
what  similar  assertion  may be made  regarding 
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the  Standard Oil Company.  It was  doubtless 
true that in earlier years it received  great  favors 
from  the  railroads.  It is  possible  that  it  has 
received  special  favors  from  the  railroads  at 
times  since,  but  it  has  not  been  proved  that 
such  favors  in the form of discriminations (ex- 
cept  those  coming  directly  from its large capi- 
tal,  which  enables it  so to locate refineries  and 
supply markets that  it has  an  advantage)  have 
been  received  to any material extent,  if at  all, 
of  late years,  while  it  has  been  proved  that its 
profits  have  been  much  greater  during  these 
later years than before. 
The other advantages claimed for the capital- 
istic monopoly, in crushing competitors by local 
cuts  in  prices,  in  transportation,  and  in  other 
ways that are perfectly legal and normal in their 
nature,  however  unjust  they  may be,  certainly 
seem  in  themselves  enough  to explain part at 
any rate of its high profits.  Similar experiences 
are  found  in  the  cases  of  other  combinations 
of lesser note ;  and yet  it ought to be repeated 
that so far most combinations have overreached 
and have paid the penalty of trying to secure ex- 
orbitant profits.  More experience is needed  to 
teach  most  of  them  the  art of  permanent  mo- 
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nopoly-an  art that, when it is learned, will need 
be kept under careful control by society. 
Even  as  regards  the  special  discriminating 
favors that  are mentioned  by  those who believe 
that  there  is  no such thing  as  capitalistic  mo- 
nopoly,  it might readily enough be claimed that 
those  special  favors  in  themselves  are  secured 
only by  virtue of the power of large capital, but 
that would  be a technical  claim which need not 
be made. 
Possibly  the chief  influence  in the long  run 
in promoting combinations of capital, as well as 
their most far-reaching  effect,  is the element of 
personal ambition which is fostered by monopoly. 
There can  be  no  doubt  that,  in  the case  of 
the  larger  industrial  combinations,  the  belief 
on  the  part  of  the  managers  that  a  virtual 
monopoly  can  be  secured,  is  a  powerful  ele- 
ment  toward  bringing  about  their  formation. 
The pride  of  power,  and  the  pleasure  which 
comes  from  the  exercise  of  great  power,  are 
in  themselves  exceedingly  attractive  to  strol~g 
men.  As  one  with  political  aspirations  will 
sacrifice  much  and  take  many  risks  for  the 
sake of  securing  politica:  preferment  in  order 
that  he  may  in  this  way  rule  his  fellows, 
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so  a  successful  organizer  of  business  derives 
keen  satisfaction  from  feeling  that  he  is prac- 
tically directing  alone  the  destinies  of  a  great 
people,  so far as his one line of business is con- 
cerned.  Mr. Havemeyer  says that his ambition 
is to refine  the  sugar  of  the American people. 
Mr.  Gates says that  it was the ambition of  the 
organizers  of  the  American  Steel  and  Wire 
Company  to  control  the  wire  output  of  the 
world.  One cannot  say that  these  ambitions 
are  not  as worthy  as  those  of  politicians,  and 
as  natural.  No one  can question  that  these 
elements  of  personal  satisfaction  and  pride are 
most powerful  factors  in  all  lines of  social in- 
tercourse,  and this  pride  could  not be gratified 
in  business  short of  the  belief  on  the part of 
these men that they can secure a  practical  mo- 
nopoly.  This ambition  will  not  be  gratified 
by  the  control  of  merely  a  very  large  busi- 
ness.  Napoleon  was  not  content  to be  the 
head  of  a  great  state.  His  ambition  would 
brook  no rival.  May  not  the ambition  of  a 
sugar king or a  petroleum  magnate well  be  of 
like  imperial  nature,  though  in  a  more  re- 
stricted  field  ? 
Connected with  this  belief  in  the  power  of 
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monopoly within the home market is that of the 
ability of  the  great  combination  to enter new, 
and  especially  foreign,  markets.  Much  more 
capital is  required  to introduce  into  a  foreign 
market a special product  than would be required 
for  the  extension  of  the  sale  of  that  product 
within  one's  home  country.  The power  of 
great  capital  thus  enables  the  combination  to 
,*tend  its trade as could otherwise not be done, 
this  power  by  no means  necessarily 
implies  monopoly.  The American  Tobacco 
Company  has  developed  a  great  market  in 
Japan,  India,  and  throughout  the  Far  East. 
In some  instances  even,  it  is  said,  it has been 
forced practically to create the taste for tobacco 
and to break down religious scruples in order to 
introduce  its  product.  One may question  the 
value to those peoples of this 'l  educated taste "  ; 
one cannot question the  skill and power needed 
to  accomplish  the  result.  The Standard  Oil 
Company  has  pushed  its  products  into practi- 
cally all the markets  of  the world.  In neither 
case  could  these  industries  have  so  expanded 
without  the  possession  of  very  large  capital; 
and  this  ability to manage  the  foreign  market 
in conjunction with the home market,  is beyond 
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doubt  an  advantage  of  the  large  organization 
which  the  small  competitor  does  not  possess. 
The possession of a secure foreign market gives 
the  large  manufacturer  still  further  power  in 
handling the home  market,  so as  to give him a 
virtual monopoly. 
Granting, then, all that can be said with ref- 
erence to the special advantages that come from 
legal monopolies and  from natural monopolies, 
it still seems  reasonable  to believe that without 
them  what  must,  under  the  present  usage  of 
terms,  be  called  monopoly,  does,  through  the 
power of capital, exist, temporarily at least;  and 
apparently it may exist permanently, exerting, if 
it wishes,  some if not all of the power exercised 
by  other  monopolies,  and  needing  like  them 
the restraining hand of  the state through courts 
and  legislatures  to prevent  abuse.  The term 
"  capitalistic monopoly "  has been given to this 
kind of business organization,  and until a better 
expression is  found,  it  seems well  to make use 
of that. 
CHAPTER V 
PROMOTER  AND  FINANCIER 
If several  different  firms  or corporations are 
to combine  into one,  or if a large corporation is 
to be  organized,  it  is  ordinarily true that some 
individual must  undertake  the  task of carrying 
on the  negotiations  among  the  different  estab- 
lishments or individuals concerned, of providing 
a plan of organization, and of persuading the dif- 
ferent  individual owners  that  it  is  to their  ad- 
vantage  to  enter  into the  combination  on  the 
terms suggested.  This persuasive optimist who 
can succeed in convincing each that it is for his 
interest to join the organization is the promoter. 
In the organization of  many of  our later in- 
dustrial combinations,  the  large pay  of the pro- 
moter  has  come  directly  or indirectly  through 
the  issuance  of  watered  stock.  To  see fully 
the common  practices in connection  with  such 
work,  we  may  profitably  sketch  hastily  in 
review  the  more  usual  processes and forms of 
organization of corporations. 
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A certificate of  stock  is  essentially a receipt 
for a certain amount of capital paid  into a com- 
pany to enable  it  to carry on  business.  This 
capital  is  divided  into  shares,  usually of $100 
each,  and  the  certificates  of  stock stand  for  a 
certain number of shares.  It is  ordinarily  sup- 
posed  that  the  certificates  of  stock  represent 
capital paid  in cash or an equivalent of cash,  so 
that ten shares of stock would represent $1,000 
in  cash or in an  equivalent of  cash.  If stock 
is issued  only for cash,  there is  little  likelihood 
of  injustice  being done,  or of  either the inves- 
tors  in the stocks  or those who are doing busi- 
ness  with  the  company  being  deceived  with 
reference  to the terms on which the business is 
organized. 
In most  cases,  however,  when  a company is 
organized,  considerable  amounts  of  property 
need  to be  purchased,  either land,  or buildings, 
or tools,  or property in some other form, adapted 
for  carrying  on  the  business.  In many  cases 
persons who wish  to invest  their money in the 
organization are  themselves  the  owners of this 
desired property.  In consequence,  it is a mat- 
ter of convenience that  shares be issued directly 
or  indirectly  for  this  property  instead  of  for 
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Sometimes,  to avoid  the  appearance of 
,,,,;ng  stock  for  property,  the managers of the 
agree  upon  a  price  in  stock  at  par 
value at which  a  special  piece of  property will 
be  purchased.  The managers then go through 
the form of handing their checks to the property 
owners for the sum  zgreed  upon,  and receiving 
in turn the  checks  for  an  equal amount of the 
owners of the property for stock issued then and 
there.  In a late case certified checks of a lead- 
ing  Trust Company were  used  to pay  for  the 
properties--a  loan  for  the amount for one day 
having  been  made  for  that  purpose-and  the 
checks  of  the  mill-owners  paid  the  loan  the 
next day.  If the  property is  tangible,  such as 
land or buildings,  and the estimate placed upon 
its  value  is  conservative  and  fair,  there  seems 
to  be  no  reason  why  the shares should  not be 
issued  directly for  this  property,  if  there  were 
no danger of injury to any person.  Likewise, 
if  the  property  is  intangible,  as a  patent  or a 
copyright,  or  possibly  the good-will  of a busi- 
ness,  its value may be as great as that of  land 
or buildings. 
Naturally the  inventor  and  the promoter are 
hopeful  of  large  profits,  and will  therefore  set 
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a  high  price  upon  the  patent.  If,  as is  often 
the case, the invention  proves a successful one, 
the patent may prove  to be worth  more capital 
than was estimated at the beginning,  and shares 
of  stock  therefore  issued  in  payment  for  it 
will  be  worth  more  than  their  par  value  in 
cash.  On the  other hand,  if  the undertaking 
proves a failure, there will  be no tangible prop- 
erty left  against  which  the  shares were issued, 
and  the shares  themselves  may  become  value- 
less.  In a case  like  this,  where  the organiza- 
tion is  founded  chiefly on  hope,  there are great 
opportunities,  and the temptations are also very 
great  to  issue  stock  to  large  amounts,  even 
though the hopes are not well founded. 
It may be  that in other cases the services of 
some individual  peculiarly  skilled  in  the  busi- 
ness may be taken  in  lieu of cash.  Under the 
partnership  form of doing business,  it is not in- 
frequently the case  that one partner contributes 
capital in the form of  cash or tangible property 
equivalent  to cash,  while  another  partner con- 
tributes his  skill  and  time  in  the  form  of ser- 
vices,  the  two  partners  dividing  the  profits 
equally.  Likewise  in  the  formation  of a cor- 
poration : one  individual,  whose  knowledge  or 
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skill  or  services  are  thought  to  be  peculiarly 
to the business,  may have  allotted  to 
him in  the  organization  of  the company a cer- 
tain number of  shares of  stock  for the services 
which he is  to perform  for the organization in 
the future;  or,  if  he is  a  promoter whose work 
has  been  of  special  service  in  putting  the or- 
ganization into a  situation to earn large profits, 
stock may be  issued  to him in  payment for ser- 
vices  already  performed.  Some  of  our  States 
forbid the issuance of stock for services;  others 
permit it.  It is readily seen how a skilful pro- 
moter,  who  may  have  succeeded  in  bringing 
together a large  company whose  profits,  on ac- 
count,  it may be,  of some monopolistic feature, 
bid  fair to be large,  may readily assume that his 
services have  been  of  great value  to the com- 
pany,  and  receive  a  large  amount  of  stock in 
consequence.  Here again,  however,  the  stock 
is  issued  largely  on  hope,  and  its  value  may 
partake of the fleeting nature of its foundation. 
If a business is  so  profitable  that it can earn 
considerably more than the rate of interest com- 
mon in the  locality  upon well-secured  loans,  it 
may be wise for  its managers to borrow money 
to enlarge  the  business.  If a  firm or corpora- 
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tion can earn 10 per cent. upon capital invested, 
it is surely profitable for  it  to increase business 
so  long  as  these  earnings  continue.  Even 
though a half  of  the capital required to furnish 
these earnings may have been  borrowed at 6 per 
cent.,  there has  been  a net gain of 4 per cent. 
When the expansion of a business,  or even per- 
haps its present success, depends, therefore, upon 
the  handling  of  comparatively  large  sums  of 
money,  it is the usual  custom to borrow a con- 
siderable  portion  of  this  capital.  Indeed it  is 
not unusual for public service corporations,  such 
as railroads,  gas  companies,  and  other  like  in- 
stitutions,  which possess  some  natural  monop- 
oly,  or which have the grant of  some franchise 
that  practically  gives  a  monopoly  of a  certain 
line  of  business,  to  borrow  enough  capital  to 
pay the entire cost of building the plant, whether 
railroad  or  factory.  If the  establishment  can 
pay anything more  than  the regular interest on 
the debt thus created,  all of the surplus may go 
as  profits  to  the  stockholders,  the  persons  in 
whom  the  legal  title  of  the  road  rests.  It  is 
not at all uncommon  for  our street railways or 
our railroads to be in debt-that  is, to be bonded 
-to  an amount fully equal to the entire cost of 
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the  road  and  its  equipment.  It is  customary 
also in  such cases for stock to be  issued  to an 
amount at least equal to the cost of building,  so 
that the railroad  thus  built,  which  can  pay the 
interest  on  its  bonds  and  pay  dividends  on  its 
stock,  gives  to the first  holders  of  the  stock a 
profit to the extent of whatever the money 
value of  the stock  may  come  to,  as well  as a 
regular annual profit of whatever dividends may 
be  paid.  This issuance  of  stock  beyond  the 
cost  value  of  the  road  is,  of  course,  what  is 
generally  known as stock watering. 
The new industrial  combinations,  which  are 
believed  by  many of  their  organizers  and  pro- 
moters to be  able  so to control  the conditions 
of the business  that  they may  possess  a virtual 
monopoly,  are also  in  many cases in a position 
to borrow in some form or other a large part of 
the capital needed  for  the creation and carrying 
on  of  the  business,  and  to  leave  their  stock 
partly  or  wholly  as  a  bonus  in  the hands  of 
those who have organized  the company, to draw 
dividends upon,  provided the company can earn 
more  than  the  interest  upon  its  bonds  and  a 
small amortization fund. 
Under  the laws  of  our  States,  of  course,  a 
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firm or corporation which fails to pay the inter- 
est  on  its  debts  is  adjudged  insolvent,  and  is 
placed  in  the hands  of a  representative  of  its 
creditors,  to be managed in their interest.  If a 
business is more or less speculative in its nature 
and is  heavily indebted,  there  is  always danger 
that in some period  of depression  it may  fail to 
pay  interest  on  its  bonds,  and  may  thus have 
the  management  taken  out  of  the  hands  of 
its  directors.  In consequence  of  this danger, 
it  has  been  customary  of  late  years  for those 
organizing the  somewhat  speculative  industrial 
combinations  to  issue  certain  classes  of  pre- 
ferred stock in lieu  of  bonds.  For example, a 
company,  the cost  value  of  whose  plants  was 
not less  than  $500,000,  might  issue  preferred 
stock  to the  extent of  f50o,ooo,  representing 
substantially cash to that amount.  If the busi- 
ness were  fairly well  managed,  it  might be ex- 
pected  that there would  be  no trouble whatever 
in paying some interest-say  6 or 7 per cent.- 
upon  this  amount  of  capital.  Persons buying 
the  preferred  stock  might  therefore  be assured 
that their  investment would  be  substantially as 
safe  as  ~f the  corporation  had  borrowed  that 
much money and issued  bonds in its stead.  In 
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case the company should fail in any one year to 
earn the full amount of the 6 or 7 per cent. in- 
terest mentioned as due the holders of    referred 
stock  before any profits  are  paid  to holders  of 
the common stock,  the company would  not  be 
adjudged bankrupt, as in the case of the issuance 
of bonds,  but the management  of  the  property 
would  still  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  stock- 
holders through their directors as before. 
The peferred  stock  is  sometimes  given  the 
still  further  advantage  of  being  cumulative- 
that is, if in any year or series of years the com- 
pany fai!s  to pay  the dividends mentioned  in the 
conditions upon which  the  stock  is  issued,  say 
the 6  or  7  per cent.,  the amount falling short 
remains as a charge upon  the future profits of the 
organization,  and no dib idends can be paid to the 
holders  of  the  common  stock  until  after  this 
charge has been met.  In  this way preferred stock 
becomes  substantially as secure in all particulars 
as bonds,  unless  there  should  be  a  later  bond 
issue.  Practically  the  only  d~fference  is  that 
in the case of the failure  of  the preferred  stock 
to secure its  dividends,  the  management of the 
company remains in the hands  of  the Board  of 
Directors;  whereas in the case of failure to pay 
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interest on bonds,  the  management of the com- 
pany is placed in the hands of a receiver. 
As has been intimated,  a  large  proportion of 
the  new industrial  combinations issue  preferred 
stock instead of bonds,  the preferred  stock often 
representing  what is supposed to be the fair cash 
value of the plants themselves.  For each share 
of preferred  stock there is  also frequently issued 
to  the  holder  thereof  one  or  more  shares  of 
common stock as a  bonus,  which  may  fairly be 
considered "  water,"  and which takes the place 
of the common  stock  so  often issued by  public 
service  corporations when  the  cost  of building 
has been substantially raised  through the selling 
of bonds.  If the  company should  be success- 
ful  in  making  large  profits,  dividends  will  be 
paid on  the  common  stock in proportion to its 
degree of success.  If the company is less suc- 
cessful, while holders of  the common stock will 
receive no dividends, they will still have a voice 
in the management or possibly indeed the entire 
management of  the business  of the corporation, 
and the fluctuating  chances  for  future business 
and future profits will give  the common stock a 
more or less range of value as time goes on. 
It is  largely  through  his  skill  in  arranging 
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all these details of  organization and of  issuance 
of stock that  the  promoter  gets his profit.  In 
most  cases,  as it  has  been  his special  labor to 
bring together  the  corporation  or the combina- 
tion of  corporations whose  profits  are largely a 
matter  for  the  future  to determine,  his  pay  is 
justly enough given him in part or altogether in 
the more speculative securities  of  the company 
organized-that  is, in common stock.  For ex- 
ample, testimony given before the United States 
Industrial Commission  seemed  to show that in 
the organization  of  the  Standard  Distilling and 
Distributing Company, for each $~oo,ooo  cash 
value  that  was  secured,  in  the form  of  either 
cash  or  tangible  property,  there  was  issued  to 
the  promoter  $150,000  in common stock.  In 
addition  to this,  $IOO,OOO  in  preferred  stock 
and $100,000 in common  stock were issued to 
the  seller  of  the  property  who  entered  into 
the  combination,  and  $~oo,ooo  preferred  and 
$150,000  of common  stock were issued to the 
underwriters,  the nature  of  whose services will 
be  spoken  of  hereafter.  It will  be  noted that 
each  $~oo,ooo  cash valued  property was  pre- 
sumed,  if  dividends  were  to be  paid,  to earn 
interest  on ~600,000.  Would  the  attempt to 
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do  this  put prices  up,  especially  if  the organi- 
zation had  some monopolistic power  ? 
An account of the organization of the Ameri- 
can Tin Plate  Company will  show one way  in 
which a promoter  may  receive  his  pay.  Most 
of the manufacturers  of  tin  plate in the United 
States,  feeling  severely the  lessening  of  profits 
that  came  from competition  and  depression  in 
business,  thought it wise to organize a combina- 
tion which should practically control the market. 
To  that  end  they  asked  Judge  William  H. 
Moore,  of  Chicago,  to aid  them.  He visited 
the different tin plate manufacturers and secured 
an option  of  purchase  for cash  at a fixed sum 
upon the plants of each one of the firms or cor- 
porations which contemplated  entering the com- 
bination.  After these options had been secured, 
Judge  Moore  organized  a  company  with  an 
authorized  capitalization  of  $~o,ooo,ooo, of 
which  about  $46,000,0oo  were  later  issued. 
For this capital stock there were to be furnished 
to  the  company  some  $~,OOO,OOO  in  cash  as 
running  capital  and  the  plants  of  all  of  the 
companies which  entered  into  the  agreement. 
It  was  understood  that  the  cash  options  on 
the  plants  amounted  to  something  less  than 
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~Ig,OOO,ooo, although as the contract was made 
with each establishment separately, and as each 
one of  the  options  was a purely  private  matter 
between  the  promoter  and  the  person  selling, 
it  was  not  publicly  known  exactly  what  sum 
was agreed  upon  for the value of  each  separate 
plant. 
It  was  understood  that  in  most  cases  the 
choice  was  given  to each  company to receive 
for  its  plants either cash or preferred stock,  of 
which the par value should be an equal amount 
with that of the cash option, together with a like 
amount of common  stock as a  bonus.  In this 
way  it  was  supposed  that  about  $18,000,000 
of  preferred  stock  and  the  same  amount  of 
common  stock  were  issued,  as  against  the 
properties and cash, whereas $1  o,ooo,ooo  more 
of common stock went  to the  promoter to pay 
him  for his services  and  for  all of the expenses 
of  getting  the  organization  together.  It was, 
of  course,  necessary  that  organization  fees, 
lawyers'  fees,  etc.,  be paid.  It was  also prob- 
ably  true  that  in  order  to raise  the  necessary 
cash  certain  commissions  had  to  be  paid  to 
bankers and others who advanced it.  It might 
have  been  also  true  that,  instead  of  the  pre- 
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ferred  and  common  stock  being  taken  on the 
terms suggested  before,  better  terms  in certain 
instances had to be  given,  and  it  is even possi- 
ble that  in  other  instances  less favorable terms 
may have been  accepted.  Inasmuch, however, 
as at the time  that  the company was organized 
one share  of  preferred  and  one  share of com- 
mon stock  together  sold  for  considerabIy more 
than $100,  it seems fair to assume that the pro- 
moter had  the opportunity of making very large 
profits indeed out  of  the $IO,OOO,OOO  in com- 
mon stock  assigned  him  for  covering  the cost 
of  formation  and  for  his  pay  for  services ren- 
dered.  It will  be  noted  that  aside  from  this 
$~o,ooo,ooo, he had the opportunity of making 
much  more if  he could make close enough bar- 
gains with those who entered into the organiza- 
tion  so  as to buy their  plants  at less  than  the 
$18,00o,ooo,  which seems  to have  been  gen- 
erally  agreed  upon  as  the  value  of  the  plants 
with  the  cash  capital;  whereas,  on  the  other 
hand,  if he could not secure them for that sum, 
his  profits  would  be  correspondingly  dimin- 
ished. 
With  the  promoter  ordinarily  works  the 
('  financier"  or the  underwriter.  If the com- 
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pany is to be a  success,  it  is necessary that the 
stock  be  sold  in  order that the  needed  capital 
in  the  form  of  either  plants  or cash,  or both, 
be  secured  to carry on  the  business.  Private 
bankers  are  ordinarily chosen  to negotiate  the 
sale  of  stocks and  bonds,  and  very  frequently 
they are persuaded also for a consideration more 
or less large  to underwrite  the stock.  By this 
underwriting " is  ordinarily  meant an agree- 
ment to secure the sale,  at a named  price,  of  a 
certain  amount  of  the  stock of  the  company. 
If  persons  not  connected  with  the  company 
or  the  banker  concerned  purchase  all  of  the 
stock  under  the agreement  at  a  price  as  high 
as that  named  in  the contract,  the  banker  has 
no  further  responsibility.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  all  has not  been  sold at the  time  agreed 
upon,  the  banker  takes  the  remainder  at  the 
rate  mentioned  and  furnishes  the  cash  to  pay 
for  it.  In that case,  his  profits  or losses  will 
depend upon the price at which  he may be able 
thereafter to sell the  stock;  or in case he holds 
it,  upon the dividends  that  may be paid by the 
company in its  regular  course of  business.  It 
is  commonly believed  that  the  sums asked  by 
the underwriter are as high or higher than those 
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of the promoter.  A banker agreeing to furnish 
millions of dollars to a company in order to en- 
able  it  to enter upon  a  line of business in  the 
way in which  its  promoters prefer,  often takes, 
of course, considerable risk, and will wish corres- 
ponding  pay.  The pay  of  the underwriters in 
the organization  of  the Standard Distilling and 
Distributing  Company  has  already been noted. 
High  officers  in  some of  the industrial combi- 
nations have stated that the cost of organization, 
including the pay of the promoter and financier, 
amounts often to from 20 to 40 per cent. of the 
total  amount  of stock  issued,  dividends having 
therefore,  if possible, to be paid upon this amount 
of  stock  at  least  in  addition  to  that  which 
represents  the  cost  value of  the plants  or the 
amounts paid for them. 
Not infrequently the work of the financier and 
that of  the  promoter  are combined,  the  profits 
depending  upon  the terms at which  the  stocks 
are bought and sold.  The  case of the Distilling 
Company  of  America  is  one  in  point.  Its 
authorized  capital  is  $55,ooo,ooo  of  7  per 
cent. cumulative preferred stock, and $70,000,- 
ooo  of  common  stock.  Of this  total  sum, 
$31,250,000  of  preferred  stock and  $46,250,- 
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oOo of  common stock were put into the hands 
of the organizers or promoters  of the combina- 
tion  for the purpose of bringing  about  the or- 
ganization.  The  company was incorporated to 
purchase  and  hold  the  stocks  of  four  existing 
companies,  each in itseIf  a combination,  and to 
secure control  of  certain  rye  distilleries.  The 
organizers  or  promoters  were to use the stocks 
placed  in  their  hands  to exchange  in  certain 
named  proportions for the entire stock  of each 
of the existing combinations, to furnish also $I,- 
~OO,OOO  in cash for working capital,  and to buy 
two rye  distilleries  owned  by the  Hannis Dis- 
tilling Company and a rye distillery in St. Paul. 
A large proportion of the stocks of these differ- 
ent companies were as a matter of fact secured, 
considerably more than go per cent. in each case. 
It was testified that the rye distilleries cost some 
$~,OOO,OOO.  If the entire stocks of all of the 
four companies had been exchanged at the rates 
agreed upon,  there would  have remained in the 
hands  of  the  organizers  $10,710,000  of  pre- 
ferred and $13,360,000  of  common  stock,  for 
which  they  were  to  secure  the  $3,~oo,ooo 
needed  for  purchasing  the  rye  distilleries  and 
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ing  capital.  At the rate  at  which  the stocks 
of  the  new  company  sold  very  soon after  its 
organization,  these  stocks  would  have  given  a 
net profit  to the  promoters  and financiers,  had 
they been  able  to sell  them promptly,  of from 
$~,OOO,OOO  to $~,OOO,OOO  for their services; 
but  one  must  remember,  of  course,  that  the 
effect on the market of  an attempt to sell these 
promptly  would  probably  have  been  very  de- 
pressing.  The speculative  nature  of  such  a 
business  is  readily  seen,  when  one  notes  that 
the stocks declined  rapidly  in  value,  so that if 
the organizers had  them  left  in  their hands six 
months later, they would have barely  sufficed to 
furnish  the  $~,~OO,OOO  necessary  to  enable 
them to fulfil their contract. 
There can  be  little  doubt  that  many of the 
promoters and financiers have in the past agreed 
to aid in the organization of industrial combina- 
tions with the hope  of  securing large profits by 
the  sale  of  stocks  without  themselves  taking 
any  material  interest  in  the  business.  This 
method of  furthering  combinations has,  beyond 
question,  proved one of  the greatest evils  con- 
nected with  them,  inasmuch  as  it  has  given  a 
decidedly  speculative  turn to industrial  stocks, 
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such  as was  found  in  the market  for  railroad 
and bonds fifteen or twenty years ago. 
Those companies that  have  been  organized 
with  a  fair  degree  of  conservatism  have  often 
assumed  or have compelled the constituent com- 
panies to pay off all their debts before the parent 
company  began  business.  The effect  of  this 
in large sections of the country has been to 
relieve many small banks of the burden of carry- 
ing, with considerable risk at times, the business 
of  these  companies.  At the same time it  has 
deprived many of these small banks of their best 
customer.  On the  other  hand,  many  of  the 
large city banks,  from underwriting or accepting 
as collateral the stocks of the new parent com- 
~anies,  find themselves carrying a heavy burden 
which it is very difficult to  shift.  The  iristability 
of  these  securities,  with the  large  numbers  of 
them thrown upon the market, has tended during 
the  last  year to make  bankers much more con- 
servative in accepting the stocks as collateral for 
loans,  or  in  attempting  to  place  the  stocks 
upon the  market;  so  that  the  worst  period of 
this speculative  organization  has,  in  all  proba- 
bility,  passed. 
Perhaps  the  worst  feature  from  the  social 
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point of  view,  connected  with  this  method of 
promotion of industrial companies, has been the 
practice  (a  practice  commonly  stated  and  be- 
lieved  to  be  exceedingly  common,  although 
rarely proved) of  securing the influence of bank 
officials-presidents,  cashiers,  or  directors- 
through the payment  to themselves individually 
of large amounts of  stocks or even  of cash,  to 
persuade their  banks  to accept  these  securities 
as  collateral  on  loans,  or  to  underwrite  the 
stocks and thus furnish  cash for the companies. 
It seems  most  unfortunately to be  true that in 
many  cases  officials  of  banks  and  trust  com- 
panies have  failed  to realize to the full the na- 
ture  of  their  trusteeship  as  it  concerns  their 
stockholders and depositors.  Nor can we over- 
look the indirect influence of such acts by these 
prominent  financiers.  The mere  fact  that  a 
prominent  bank or a successful capitalist is will- 
ing  to  invest  in  the  stock  of  a  company  is 
enough  to lead  hundreds  of  small investors to 
follow,  often to their injury.  And beyond  the 
financial  evil,  in  the long  run,  is  to be  feared 
most  of all  the lowering  of moral tone in busi- 
ness  circles  if  such practices  were to continue. 
The  essence of successful business as well as of 
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social  and  political  success of  the highest  type 
is faithfulness to a trust,  a keen sense of honor. 
This  evil  of  speculation,  coming  from  the 
work of  the promoter  and  financier,  which has 
led  to the  substantial  bribery  of  bank  officials 
and to excessive  stock watering on the part of 
the  industrial  combinations,  is  to  be  counted 
among the great evils which have attended their 
organization.  They  should  be  so  conserva- 
tively capitalized and managed  that their stocks 
will  prove as safe  an  investment as farm mort- 
gages,  and  a  far  more  convenient  one for the 
man of small means. 
7 The  Basis  of Capitalization 
CHAPTER  V1 
THE  BASIS  OF  CAPITALIZATION 
So much has been said  of late years with ref- 
erence to the evils of over-capitalization and of 
fraudulent  practices  in  connection  with  stock 
watering,  that  it  may  be  worth  while  to con- 
sider briefly  the  actual  and  the proper basis of 
capitalization  of  industries.  It  is  ordinarily 
assumed in discussion by those who are opposed 
to  what  is  generally called ('  stock watering," 
that stock ought to be issued for cash or for what 
is  called  the (l  actual cash value "  of the prop- 
erty  taken.  It  is  generally  assumed  that  the 
actual  cash  value will  represent  fairly well  the 
cost of reproduction of the properties in present 
condition  together with  needed  running capital 
in the form of cash on hand.  Such an issuance 
of stock in an ordinary manufacturing business, 
under conditions  of  fair  competition,  wiI1 give 
dividends in the long run probably not materially 
different  from,  but  perhaps  somewhat  higher 
than the usual rate of interest in the community. 
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It seems to have been the purpose of the cor- 
pation  law of Massachusetts,  and of some other 
States and countries,  to secure capitalization on 
this basis.  The  new law for Puerto Rico, lately 
passed  by  Congress,  takes  this  position,  and 
shows how conservative it has tried to make its 
action on this  subject.  In Massachusetts, not 
merely  must  the  directors  or  organizers  of  a 
corporation, part of whose stock is issued against 
property,  make oath that the property has been 
received  at  its  actual  cash value,  and  that the 
stock is issued at this rate at par,  but the Com- 
missioner of Corporations of the State must also 
certify that  he  is  satisfied  that this is the case. 
Let us note just what this means.  This is the 
capitalization  of the  plant and running capital, 
pot  necessarily that of  the  business  as  a going 
concern. 
On the  other  hand,  most  business  men are 
of  the  opinion  that  the value of  any  property 
depends upon  its  earning  capacity,  its  value as 
l  a going concern,"  and that it is wise and just 
to issue stock of  a  corporation  upon that basis. 
In the case of corporations,  such as those men- 
tioned  in the paragraph  above,  the probability  is 
that the reproduction value of  the establishment 
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would correspond closely with the capitalization 
of its earning  capacity at  current interest rates. 
On  the other hand, it must be remembered that 
much higher rates of  profit  can often be made, 
either (a) in times  of  more than  usual business 
prosperity,  or  (b)  under  exceptionally  skilful 
management,  or (c) with  the possession of con- 
siderable  monopolistic  power,  from  whatever 
source derived, whether the possession of patents, 
or of  exceptional  good-will,  or of  a  very large 
capital.  Mr.  Bryan's  dictum  that  ( '  only  in 
the case of monopoly can you  secure dividends 
upon  stock  that  does  not  represent money  in- 
vested "  is  not always strictly accurate ;  but  it 
is so generally true that  it ought carefully to be 
noted.  The  times of  prosperity  when this can 
be done without monopoly may be fleeting.  The 
exceptional skill  or the monopolistic power are 
likely  to endure  for  a  longer  season.  Under 
those  circumstances, with  any of  these  advan- 
tages,  the  corporation  might  readily  pay  divi- 
dends of  the usual  rate  of  interest  on  a  capi- 
talizatioll  twice  or  three  times  more  than the 
reproduction cash value of the plants. 
Attention is  frequently called  to the case of 
a  newspaper  with  a  tangible  property  of,  say, 
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g~oo,ooo.  Such a newspaper,  ably edited, with 
a strong constituency of subscribers and a Iarge 
patronage,  might  readily  pay  good 
dividends  on  $I,OOO,OOO  or  more.  Why 
should  the  capitalization  not  be  placed  at 
$I,OOO,OOO,  regardless of what the plant might 
cost  ?  The  earning capacity may be due largely 
to the skill of the editor,  or to the fact of con- 
nection with some political party,  or to the pecu- 
liar business skill of its  advertising manager,  or 
to the good  will gained  through many years of 
skilful catering to the public taste.  Why,  it is 
asked,  should  not  the  capitalization  be  made 
upon its  earning  capacity rather than with  ref- 
erence to the cost of the plant  ? 
Most  business  men,  as has  been  intimated, 
prefer capitalization on the basis of  earning ca- 
pacity.  In  the  first  place,  if  the  dividends 
declared  seem to be at about the normal rate of 
interest,  it conceals the actual state of the busi- 
ness from all  persons  not  so situated that they 
either  know the  details  of  the business of this 
special  establishment,  or  know  that  kind  of 
business so well that they  may readily judge the 
profits  from external signs.  This concealment 
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to enter the business, and lessens also the danger 
of popular disapproval, which is often expressed 
against those who make large profits upon capital 
invested,  even  though  such  profits  may  have 
been  made  more by  the special  individual  skill 
of the manager than by the advantage that comes 
from  the possession  of  capital.  A  prominent 
stockholder  in  a  large  gas  company  lately ex- 
pressed  the fear that it might be necessary soon 
to lower the price of his gas.  The  profits were 
becoming too large  to please  the public,  and  it 
seemed  difficult  to  find  an  excuse  for  issuirlg 
more stock, though such excuses in the past had 
been found and for a time had  served to conceal 
the rapidly  increasing profits. 
Again,  a large  capitalization  is  more  advan- 
tageous,  provided  the stockholders wish to sell. 
If in  any  line  of  securities,  for  example,  the 
stock  of  corporations  that  regularly  pay  divi- 
dends  at  6  per  cent.  stand  at  par,  those  of 
similar  nature and class of which the dividends 
are  regularly  3  per  cent.  will  usually stand  at 
more  than  50.  People seem to like to deal in 
large figures, and there is also a greater element 
of speculation present perhaps in the latter case, 
though either motive  is  probably largely an un- 
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one.  But,  because they will  sell  for 
more  usually,  a large capitalization  is often de- 
sired, even by conservative business men. 
Still  more  is  this the case  if  the  business  is 
speculative in its nature.  Doubtless the stocks 
of many industries which have been largely over- 
capitalized  are more pleasing  to speculators on 
that account.  They may not pay dividends;  it 
cannot be expected that they will pay dividends 
in  the  near  future; but  on  account  of  the in- 
stability  of  the  business,  their  fluctuations  up 
and  down  are  more  readily affected  by  rumors 
or  by other  slight influences  on the stock mar- 
ket -  and  speculation  flourishes  on  Auctua- 
tions. 
It is claimed by many that the public  is  little 
affected by  stack watering,  and  has  little  inter- 
est in  the  basis of capitalization.  If the capi- 
talization  is  high,  the value  of  the  stock  will 
be  correspondingly low,  and vice versa.  Busi- 
ness men will invest their money,  it is thought, 
on the basis of actual values, as shown by earn- 
ing  capacity,  regardless of  the par  value of the 
stocks,  and neither prices  nor investors are ma- 
terially affected,  whatever  the  basis  of  capitali- 
zation.  After a business  has  been  long estab- 
103 The Trust Problem  The Basis  of Capitalization 
lished and its  methods of  management  are well 
known,  this  contention  is  largely  true.  On 
the other hand,  when  new corporations are  or- 
ganized,  and  only  those  who  are  closely  con- 
nected  with  the  management  know  on  what 
terms properties are  purchased for  which stock 
is  issued,  there  is  great  opportunity for  decep- 
tion.  Even  a  public statement of actual earn- 
ings  of  different  corporations  for  a  series  of 
years  past  may be  so  arranged  that  the results 
will  be  decidedly misleading.  Average  profits 
over a period  of five years might well be 10  per 
cent.,  when  if  a  period  of  seven  years  were 
taken  the average would be not more than five. 
Even the profits of the last two years  might be 
nil.  The ordinary investor,  who has  not  had 
the opportunity of  studying the details of orga- 
nization,  is unable to judge. 
Even capitalization at the reproduction  value 
of  the  plants  may be  as  misleading  in  many 
ways  as  capitalization  on  supposed  earning 
capacity,  because  unskilful  management  or  a 
changing state of the market  may either  double 
the value of  the plant or  halve it  within a year 
or two,  if we  are to take as the basis of  value 
what  it  might  actually  bring  in  the  market, 
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which depends again,  as has been intimated,  on 
its earning capacity. 
There  can  be  no  doubt,  too,  that  a  high 
capitalization  brings  pressure  to  bear  upon 
officers of corporations  to raise  prices of  their 
Payment  of  dividends  is  likely  to 
seem  their  first  duty,  and  they push  prices  as 
high as the market will bear. 
The only just  method of preventing the evils 
which are  likely to come  through  the capitali- 
zation  of any establishment,  is  to  place  clearly 
and fully before all investors,  at the time of the 
organization, the plan of organization itself,  the 
amounts actually allowed for all and each of the 
properties taken into the establishment,  with as 
complete information as possible regarding these 
properties,  so that a fair judgment can be made 
regarding  both  their cost  and their  earning ca- 
pacity.  In like  manner  the  condition  of  the 
business from  year to year must  be  impartially 
set before the public,  so that its earning capacity 
can  be  fairly  known.  Whatever capitalization 
is then made at  the  beginning,  the value of  its 
stock will  in  the  main  be  based  upon  its  fair 
probable  earning  capacity,  while  the  changing 
conditions of  business  from  year to year being 
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made  fully known  would  determine with  even 
justice  among  the  different  parties  concerned 
the  changing  values. 
The chief  evils of  our over-capitalization  in 
recent  years  have  appeared  in  those  organiza- 
tions that have issued stock far beyond any rea- 
sonable likelihood  of  dividends on the common 
stock,  short of monopoly,  and whose promoters 
have  been  primarily,  not  business  men,  but 
gamblers. 
A  proposition  has  been  made  to  avoid  all 
evils connected with capitalization by  providing 
that shares of stock, representing dollars as their 
par value,  should not be  issued,  but that a plan 
reported by a committee of the New York State 
Bar  Association  should  be  adopted,  which  it 
was thought would afford a remedy for all these 
evils.  The  proposition  is as follows: 
'L  To  permit the formation of a distinct class 
of  business  stock  corporations,  whose  capital 
stock may be issued as representing proportional 
parts of the whole capital  without  any nominal 
or money value. 
"  The effect  of  such  amendment  would  be 
to provide for the  measurement  of  the  interest 
or shares of the members of  such a corporation 
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by  a statement of  proportion,  as  in case of the 
part owners of  a ship,  and  not  by  an  arbitrary 
assignment  of  money value,  which  is  delusive 
in  the  case of  every corporation  whose  capital 
stock  has  a  market  value  either  more or leas 
than its nominal par value. 
"  Such  an  amendment,  though  somewhat 
radical,  is  not altogether novel.  It embodies a 
principle  adopted  in  corporation  laws  in Ger- 
many. 
"  It  would  relieve  any  possibility  of  injury 
to the public from misleading representations as 
to  the  money  value  of  corporate  stock,  and 
would  also  relieve  from  embarrassment  con- 
scientious corporate officers  often  compelled to 
deal with legal fiction as to which they have no 
~ersonal  knowledge,  as though  it were a reality 
within their own observation."  * 
The suggestion is valuable and would  appar- 
ently  prove  effective;  but  there  is  no general 
interest  in  a  change,  and  it  is  probably,  for 
the present at least,  not practicable. 
The effect of over-capitalization  upon prices 
will be discussed briefly in a later chapter. 
* Proceedings  of  New  York State  Bar  Association, 
January, 1892,  p. 148. 
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CHAPTER  V11 
METHODS  OF  ORGANIZATION  AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Before  the  compact  combinations  of  the 
present day were  known,  various forms of  spe- 
cific agreements among independent corporations 
and individual competitors were  common,  such 
agreements  often  being  called  pools,  although 
the earnings of the different companies were not 
put into one common stock  from which  profits 
were to be distributed. 
For  some  years  before  the  organization  of 
the Whiskey Trust, competition had been very 
fierce among the different  distillers,  and  agree- 
ments  were  usually  made  from  year  to year 
which fixed the amount that each distiller should 
produce during the year.  At other times, under 
agreement, an assessment was levied which each 
distiller  should  pay  upon  each  bushel of  corn 
mashed,  in order to export the  goods  at a loss, 
and thus, by  relieving the  home  market  of  its 
surplus,  make  sufficient  provision  for  selling 
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the domestic production at a remunerative price. 
These so-called  pools were  not stable.  Ordi- 
narily, within a year,  some one of the parties to 
the  agreement  would  be  discovered  distilling 
more than his proportion of the normal output, 
and  the  result  would  be  a  break  in  the pool. 
Agreements for fixing  the price of  the prod- 
uct  or for  dividing  territory  are  perhaps  still 
more common.  A noteworthy late case is that 
of  the Addyston Pipe Company,*  in which the 
different  parties  agreed  not  to enter into com- 
petition  with  one  another.  The  contract 
was  to  be  carried  out  in  the following  way: 
a committee consisting of  a representative from 
each  corporation  entering  into  the  agreement 
set the price for each job  of work,  and the cor- 
poration  that offered  the largest  bonus  for  the 
job,  secured it, the others putting in higher bids 
to make an  apparent  competition.  It will  be 
seen that,  although in this agreement there was 
no uniform fixing  of  price or of  profits,  com- 
petition was done away with,  and the agreement 
may fairly be  considered  as  one tending to cre- 
ate a monopoly, or,  at any rate,  to bring  about 
* United States v.  Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., ri  al., 
78 Fed.  712; 85  Fed. 271 ; 175 U.  S. 211. The Trust  Problem  Organization  and  Management 
all the evil effects of a monopoly and to oppress 
the consumers. 
An agreement of a quite different  nature  has 
been  formed  among  coal dealers  in one of  our 
cities.  A committee  of  several of  the  leading 
dealers  determine the price  at which  coal  shall 
be sold by all wholesalers  and  retailers.  They 
also keep a supervision of the trade,  seeing that 
full weight is  given,  that  the quality of  coal  is 
exactly as  represented,  and  that the  consumers 
are protected  against dishonest  dealers  as  well 
as  the  dealers  against  excessive  competition. 
If any dealer  cuts the  price to  any of  his con- 
sumers,  he is heavily  fined  by  the central com- 
mittee.  If  he  refuses  to  pay  the  fine,  an 
agreement  with the mines stops  his  securing  a 
sufficient  supply of coal to meet the needs of his 
customers.  The initial  cause of  this  agree- 
ment  was  said  to  be  excessive  competition. 
Some of  the  dealers  finding  the  prices so low 
that they could not  make a  profit,  came  to the 
conclusion  that  some  must  be  giving  light 
weight.  An  investigation  and  a  re-weighing 
of several loads proved  this.  The  combination 
was  then  formed,  which  may  be  said  to exist 
primarily to protect the dealers and  incidentally 
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the consumers against  this unfair kind of  com- 
petition,  which  resulted  in  their  detriment. 
Prices are fixed at a rate  which  is said to give 
only  moderate  profits  to  retailers  and whole- 
salers,  and  fair prices  to the consumers;  while 
the  consumers,  as  has  been  said,  are secure 
against  light-weight  loads  and  poor  quality of 
coal.  It should  be  noted  that  those  who  fix 
the "  fair"  prices  are  interested  parties;  but 
experience may have shown them what is really 
wise  and  fair  for all.  All  those  dealers  who 
are willing  to conduct  their business fairly and 
honorably at the rates fixed are allowed to make 
a  reasonable  profit.  Longer  experience  may 
perhaps  show  different  results.  At  present 
reports are favorable. 
Owing to the fact  that  ordinary  pools  and 
agreements of the kind mentioned above cannot 
usually  be  well  enforced,  the  Standard  Oil 
Company iq  1882  organized  the Standard Oil 
Trust, a  torm  followed  afterward  by  the  so- 
called Whiskey Trust (the Distillers'  and Cattle 
Feeders'  Trust),  and  also  by the  Sugar Trust. 
The  form of  organization  is  substantially this: 
the stockholders of  each  of  the  separate  com- 
panies  assign  their  stock  to a certain  number 
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of trustees-seven  or  nine-giving  thus an ir- 
revocable power of attorney to these trustees to 
vote  the stock  as  they see  fit.  The trustees 
issue trust certificates to the stockholders in lieu 
of  their  assigned  stock,  and  it  is  upon  these 
certificates that profits  are divided.  All of  the 
earnings  from  all of  the different  members  of 
the combination  are  put into  a common  treas- 
ury,  and  whether  one  of  the  manufacturing 
establishments  is  running  or closed  makes  no 
difference  in the profits  received  by the  stock- 
holders of that special company.  The  trustees, 
by  having  in  their  hands  the voting  power of 
all of the separate corporations,  of  course  elect 
whatever  officers  of  the  corporations  they see 
fit,  and direct thus,  as seems to them wise,  the 
affairs of each separate corporation. 
The decision*  of  the  New York  Court of 
Appeals against the Sugar  Trust, declaring that 
the act of a corporation in thus  its stock 
into the hands of trustees and abdicating its OWR 
independent  power  of  self-direction,  was  ultra 
vires, together with  hostile  legislation  in  other 
States and an apparent  hostility  of public  opin- 
*The People of  the State of  New York v. The North 
River Sugar Refining Co.,  121 N.  Y.,  582. 
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ion,  led the old Trusts to give up this  form of 
organization  and  to reorganize.  The Sugar 
Trust  and  the  Whiskey  Trust  organized  as 
individual  corporations,  the  certificate  holders 
becoming  stockholders  in  a  new  corporation 
which  owned  all  of  the plants  that  had  been 
owned  by  the  individual  corporations  before 
the  formation  of  the  Trust.  In both  cases 
there was  substantially  no change in  the man- 
agement,  the trustees  of the former Trust be- 
coming  directors  of  the  new  corporation  and 
the  officers  of  the  new  corporation  remaining 
substantially  the  same  as  the  oficers  of  the 
Trust.  It was a  change in name,  a change in 
technical  legal  form, but  no  change as regards 
the practical  management of  the organization. 
The Standard Oil Trust followed  a different 
plan.  It so happened that the  nine trustees of 
the Trust owned  a large  majority of  the Trust 
certificates.  The Trust  then  dissolved  into 
separate corporations,  the holders of  Trust cer- 
tificates being given  shares pro rata in each one 
of the twenty corporations into which the Trust 
was  divided.  Inasmuch,  however,  as  the  for- 
mer trustees then owned a majority of the stock 
in each  one of these  twenty different  corpora- 
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tions,  they  were  enabled,  without  any  formal 
organization  among  themselves,  to direct  the 
affairs of  all  these  corporations  in  perfect  har- 
mony just  as  efficiently as they had done while 
acting as trustees  and  holders  of  a  majority of 
the Trust certificates.  Here,  again,  there was 
a  change in form;  but  in  this case,  instead of 
the Trust becoming  a single corporation,  it be- 
came  twenty corporations,  the  majority of  the 
stock in each being held in the same few hands, 
and  all of  the  corporations  being  managed  in 
perfect harmony. 
A comparatively late change in this company 
of a different kind has been  made.  One of the 
separate  corporations,  the  New Jersey corpora- 
tion,  has  increased  its  stock,  and  so  arranged 
that  it  can take  control  of  the business  of  all 
of the different companies.  The  stocks of  the 
separate  companies are therefore now being ex- 
changed  gradually  for  the  stock  of  the New 
Jersey  corporation,  and  in the  course  of  time 
it is expected that this one corporation will own 
all of  the stocks of  the  twenty different  corpo- 
rations,  so that the  management will thereafter 
be  not  merely  practically one,  but also techni- 
cally and  legally one  under the directors of one 
corporation,  they voting  all the stock of each of 
the  corporations.  It is practically  a  return  to 
the Trust form in all but name. 
A voting Trust, somewhat different from the 
kinds of  Trusts  described  before,  is  also  fre- 
quently found.  In this form the Trust applies 
ordinarily only to one corporation.  The  hold- 
ers of a majority of the stock of this corporatio~~ 
put into the hands of some few trustees or pos- 
sibly of a trust company the voting power of the 
stock,  with specific  instructions  in  certain  in- 
stances as to the way in  which this  stock  is to 
be  voted  and the affairs of  the corporation  car- 
ried on.  In other cases  the  power is  left to 
the trustees to carry on the business of  the cor- 
poration  as  seems  to  them wise  in  accordance 
with a  certain general  line of  policy laid  down 
beforehand.  The individual  shareholders  may 
then pledge or sell or dispose of  their  stock  in 
whatever way  seems to them best,  but  the vot- 
ing power remains in the hands of the trustees. 
The  purpose  of  such  a  voting  Trust is,  of 
course, to secure continuity of the policy which, 
for whatever reason,  the stockholders prefer.  In 
some cases  it  may be  that  the  majority of  the 
stockholders of the original  corporation think it 
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desirable to devote all the earnings for a specific 
period to the improvement of the property instead 
of  to the  payment  of  dividends.  It might  be 
impossible  to  continue  such  a  policy  with  a 
shifting body  of  stockholders,  many  of  whom 
might  wish  to receive  annual  dividends.  If, 
however,  the stock  can be transferred,  but the 
voting power remain in a few hands,  the policy 
can be carried out consistently for a fixed period 
of years. 
In the  case  of  the  Pure Oil  Company and 
other competitors of the Standard Oil Company, 
it  was  thought  desirable  to place  the majority 
of  the stock in the hands of a  few trustees,  be- 
cause many stockholders felt that otherwise the 
Standard  Oil  Company  might  in  time  buy 
from individual stockholders a controlling num- 
ber  of  shares,  and  thus  succeed  in  absorbing 
more or less  completely one of  its chief  rivals. 
It is claimed  by the managers of  the  Pure  Oil 
Company that,  owing to experience  with  some 
other  companies,  they  had  reason  to  believe 
that this  was the  purpose  of the  Standard  Oil 
Company,  and,  in  consequence,  the  Pure Oil 
Company had  its stock placed  in the  hands  of 
a voting Trust. 
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It will  be  noticed  that  in all of  these cases 
the  difference  between  this  form  of  voting 
Trust  and  the  original  Trust  as  seen  in  the 
case  of  the  Sugar  Trust,  is  that  in  the  later 
cases  provision is made  simply for the manage- 
ment  in  a  specific  way of  the  affairs  of  some 
one  corporation,  whereas in  the other  case  the 
intention of  the Trust was  to  unite  many dif- 
ferent corporations under  a  single  management 
and  possibly  in certain cases to secure  a virtual 
if  not a complete monopoly of the output. 
After the  dissolution  of  the  old Trusts, the 
form of organization  into one great  corporation 
that  should  own  the  separate  plants,  became 
most common.  Under that form, as, for exam- 
ple,  in  the  case  of  the  organization  of  the 
American  Tin Plate  Company or  of  the  Na- 
tional Steel Company, each one of  the separate 
corporations sold its plant outright to  a new cor- 
poration,  and  the original corporation  then dis- 
solved.  When the combination was completed, 
there remained  in existence  only the one great 
corporation owning the plants that had  belonged 
before  to  the  separate  corporations or to indi- 
vidual  partnerships or owners.  In no essential 
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corporation  differ from that of the separate cor- 
porations which had  preceded  it. 
The form of organization that seems to have 
become  most  common within  the  last  year  or 
two  is  one  that  is  closely  allied  to  the  old 
Trust form  in its essential character.  In this 
case,  when a combination  is  about  to be  per- 
fected, a new  corporation  is formed whose pur- 
pose it is to buy up all,  or at least a controlling 
share, of the stock of all of the separate corpora- 
tions that are to come together.  The different 
corporations then  maintain  their  separate  legal 
existence,  but  their  stock  is  held  by the one 
company.  The officers of the great corporation 
having thus  in  their  hands  the  control  of  the 
stock  of  all  of  the  separate  corporations,  and 
voting  that  stock  as  they  see  fit,  elect,  of 
course,  from year to year the directors of all of 
the corporations,  and thus by  this absolute con- 
trol of the officers, direct the affairs of the differ- 
ent corporations.  In some cases  the ('  parent 
corporation "  (so called,  though  born from  the 
others),  besides  owning  the stock of  the  indi- 
vidual  corporations,  owns  also  independently 
some properties of  its own; but  in  other cases 
the  parent  corporation  owns  only  the  stock 
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of the separate ones which have entered into the 
combination.  The profits  of  the  individual 
corporations  are  made,  of  course,  as  before; 
their  dividends  are  declared;  and  these  divi- 
dends are the only source of profit of the parent 
corporation. 
While  this  form  of  combination  probably 
doubles the total capitalization  in par of stocks, 
it  shouid  be  noted  that  there  is  no  increase 
in  capital,  and  that  there  need  be  no  stock 
watering-although  there  often  is.  Neither 
need  there  be  any more  speculative  securities 
created.  This fact  is  often  overlooked  by 
those who are appalled  by  the  huge  capitaliza- 
tion  of  industries  during  the  past  few years. 
While  new  companies  have  formed,  old  ones 
have  died  that  they  might  live,  or  the  con- 
stituent  companies  pay  all  their  dividends 
to the  parent  company to enable  it  to  pay  its 
bills.  In this way the earnings of the separate 
corporations  are  pooled  as  effectively  as  they 
were  in the  old  Trust.  The management  is 
kept  as  effectively  in  the  hands  of  the  offi- 
cers.  The only difference  seems to be  a legal 
one.  The parent  corporation  now  owns the 
stock  of  the  different  corporations.  In  the 
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other case a Board of  Trustees  held  this stock 
in trust without themselves having any separate 
legal corporate organization.  These new  cor- 
porations are,  it  is true,  amenable to the courts 
in a somewhat  more  direct way  than were  the 
former trustees; otherwise there seems to be no 
essential difference  between these two forms of 
combination.  In this later form of combination 
the  constituent  companies  have  their  separate 
boards  of directors,  their separate officers,  and 
carry on their business independently,  managing 
it,  however,  under the general  direction of the 
officers of the parent  company.  It follows of 
necessity  that  the  work  of  all  the  different 
corporations is carried on harmoniously.  Some 
one  of  them  may  have  its  plants closed for  a 
time in order  to suit  the  supply of  product  to 
the demand; on the other hand it  may even be 
that  prices  will  be  fixed by the officers  of  the 
several companies;  but in case of need they can 
always be readily controlled. 
It should be noted  that among  these  various 
forms of  combinations  there  are two kinds,  as 
was  indicated  earlier  in  Chapter  11,  essen- 
tially  different  in  nature.  The first  is  made 
up  of  companies  that  have  been  active  com- 
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petitors  before  the  combination  was  made,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  original  Sugar  Trust and 
Whiskey Trust.  In  these cases the combination 
was sought for the special  purpose of  lessening 
competition,  together with  the  elimination  of 
the  competitive  wastes.  The  combination 
simply  took  different  competitors  out  of  the 
market  and  enabled  the  price  of  the  product 
to be fixed by the central organization. 
In  the second kind of combination, the constit- 
uent members  have often not  been competitors 
in the same line of work before the combination 
was made,  though they each seek a share of the 
value of the final product.  Instead of being com- 
petitors in the same line of  business,  they have 
been producers of different products  at different 
stages in the same industry.  For example,  the 
Federal Steel Company is a combination of sev- 
eral companies that were not competitors.  The 
Minnesota Iron Company owns  iron  ore prop- 
erty,  also the Duluth and Iron  Range  Railroad 
Company, which connects its mines with  Lake 
Superior at two points.  It owns ore docks and 
also twenty-two steel lake vessels that can carry 
a  large  proportion  of  its  products  each  year. 
The  Federal Steel Company bought all its stock, 
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It also bought all of the stock of the Lorain Steel 
Company,  which manufactures chiefly steel rails 
for street  railways,  although  some steel  billets ; 
it  bought  all  the  stock of  the  Johnson  Com- 
pany, which is engaged chiefly in manufacturing 
frog switches and  crossings for street railroads, 
as well as  electric motors.  Another company, 
all the stock of  which it  purchased,  is the  Illi- 
nois  Steel  Company with several  plants,  which 
pig iron,  steel  rails,  steel  billets,  steel 
plates,  etc.  This company is  also the owner 
of  the  stock  of  the Chicago,  Lake  Shore  and 
Eastern  Railway,  which  connect  its plants  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Chicago,  and  also  gives 
these plants an outlet to the general market over 
all of the railroads in the country.  It  also owns 
large tracts of  coal  property on which it manu- 
factures  coke  used  in  its  plants.  From  this 
statement it will  be seen that the  Federil Steel 
Company by  its  formation  lessened  only  to a 
very slight extent,  if at  all,  the  competition  in 
the same lines which  had  existed  before.  Its 
purpose was different.  Through the combina- 
tion  the  mines  are  furnished  with  a sure cus- 
tomer,  provided they need one, for a large part at 
least of their output ;  while,  on the other hand, 
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the Illinois Steel  Company, in  its  manufacture 
of steel rails,  billets,  etc.,  is assured of a steady 
supply of its ore for the carrying on of  its manu- 
facture.  In this  way  contracts  can  be  taken 
for a  long  period of time  in advance  with per- 
fect certainty of their being  carried out on time 
without  any excessive  losses  that  might other- 
wise  come from  possibIe  changes  in  the price 
of  ore.  Before  the  organization,  of  course, 
each  of  these  separate  companies  tried  to get 
the  largest  share  possible  of  the  value  of  the 
finished  product.  Now,  while  the  contest 
may be  the  same,  the motive  has  been  weak- 
ened.  The profit  which  the  mine  foregoes, 
may  be  made  by  the  rolling  mill  or the  fleet 
of  transports.  It is,  of course,  true  that  the 
business  of  each  one  of  these  separate  com- 
panies  is  managed  independently;  it  is  still 
further true that at times  the  mining  company 
can  sell  its  ore  to better  advantage to outside 
manufacturers  than  to  the  other  constituent 
members  of  the  Federal  Steel  Company,  they 
in  turn  buying  their  ore  to better advantage 
from some  other  mine.  But,  while  the  work 
can  be  ordinarily  and  is  ordinarily  carried  on 
independently,  and  while  at  times each of  the 
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separate  constituent  companies  deals  largely 
with  outsiders,  this  perfect  union  in manage- 
ment  enables them to be secure  at all times as 
regards  the supply of  raw  material on  the  one 
hand,  and a proper  sale of  the raw product on 
the other,  advantages that can  by  no means be 
lost sight of. 
Some  other  companies  without  any  formal 
organization  are  managed  in  largely the same 
way.  For example,  the American  Tin Plate 
Company,  the  National  Steel  Company,  and 
the American Steel  Hoop  Company,  while en- 
tirely  independent  in  their  organization,  have 
nevertheless  to  a  considerable  extent the same 
men  as  large  stockholders  and  as  directors. 
While  each  one can thus work  independently, 
and while  legally  each one does so work,  there 
is to a considerable extent the same knowledge 
on the part of  each of the business of the other 
and the same harmonious working that is found 
among the constituent companies of the Federal 
Steel  Company, of  the Distilling  Company of 
America, and of others that have united through 
the holding of the stock of the constituent com- 
panies by  one parent  company. 
Whatever the form of organization, however, 
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the  one  essential  requirement is efficiency  and 
an opportunity for saving any of the waste that 
might  come  if  the  different  corporations  or 
were working  independently.  It is 
desirable,  of course, from the one point  of view 
that  this efficiency be used to serve the public 
in  the  way  of  better  goods  and  lower  prices. 
On the other hand,  from the standpoint of the 
combination  itself,  the efficiency points simply 
to the cheaper cost of  production  and the more 
efficient control of  the process of  manufacture, 
whereas the service to the public in the way of 
cheaper prices is of course a secondary considera- 
tion, and is sometimes even contrary to the wish 
of the corporation. 
The form of  organization  will naturally de- 
termine to a considerable  extent the  method of 
management  of  one  of  these  combinations. 
Ordinarily there is no difference  in  appearance 
between  the management of a large corporation 
called  a  Trust  and  any  ordinary  corporation. 
Any student of  corporation  law,  upon  reading 
the  charter  and  by-laws,  can  readily tell  from 
the power that is put  into the hands of  the di- 
rectors whether they are in a position  to manage 
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those of the stockholders, or whether the stock- 
holders  are given power of control. 
If one may judge from the fluctuations of the 
shares  of  several  of  these  larger  corporations 
on the Stock Exchange,  it  would  seem that the 
power at any rate is given to the directors so to 
maniDulate the stock that they as individuals, by  -- 
buying and selling  at suitable  times,  may make 
large  individual  profits  at  the  expense  of  the 
majority of the stockholders-a  most dangerous 
power. 
In  the first  place,  the  stockholders  in  many 
rases are prevented by  the by-laws  from having 
access to the  books of  the corporations,  except 
under  the  most  extreme circumstances.  The 
directors  make  no  reports  to the stockholders 
that give them any clear  insight  into the meth- 
ods  of  management  of  the  business,  and  the 
public  who  may be  intending  to invest in the 
stock have no means of judging  what the finan- 
cial condition of the corporation is.  When the 
charter  and  by-laws  thus  enable  a  board  of 
directors to conceal  absolutely  from the stock- 
holders the condition of  the  business,  one  may 
at  least  be justified  in  the  opinion  that if  the 
affairs of  the corporation  are  not  managed  for 
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speculative  purposes  by  the  directors,  it is  be- 
cause  they are  men  above  temptation of  that 
kind. 
In some instances,  also,  the Boards of Direc- 
tors  are  so  classified  and  the  terms  of  their 
office so arranged  that  those  who  are  first  put 
into  control  as  directors  by the  organizers of 
the company may keep that control for a period 
of years without any possibility of  being ousted 
by  the  shareholders,  unless  their  methods  of 
management  are so palpably  fraudulent that the 
courts will  order  their removal.  Under those 
circumstances  the  directors  and  officers  are 
in  a  position  of  strong  temptation to manage 
business  in  their  own  interests  with  compara- 
tively little danger of being found out for a con- 
siderable  length  of  time.  Here,  again,  an 
investor who sees in the articles of incorporation 
and  by-laws  provisions  which  deprive him and 
his  fellow  shareholders  of  all effective  power 
over  the  directors  for  a  period  of  years,  buys 
the stock knowing his own risk. 
It is not intended,  of course,  to overlook the 
fact  that too great  power  given  to  the  share- 
holders,  or too close a knowledge of the interior 
management  of  a  corporation  by  the  share- 
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holders,  may easily result in injury to the inter- 
ests of  the great majority of  them.  It is not 
desirable for a corporation  to have its competi- 
tors  know the  details of  its  management.  If 
any shareholder were  at liberty to examine  the 
books of the corporation at  any time,  or  if  the 
directors were  compelled  to give to the share- 
holders  the  privilege  of  examining closely  the 
details of their management,  it would be a com- 
paratively easy matter for the manager of a rival 
company to buy a few shares of  stock  in order 
that the lawful and  proper secrets of the corpo- 
ration  might  become  his.  It  would  also be 
possible  for an individual shareholder practically 
to levy a blackmail upon the corporation, which it 
will promptly, however unwillingly, pay, in order 
to prevent proper  secrets  of  management  from 
becoming  public  property.  While  one  may 
readily  grant that these dangers to the real wel- 
fare of a corporation exist if  too great  power  is 
given to the shareholder,  one must not overlook 
the fact that the other extreme  is  no less  dan- 
gerous. 
It would  be  very  desirable  if  more  careful 
study were made of  the forms  of  organization, 
as shown  in  the charter and by-laws  of  corpo- 
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Intending  investors  would  in  many 
cases by  such  study be  prevented  from putting 
their  money  into  corporations  organized  evi- 
dently  for  purposes  of  speculation,  or for  the 
special  advantage  of  the  directors  and  officers 
against the interests of the shareholders. 
So,  too,  if more attention were  paid  to this 
feature  of  corporation  organization  and  man- 
agement,  there would  soon be some decided im- 
provements in our corporation laws. 
Of  course these  statements  regarding Trusts 
apply to all  large  corporations,  but  the  oppor- 
tunities  for speculation  against  the interests of 
the shareholders and of the public are so much 
greater  in  the  case  of  the very  large  corpora- 
tions, which have some monopolistic power, that 
the offence becomes almost of a different  kind. 
9 CHAPTER  V111 
PRICES 
If in  any industrial  combination  the  econo- 
mies which are  made  by  saving  the  wastes  of 
competition  can be  secured,  it  is evident that, 
if  the managers of  the  combination  wish,  it  is 
possible,  without the  profits  being lessened,  to 
put  prices  of  the  finished  product  below  for- 
mer  competitive rates;  or,  on  the  other hand, 
to  put  prices  for  raw  material  above  those 
common before.  Or again,  if,  as  a  result  of 
the combination,  there comes an increased  out- 
put from  the  demands of  the  export  trade  or 
from an added  demand  that  might  come  from 
lowered  cost,  the  price  paid  for  raw  material 
might  through  either  of  these  influences  be 
raised  somewhat.  What may be done if a cer- 
tain degree of monopoly can be held,  has already 
been  discussed  at  considerable  length  in  the 
chapter  on  Monopoly.  What  may  be  done 
is,  however,  but one consideration.  It is,  per- 
haps,  of more importance at the present date to 
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what has been done,  in order that we may 
be  better  able  to  judge  the  present  industrial 
&uation,  to  note  possible  changes  in  the  fu- 
ture,  and  to see  what  measures of  legislation, 
if  any,  may be needed  in  order  to adapt these 
combinations to our  present  industrial  condi- 
tions.  It  will,  perhaps,  be  best  to give  as 
careful a statistical representation as possible of 
the prices over a series of  years  in several lines 
of industry where the statistics can be gathered, 
and  thus  to  test  the  effects  of  the industrial 
combinations  upon  prices.  While the effects 
can thus be shown here upon only a few articles, 
it is believed  that they are sufficiently typical, so 
that they represent fairly well  the actual effects 
of  combination up to date.  Similar  studies of 
many other articles show, in the main, the same 
general results.  From a theoretical discussion we 
can judge,  perhaps,  somewhat more  accurately 
what the effect is likely to be in the future. * 
The actual  effects of  the industrial combina- 
tions upon prices form certainly one of the best 
* The remainder of  this chapter has been reprinted, with 
some changes  and additions, from the chapter written by 
the author for the United  States Industrial  Commission, 
and printed in their Preliminary Report on Trusts, Vol. I., 
Part I., PP.  39-57. 
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tests  of  their  usefulness or disadvantage to so- 
ciety.  The popular  impression seems to be that 
these combinations very greatly increase prices to 
the  consumers.  On  the other hand, the Trust 
managers  and  their  advocates  are in  the  habit 
of claiming  that,  owing  to economies  of man- 
agement, the Trusts lower prices to consumers, 
while at the same  time they increase the wages 
of their employ5s. 
It is,  of  course,  comparatively  easy  by  the 
selection of  statistics  at  certain  chosen  periods 
to show either of these results.  It has, in con- 
sequence, seemed wisest to secure as far as pos- 
sible average monthly prices  of  the leading raw 
materials and finished products of several of the 
larger combinations  for a series of years,  and to 
plat these on  charts  in  such a way that the re- 
lations at all times between the two can be most 
readily  seen.  Wherever  it  has  been  practica- 
ble,  European prices  have  been  compared with 
American,  in  order  that  the  influence  of  the 
Trust itself might more  clearly be brought out. 
The differential  or "  margin " between  the 
price of  the  raw materials  and  that of  the fin- 
ished product  should  show,  other things equal, 
the cost of  manufacture  plus  the  profit.  Un- 
137- less one is  somewhat  guarded,  however,  one is 
likely to reach false conclusions, if this assump- 
tion  is  made without  qualification.  In nearly 
all processes of manufacture there is a consider- 
able  element  of  waste  raw  material.  As  the 
price  of  the  raw  material  increases,  the  value 
of this waste  is  also  correspondingly increased. 
In consequence,  in  order  that  the  profits  may 
be  the  same,  the  margin  between  the price of 
the raw  material  and  that of  the  finished  pro- 
duct  should  generally increase  slightly with the 
increase  in  price of  the  raw material.  Again, 
when  the  raw material  has  to be  held  in  large 
quantities,  so that  it  involves the investment of 
considerable capital,  it can  be  readily seen that 
the interest charge for carrying this raw material 
is  not  a  little increased as the price of  the raw 
material  rises.  This, of  course,  is a  factor of 
less importance than the other, but nevertheless 
is worthy of consideration. 
Sugar * 
The lines  on  the  chart  represent  standard 
raw  and  refined  sugars  in the  United  States, 
* The prices from which the chart has been  made were 
taken  from  Willett  and  Gray's  Statistical  Sugar  Trade 
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England,  and  Germany.  For  America  raw 
sugar is  represented  by  96O  centrifugal,  and re- 
fined  by  granulated.  The English  raw sugar, 
Java Afloat, corresponds closely with the Ameri- 
can  960  centrifugal ; but  the  English  refined 
sugar,  Tate's  Cubes,  is  a  special grade,  which 
normally brings  somewhat  more than the regu- 
lar  price  of  granulated  sugar-at  times,  prob- 
ably,  nearly  half  a  cent  more.  The conse- 
quence  is  that  we  should  expect  the  margin 
between the  raw and  refined  in  England to be 
somewhat  greater  than  the  American  margin 
between 96O  centrifugal and granulated. 
The German  sugars  shown,  both  raw  and 
refined,  are  of  somewhat  poorer  quality  than 
the  American  sugars.  The margin  between 
them,  other  things  equal,  would  be,  perhaps, 
not quite so great as that between the American 
raw and  refined.  The fact  that  it is  so much 
less  is  due  in  part,  doubtless,  to the  German 
Tournal.  In  the Journal,  English and German prices were 
given  in shillings and  pence  per  hundredweight of  IIZ 
pounds.  They have  been  reduced  to cents per pound  in 
order that comparisons might be more readily made, and the 
chart more easily platted.  The convenient rule for ~educ- 
tion given  in the Journal of  January 4,  1900, from which 
the prices of  foreign suga s are taken, has been followed. 
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bounty on the exportation of  refined  sugar.  It 
is also probable,  if  one  may accept the opinion 
of sugar experts, that the cost of refining in Ger- 
many is somewhat less than here, and that under 
normal  conditions  the  Germans  are  satisfied 
with a somewhat smaller profit. 
The effect  of  the  sugar  combination  upon 
prices of sugar can perhaps be most readily seen 
from the course of line C,  which represents the 
perpendicular  distance  between  line  B,  repre- 
senting 96O  centrifugal  sugar,  and  line A,  rep- 
resenting granulated sugar, both of them whole- 
sale  prices  in  the  New  York  markets.  The 
distance,  then,  of  C  from  the  bottom  of  the 
chart represents  the  cost of  refining,  including 
selling  cost,  plus  the  profits.  The line  F  in 
the same way  represents the English cost of re- 
fining,  plus  the  profits,  it  being  remembered, 
however,  that  the  English  refined  sugar  is  of 
a  somewhat  higher  grade  than  the  American 
granulated.  The line F,  it will  be  noted,  ran 
somewhat  above  one  cent a pound,  perhaps on 
an average between  a  cent  and a quarter and a 
cent and  a  half,  from  1880 to 1887,  the time 
of  the  formation  of  the  Sugar  Trust  in  the 
United States.  There seemed  to be  no lower- 
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ing in this English margin during the years 1883 
to 1887.  From  the  beginning  of  1888 on to 
1894 this  line  seems  to have lowered  slightly, 
but,  on the whole,  to have  remained  about the 
same.  From 1894 to date there seems to have 
been  again another lowering, the line represent- 
ing,  on  the  whole,  since  that  date  something 
less than one cent a pound. 
On  the other hand,  line C shows that during 
the  years  from  1883  to  1887  there  had  been 
a  very  decided  lowering  in  this  margin  in  the 
United  States,  owing,  of  course,  to vigorous 
competition  among  the  independent  refiners. 
From  the testimony given  by  witnesses  before 
the Industrial Commission, this competition was 
so very destructive in its nature that a large per- 
centage  of  the American  refiners,  as has  been 
said--eighteen  out of about forty-had  failed. 
In 1887 the Trust was formed.  The mar- 
gin  was  immediately  raised  more  than  half  a 
cent  a  pound,  at  times  even  fully one  cent  a 
pound.  During the two years  1888 and 1889, 
when one takes into account the  lessened  cost 
of manufacture that came from the organization 
of  the  combination,  one  may  fairly judge  that 
the Trust made enormous profits. 
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The margin  fell  again  in the latter part  of 
1889.  This was owing to the fact  that  large 
competing  refineries,  especially those  built  by 
Claus Spreckels at Philadelphia,  had  entered the 
field.  For  rather  more  than two years,  while 
this vigorous competition continued,  the margin 
fell  back  to a  point  substantially as low as had 
existed before  the  formation of the Trust.  In 
February,  1892, the Trust bought up the  com- 
peting refineries, and the margin was at once put 
back to the non-competitive height.  From the 
years  1892 to 1898 this margin remained,  rela- 
tively speaking,  high,  with,  as will  be  noted,  a 
slight  gradual  lessening,  owing  presumably  to 
the improvements in refining and the consequent 
lessened  cost,  with  possibly a  growing  realiza- 
tion  of  the  danger of  inducing  new capital to 
enter the business.  Throughout all these years, 
with the exception of the time when there existed 
vigorous competition between the Trust and the 
Spreckels refineries,  it will be noted that, on the 
whole, there was a close correspondence between 
the  English  margin  and  the  American,  the 
changes in the duty upon  sugars  having  appar- 
ently  only  a  slight  temporary effect  upon  this 
margin, although the removal of the duty on raw 
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sugar  by  the  McKinley tariff  affected  very  de- 
cidedly the price of sugar to consumers. 
In the latter part  of  1898 vigorous competi- 
tion against the American Sugar Refining Com- 
pany (the reorganized  Trust) began  on the part 
of Arbuckle Brothers, Claus Doscher, and others. 
Prices were immediately  cut so that  the  margin 
between raw and refined  sugar has  fallen  again 
very  decidedly.  Instead  of  standing from  75 
cents  to $I per  hundred  pounds,  as had  been 
the case  most  of  the  time  during  the  three  or 
four years preceding,  it has remained  during the 
last  year  at  but  little  above  50  cents,  and  at 
times has been even below that, with at present, 
in June,  1900,  a considerable increase. 
This study of the chart, then, especially when 
we compare the American with the English and 
German margins,  shows clearly this : The  sugar 
comb~nation  has, beyond question, had the power 
of  determining  for  itself,  w~thin  considerable 
limits,  what the price of sugar should be,  low or 
high,  with  or  without  competitors,  although 
when there  has  been  competition it has chosen 
to cut prices to drive  out its  rivals  rather  than 
to run  the  risk  of  letting  them  gradually take 
its market on account of its high prices.  Dur- 
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ing  about nine of  the twelve  years which have 
passed  since  the  organization  of  the  Trust, 
the margin  between  raw and  refined  sugara has 
been considerably higher  than  it  was  for  three 
years before the Trust was  organized,  and  than 
it  has  been  during  the  three years  when there 
has been vigorous competition. 
The combination  forced  the  fighting  so se- 
verely  against  Mr.  Spreckels  as a  competitor 
that he was apparently glad to sell out after about 
two  years.  The present  contest between  the 
Trust and its opponents has continued  for more 
than a year and a half,  and at present  shows no 
sign  of  ending  but this,  that,  with perhaps the 
exception  of  Arbuckle  Brothers,  the opposition 
refineries have  been  run at far below their  full 
capacity,  have  stopped  entirely  at  times,  and 
presumably  have  been  making  practically  no 
~rofits,  and  that  now  they are  making a  com- 
bination among themselves. 
The chart seems  to show also that the Trust 
has had  very little,  if any,  effect toward  steady- 
ing prices.  The fluctuations,  both in the price 
of sugar and  in  the margin,  seem to be  fully as 
great since the  combination was  formed  as  be- 
fore,  and  to  be  rather greater,  on  the whole, 
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than the fluctuations in the English or the Ger- 
man market. 
The assertion  often  made  that the  price  of 
sugar would have been higher if  it had not been 
for the formation of the  Trust seems to have a 
partial,  but  only  a  partial,  justification  in  the 
chart.  The chart does make  it  perfectly clear 
that during periods of the most vigorous competi- 
tion the sugar refiners were doing their work on a 
very low margin.  The  large number of refiner- 
ies that went into bankruptcy before the  forma- 
tion of the Trust seems to show clearly that the 
margin  was  ruinously low.  While  it  is  prob- 
ably for the economic advantage  of  the country 
that  the  weakest  competitors be  forced  out  of 
business from time to time,  it can hardly be con- 
sidered for the benefit of  the country that  com- 
petitors  of  substantially  equal  strength  carry 
competition so far that all are running at a loss, 
and  that  a  large  percentage  of  them  go  into 
bankruptcy.  When  competition  is  so  fierce, 
the inevitable result of its continuance would be 
that, as Mr. Post, a rival of the Trust, says, the 
few who  survive  would  be  able,  owing  to the 
lessened  supply,  to  put  prices  at  considerably 
above usual competitive rates,  and would be en- 
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couraged  to do so,  because they could not well 
supply the demand.  Unrestricted  competition, 
then, among powerful rivals in an industry of this 
character would thus lead, it ufould seem, to very 
great fluctuations in prices from those abnormally, 
not to say ruinously, low to  those abnormally high. 
One ought  not  to fail to note that in indus- 
tries of this class,  under present  methods of do- 
ing  business,  one  can  scarcely  with  propriety 
speak  of  a  competitive rate that is in any sense 
normally  uniform.  The  normal  price " of 
economists has been based upon cost of produc- 
tion under a system of competition among small 
capitalists.  From  what  has  just  been shown, 
it appears that in an industry like that of  sugar- 
refining competition will first force all  to sell at 
a  rate that is below cost  for many,  perhaps all, 
refiners,  until many fail.  Then the short sup- 
ply  for  a  period of  years,  if  no combination is 
made, will enable all those surviving to reap large 
profits  from  high  prices,  till  new capital,  after 
months  or years,  is  tempted  into the business. 
Then prices  fall  again  below  cost.  It would 
seem that in such an industry the real rate under 
competition, if the almost inevitable combination 
were  not made,  would be first below cost,  then The Trust  Problem  Prices 
far  above  it,  then  below  again,  and  thus  con- 
tinuously in  cycles.  There is  no normal level 
of competitive price based on cost of production. 
While there does seem, from this  thought, to 
be this partial  justification  for the claim that the 
Trust may have lowered the price of sugar on the 
whole below what it would have been for a time 
had the combination never been formed, the rela- 
tive steadiness of  the English  margin at a point 
which,  in the main,  seems lower than ours, con- 
sidering  the  higher  grade  of  English  refined 
sugar,  as  well  as the exceedingly  high  margin 
found frequently in the United  States since  the 
organization  of  the Trust and  the large profits 
of  the  American  Sugar  Refining  Company, 
would  seem to show that  the price of  sugar in 
this  country has  probably,  on  the  whole,  been 
rather higher than  it would have been had  most 
refiners  been  willing  to take but  a  small  profit 
above. the  cost  of  refining,  and  certainly  con- 
siderably  higher  than it  would  have been  under 
conditions  of  competition  such as have existed 
during the last two years. 
A  still  further  fact which  leads  to the same 
conclusion is that Mr. Havemeyer, the president 
of the American Sugar Refining Company, seems 
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unwilling to concede that the cost of refining  is 
as low as his competitors assert.  Mr. Jarvie,  of 
Arbuckle Bros.,  says that with a margin  of from 
50 to 60  cents sugar can be refined without loss. 
Mr. Doscher agrees,  saying that it  can  be done 
without loss when the margin is 50.  Mr.  Post 
places the margin somewhat higher, but concedes 
that  a  large establishment like the Trust would 
have  an advantage  of  from 3 to 5 cents a hun- 
dred pounds in refining.  Mr. Havemeyer, on the 
other hand,  puts 50 cents a hundred as the bare 
cost of refining,  and declares that 24 cents more 
at least must be added on account of  the waste 
in  raising  sugar  from  96'  to  IOO',  the polari- 
scope test of the  refined,  thus making the mar- 
gin necessary for profit some 75 cents a hundred, 
instead of from 50  to 60.  Apparently he thinks 
it wise to reckon in some interest on investment 
with the  cost,  which  the  other  witnesses  seen1 
not  to have  done.  He admits that "no  great 
damage  is  done"  when  the  margin  is  at  75 
cents.  There is a profit,  if all is in good work- 
ing  order. 
Another point which  IS  to be  considered,  al- 
though it is one which is scarcely noticeable,  or 
noticeable  only  in certain  special  cases  on the 
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chart,  is this,  that in order  to secure  the  same 
profits the margin  between  raw and  refined  su- 
gars should be slightly greater when the price of 
raw sugar is high,  inasmuch as the loss of weight 
is  a  more  expensive  waste.  If,  for  example, 
with raw sugar at $3 a hundred there were  a  7 
per cent. waste,  let us say,  in refining,  this loss 
would amount to 21  cents a hundred;  while if, 
with the  same  7  per cent.  waste,  the  price  of 
raw sugar were  $4 a hundred,  the waste  would 
amount  to  28 cents.  We see,  therefore,  that 
in  order  to make  the  same  profit  the  margin 
should be  7 cents a hundred more in the second 
case than in the first.  The  witnesses  speak  of 
unusually vigorous competition and a consequent 
low margin each year from December to March, 
while  the  Louisiana  crop  is  being refined  and 
marketed,  but  this  does  not  appear  with  any 
regularity. 
On the  whole,  the  chart  seems  to make  it 
perfectly  evident that the sugar combination has 
raised  the price of refined sugar beyond the rates 
in vogue during the period of active competition 
before the formation of the Sugar Trust and the 
two  competitive  periods  during  its  existence. 
We  can perhaps hardly judge  so accurately as to 
I44 
what might have happened had the combination 
not been formed, but the price has probably been 
raised  beyond what it would have been.  There 
is doubtless some force in the argument of  Mr. 
Post to the contrary, and  we must concede that 
in industries  of  this  type  we can  hardly speak 
with accuracy of a  normal competitive rate," 
based on cost of production or on the prevailing 
rate of interest,  which we can use as a standard 
of measurement. 
The chart does not  give  us any information 
regarding  the  effect  of  the  sugar  combination 
upon  the  price  of  raw  sugar.  That seems to 
follow in  the  main,  as would  be  expected,  the 
fluctuations in  the  prices  of raw sugar in  both 
England and Germany,  with the  decided differ- 
ences that we should expect  at  times  from the 
effect  of  our  tariff.  It does,  however,  show 
some remarkable fluctuations.  The  advance in 
prices in  I 888 and  I 889 was due  principally to 
a  shortage in  European  beet  crops and  in  the 
Cuban cane crop,  which led to wild speculation 
in  Europe.  It is  probable,  as  several  of  the 
witnesses  testified,  that,  owing  to  its  peculiar 
strength  as a  buyer  of  raw sugar, the Trust is 
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sixteenth of a cent, but this is not enough to be 
clearly  shown on the chart.  It is probable, too, 
and  this,  in  fact,  seems  to  appear,  that when- 
ever there comes  a  decided  drop in the price of 
raw  sugar  the  Trust  has  been  able  to delay 
slightly,  though  only for  a  brief time,  the  cor- 
responding drop in the price of  refined ;  while, 
on the other hand,  increase in the price  of  raw 
is attended almost immediately by an increase in 
the  price  of  refined,  the Trust thus being  able 
to hold itself for its own  advantage,  to a slight 
degree,  independent of market conditions. 
Whiskey * 
A study of the line showing the diKerence be- 
tween the price  of  the raw  material,  corn,  per 
* The figures  upon  which  this chart is based are to be 
found on pp.  815-817 of  the Report of  the United States 
Industrial  Commission, Vol. I., Part  11.  The prices  of 
spirits  were  derived from the reports  of  the Peoria Board 
of  'Trade,  and are 'Trust  prices at that  point.  The price 
of  corn, derived  from  the  same source, is No.  z  corn  at 
Chicago,  which  is  at present  used  by the Distilling Com- 
pany of  America as the basis in fixing its price for spirits. 
For the last  few  months  the prices of  sp~rits  have been 
furnished by the Distilling Company  of  America, and the 
price  of  corn by  the  Secretary of  the Chicago  Board of 
Trade. 
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bushel,  an2 the  price,  less  the  revenue  tax,  of 
the  amount  of  the  finished  ~roduct,  spirits, de- 
rived from onebushel of corn, shows nothing else 
so clearly  as  the very great  fluctuations  in this 
margin.  The  price of corn, of course, owing to 
variations  of  crops and to various  factors which 
determine  demand,  fluctuates  greatly from  sea- 
son to season.  At present-as  was the  case at 
one time earlier,  while the Distilling and Cattle 
Feeding Company was in the hands of a receiver, 
Generai McNulta-the  price of  spirits is based 
directly upon that  of  corn,  so  that the fluctua- 
tions correspond  in the  main ;  but for most of 
the period  represented  on  the chart this is  not 
true. 
During the years  188  I  to 1887 various pools 
were  formed  among  distillers,  most  of  which 
lasted less than a year.  The  chart shows clearly 
that during the existence of each pool the prices 
of  alcohol  were  kept  up  and  the  profits were 
correspondingly large.  When, however, the pool 
suspended,  profits  fell  to a minimum,  the mar- 
gins doubtless being at times below  the cost  of 
distilling.  At  the  formation  of  the  Trust  in 
1887 prices were cut for a time in order to force 
competitors into the  organization,  but within a 
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few months  prices were  raised  and  profits  be- 
came  very  large.  These profits  stimulating 
competition, however,  it became necessary again 
at the beginning of  1889  to cut prices very de- 
cidedly in order to force rivals into the combina- 
tion.  For some two  or three  years  after this 
prices and profits were kept, on the whole,  fairly 
high,  but in  1892 and  1893 a period of specula- 
tion led to very startling sudden changes in prices 
and  corresponding  changes  in  profits  so  far as 
sales  were  actually made.  It was,  of  course, 
true  that  at  many  times  the  sales were  very 
small. 
While the chart  attempts  to show the prices 
without the rebates  which  were  paid to whole- 
salers during  the  years  1890 to 1895,  as well 
as the quoted  market  prices,  one cannot be en- 
tirely sure of  the  accuracy  of  the chart in this 
regard,  inasmuch  as  it  has  been  impossible  to 
secure with  absolute  certainty  the  dates of  the 
various rebate changes.  The  chart is, however, 
not far out of the way,  if at all. 
Since the  formation  of  the American Spirits 
Manufacturing  Company  in  1895, while  the 
business  has  been  somewhat  more  stable  than 
during the last years of the Distilling and Cattle 
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Feeding Company, at  no  time  until very  lately 
has the combination  had  complete enough con- 
trol  of  the  market  to be  sure  of steady  prices 
and  corresponding  profits.  It will  be noticed, 
however,  that  for  the  last year and a half con- 
ditions  have,  on  the  whole,  been  much  more 
favorable  for  the  combination  than  before,  it 
having more  nearly  secured  the  control of  the 
market. 
The chart  as a whole  would  seem  to show 
that the whiskey combinations have been able to 
hold pricesand profits high only for short periods, 
inasmuch  as  they  have  almost  invariably  at- 
tempted  to  overreach  and  secure  too  high 
profits.  They may hold  prices stable for a few 
months,  but  when  the  changes do  come  they 
are much more radical  and  much more disturb- 
ing to the  trade  than  would  be  the  changes- 
relatively  speaking  slight--which  would  come 
under the rkgime of free competition. 
According  to the  testimony of  the President 
of the Distilling  Company of  America and one 
of  its  directors,  the  combination  has  finally 
adopted the policy of comparatively low profits, 
but invariably secure ones.  It remains to be seen 
whether for  the  next  two or three years it will 
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be able to carry out this policy,  which,  from the 
point  of view  of the  combination,  if it is man- 
aged on business principles  and not for thc pur- 
pose of speculation,  is a wise  one. 
Petroleum * 
In considering the chart showing the prices of 
crude and refined petroleum,  attention should be 
called  to the  fact  that  figures  for  crude oil are 
given in bulk per gallon,  the  package not being 
included  in the price;  whereas  those for refined 
*The  prices for  crude  and  refined oil for export  have 
been taken  from  the  Derrick's  Handbook on Petroleum, 
with the exception of  those for the last few months, which 
have been furnished by the Standard  Oil Company.  The 
prices  are  in  cents  per  gallon,  including  the  cost  of 
the barrel  in the case of  refined  oils, excluding  it in the 
case  of  crude oil.  The prices of  standard white  illumi- 
nating  oils  at  New  York, Chicago,  and Cincinnati  have 
been  furnished  by  the  Standard  Oil  Company.  Prices 
were  given  in  bulk,  and  the  amount  of  23 cents  per 
gallon  was  added  for the cost  of  the  barrel.  This cost 
of  the  barrel  would  of  course  vary  slightly ; but  the 
rule  of  2+  cents per  gallon  is  one that  is laid  down in 
the Handbook of  Petroleum, and is probably a fair general 
average.  The prices of  export oils at Bremen were taken 
from the Handbook for the earlier period, and for the last 
few months have been furnished by the Standard Oil Coma 
pany.  Figures are  found  in detail with margin reckoned 
in Report of  Industrial Commission, Vcl.  I., p.  48. 
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oil are  given  per gallon,  including  the  cost  of 
the  barrel.  This  is  in  accordance  with  the 
usual  system of quoting these prices. 
It  will be observed that the price of export oil at 
Bremen,  H,  is  regularly  above  the  price,  not 
merely of that same quality of oil in this country, 
but  even  of  the  higher  grade  standald  white 
illuminating  oil.  It  frequently happens,  how- 
ever,  that  the  high  grade  illuminating  oil  is 
lower  in  price  in  New York  than  the  poorer 
grade oil for export.  For brief times, in 1893-4, 
the  New York  price for  illuminating oil  stood 
nearly as high  as the  Bremen  price.  The in- 
dependents claim that the very low price in Ger- 
many  during  those  years  resulted  from  an at- 
tempt to prevent their  getting a foothold in the 
German  market. 
It  will be noted that the prices  of oils in New 
York,  Chicago,  and  Cincinnati  are  charted on 
a  scale  twice  as  great  as  that  of  the  main 
chart.  This  has been done in order to show the 
difference in  prices  between  the  three different 
markets  under  consideration.  On  the whole, 
the price of oil  in  New York stands somewhat 
above that in either of the other two cities, New 
York being somewhat further removed  from the 
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oil  fields ; while  the  prices  at  Cincinnati are 
lowest.  Although there is a general correspon- 
dence  between  the  figures  in  these  different 
markets, there are,  nevertheless,  special fluctua- 
tions  in  each niarket,  which seem to be largely 
independent of  fluctuations in the others. 
The  rapid and decisive fall in the price of re- 
fined oil  in  New York in  1896,  it  is claimed, 
was due to the competition of the Pure Oil Com- 
pany.  In  March it put some wagons in New  York 
selling oil.  Prices  dropped  very  rapidly  until, 
as Mr. Lee, perhaps the leading opponent of the 
Standard  Oil Company,  says, they were  below 
cost.  Mr. Archbold  of  the Standard Oil Com- 
pany makes  a  somewhat  different  statement  of 
the figures, and  points to the fact that the price 
of the crude oil was  rapidly falling.  The chart 
shows also that prices in both Chicago and Cin- 
cinnati fell in like proportion,  if  not even more 
rapidly, at the same time.  The  Pure Oil Com- 
pany began exporting oil to Germany in October, 
1896, with apparently somewhat better facilities 
than  the  independents  had  had  before,  which 
may possibly account in part for the rather rapid 
fall  of  oil  in  Germany at  about  that  time, 
although crude oil was also falling. 
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If we take the chart as a whole,  and note the 
margin  between  the  price  of crude and refined 
represented by the line C, we shall see 
that this margin lowered very much more rapidly 
during the early years of the industry than of late. 
This, of course,  is to be  expected,  as methods 
of ~roduction  are  much  more rapidly improved 
during the early years of  an industry than later. 
There has been  more or less of an association 
among the oil refiners who have made the Standard 
Oil Company since  1872.  This did not,  how- 
ever, in the earlier years seem materially to affect 
this margin, which kept steadily decreasing until 
1879  or 1880.  The Standard  Oil Trust was 
formed in 1882.  From that time on, for a period 
of eight or nine years,  it is noticeable that there 
is only a slight decrease  in  the margin.  From 
1891 until  1898 the margin seems to have been 
steadily nearly or quite a cent lower than for the 
period preceding.  But the period of the smallest 
margin  seems  to have  been  in the years 1893 
and  1894. 
Of late years,  according  to  the testimony of 
several refiners, there has been  a very decided in- 
crease in the value of the by-products,  the profits 
from the by-products  being  apparently equal to 
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those  from  illuminating  oil.  It seems to be 
generally conceded that the rivals  of  the Stand- 
ard  Oil  Company  do  not  make  so  complete 
use  of  the  by-products  as does  that  company. 
With  its  enormous  capital  it  has  a  decided 
advantage  in  that  regard,  and  shows  how  a 
combination with large capital may save a waste 
of  competition,  or  of  production  on  a  small 
scale.  Under  these circumstances it was  per- 
haps  to be  expected  that  the price  of  refined 
petroleum,  as  compared  with  that  of  crude, 
would  have  lessened  still  more than  has  been 
the case. 
During the last two  years  there  has  been  a 
decided  increase,  not  merely  in  the  price  of 
refined petroleum, but also in the margin between 
crude and refined.  For the last year this higher 
margin is to be partly explained by the added cost 
of  refining,  coming from the increase in cost of 
supplies.  For example, refineries are constructed 
largely of iron, and deterioration in them is rapid. 
The price  of  iron  has  increased  considerably 
more  than  IOO per  cent.  during  this  period. 
It is also true that within the last year there has 
been an increase amounting at times to as much 
as half a cent per gallon in the cost of packages in 
154 
which refined oil is carried, and the price of acids 
has also increased.  These  facts would explain, in 
part at least,  the increase in margin,  so that the 
profits have not been  so much greater than they 
were before,  as might be inferred.  The  general 
testimony of the independent refiners,  however, 
seems to show that conditions have been  some- 
what easier for them during the last year or two 
than  earlier,  and  the  large  dividends  of  the 
Standard Oil Company of over 30 per cent.  for 
each of the last  three  years  would also seem to 
indicate that profits have increased, and that this 
has  been a chief  factor  in  the  increase of  the 
margin. 
The  independent oil producers have said much 
about the arbitrary acts of the Standard in fixing 
the prices of crude oil.  The  charge of arbitrary 
action  is  conceded  by the  Standard  to be true 
in  special  cases.  That  organization  has  at 
times  in  special  localities  raised  the  price  of 
crude oil till it has ruined a rival pipe line, which 
was also a buyer, and then, on the absorption of 
the line,  has lowered it again to the great disad- 
vantage of  the oil-well  owners.  At times, too, 
where it has been almost the sole buyer of crude 
oil,  it  has  kept  prices so  low that well owners 
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were practically compelled to sell out to it; then 
it has raised the price.  Most of these instances 
have to do with special localities and produce no 
great  effect  on  the  entire market,  though they 
are enough to add decidedly to the profits of the 
Standard Oil Company. 
The  greater general changes seem to have been 
due  to  the changes in supply brought  about by 
other causes.  The  discovery of the very produc- 
tive fourth sand oil wells in Butler County, Pa., 
only about eighty feet under the third sand levels, 
led to a great increase in production and the con- 
sequent rapid  fall in price  noted on the chart in 
18  73 and 1874.  Mr. Lee claims that the fall of 
the two preceding years was brought about by the 
general demoralization in the business caused by 
the relations of the railroads with the South Im- 
provement Company and its successors.  That 
year, 1873, was also the panic year.  The  check- 
ing of the flow in the next three years raised the 
price  again.  Then the discovery of the famous 
Bradford fields  in  1876 led to the  great decline 
of  18 j j and  1878.  Likewise the depression in 
1891 to 1893, though not so marked, was caused 
by the discovery of the McDonald field in Alle- 
gheny County, Pa., with some of the largest wells 
156 ever known in this  country.  The sudden rise 
in 1895 seems to have been  due  to the discov- 
ery of  the fact that the  amount  of  oil on hand 
and the  production  were  declining very rapidly 
as compared with the  demand,  and to a conse- 
quent desire to get stocks ahead.  It was thought 
that  some  of  the  refiners  had  sold  ahead  far 
beyond their capacity to supply from  any stock 
which  they had  on  hand,  and that the  advance 
in  crude oil was  largely arbitrary,  and  intended 
to  overthrow  them.  At  any  rate,  there was 
urgent demand on  a short supply, and the mar- 
ket  was  largely  speculative  for  a  time.  In 
1897 another  decline  is  due to the opening  of 
the West Virginia fields,  while  the  present rise 
is to  be ascribed  chiefly to another decided check 
in the output,  which is clearly destined to grow 
worse unless new fields are discovered. 
Tin  Plate * 
The  most  striking  fact  which appears in the 
chart is the very rapid increase in all prlces dur- 
ing the year 1899-in  steel as well as tin plate 
*On this chart the prices of  steel billets have been  take^ 
from the "  Iron Age," which is, perhaps, as  trustworthy a, 
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The causes  of  the rapid increase in the price 
of steel,  the  chief  raw  material,  are,  perhaps, 
Inany,  but,  from the standpoint of the manufac- 
turers  and  for  our  purposes  here,  it will  be 
sufficient  to  say that the  enormous  increase in 
the demand for steel of all kinds  is,  perhaps,  to 
be considered as first and most important.  There 
has been during the past year a  decided increase 
in the demand for steel rails,  not merely for the 
building of new railroads,  but also for the relay- 
ing  of  old  track with heavier  rails,  because  of 
the heavier rolling  stock  now used on the most 
important roads. 
Structural steel for buildings  is  now used  in 
enormous  quantities,  whereas  for  this  purpose 
its use was almost unknown ten years ago.  Steel 
bridges  on  railroads  and  elsewhere are  rapidly 
displacing all the wooden bridges.  The use  of 
pressed steel for railroad  cars  is  almost  entirely 
new.  Chairman  Gates  of  the American  Steel 
The prices of  tin and of  tin plate have been furnished by 
Phelps, Dodge & Co., of  New York city, while Mr.  Reid 
president of  the  American  Tin Plate Company, has him- 
self  given, as nearly  as was  possible,  the cost of  labor of 
manufacturing one standard box of  tin plate. 
These figures  may be found in the Preliminary Report 
of  the United  States Industrial Commission, Vol. I., pp. 
55, 868-9. 
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and Wire Company is of the opinion that these 
later  uses  of  steel  have  increased  the  demand 
for that article within  the last two or three years 
by more than  the  total output  of  steel  for the 
United States fifteen or twenty years ago. 
~t is in  all  probability  due to this enormous de- 
mand for  new purposes,  without  as yet  a  cor- 
responding  increase in  the facilities for produc- 
ing an  adequate supplg,  that  the  great increase 
in  its    rice  has  come  about.  The increased 
demand for steel,  and consequent increased price, 
has  been  to  a  considerable  extent  reflected  in 
the prices of iron ore and pig iron, in the charges 
for the transportation  of  ore,  and in the  highet 
wages  of  labor.  This increase in  the price  of 
steel,  which  is  the  chief  raw  material  in  the 
manufacture of tin plate,  of necessity has forced 
up the price of tin plate. 
Tin has  increased  within  the  last two years 
from some $14  a hundred  to double that price. 
Labor  also,  since July  I,  1899,  when the new 
arrangements were made with the Amalgamated 
Association  of  Iron,  Steel,  and  Tin Workers, 
has increased  some 20 per cent. on the averagr. 
The line  D  represents  the  market  value  ot 
105% Ibs.  of steel plus that of  2%  lbs.  of tin, 
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i.e. :  the  value  of  the raw  material  in a  full- 
weight box of tin plate.  The  line B shows the 
same plus the  cost of  labor to manufacture one 
box.  The line A represents the price of a full- 
weight box of the manufactured product.  The 
diagram  shows  clearly  the  decided  increase  in 
all of these costs. 
The distance  from the  base  of  the  chart of 
the  line  C, representing  the  perpendicular  dis- 
tance between the lines B and A, shows then the 
cost of manufacture, aside from the labor, which 
is included in  R,  plus the profit  in  manufactur- 
ing.  It  will be noted that from the beginning  of 
1895 up to the middle of  1897, in spite  of  one 
decided drop in the latter part of  1895, this dif- 
ference  between  the cost of  material  and  labor 
and  the selliag  price of  the tin  plate  remained 
somewhat above $I, say $I. I o to $I.  20 a box. 
During  1897 there was  a  decline in price with 
a  more  decided fall in  the  margin between  the 
prices of  the raw material and the finished  prod- 
uct,  shown  by line C, which, with  slight  vari- 
ations,  continued downward until October, I 898. 
Before  the  organization  of  the  American  Tin 
Plate Company,  in  December,  1898,  there had 
been,  in  October,  a  decided  increase  in  the 
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price  of  tin  plate,  and  this  increase  had  been 
more  than  proportionate  to the increase  in the 
price of  the  raw material,  which  had  advanced 
as early as July.  It was,  of course,  known to 
most  of  the  tin-plate  manufacturers  that  the 
would  probably  be  formed,  and 
presumably  the  different  establishments had  al- 
ready stopped in  part the most vigorous compe- 
tition.  This increase  in  the  margin  between 
the cost and selling price continued rapidly until 
March,  1899.  From that  time  on  there  has 
been no further general  increase in the  margin, 
although  there have been fluctuations. 
The very strong  demand  for  tin plate would 
probably have enabled  the manufacturers to  in- 
crease this margin,  even if  the combination had 
not been made;  but the  union of  practically all 
the  manufacturers  under  one  management  en- 
abled them  to make the best  use  of  the oppor- 
tunity,  and  thus  the  margin  was  put  back  to 
substantially the same position which it had held 
during the year 1896 and the first part of  1897. 
Since  March,  1899,  however,  the  increase  in 
the price of  American tin  plate has not, on the 
whole,  been more than the increase in the value 
of  the  raw  material,  plus  the  increase in labor 
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cost,  facts  which  were  testified  to in  October 
by officers of the combination. 
The  course of events seems to have been this: 
the price of steel and tin was advancing rapidly, 
and this advance would  naturally  tend  to lower 
the  margin  between  the  material  and  the  tin 
plate.  For four  months,  from March to June, 
1899, the  price  of  tin  plate was not increased, 
while  that  of  the  raw  material  did  increase, 
and  the margin, in  consequence,  fell.  In July 
and August  the price of tin plate was  increased 
very rapidly,  so that  the  margin  was  put  back 
nearly, but not quite,  as high as in March.  The 
continued increase in the prices  of  the raw ma- 
terial in  September lowered the margin,  while a 
temporary decrease in the prices  of the raw ma- 
terial in October raised  it  again.  Another  in- 
crease  in  the  price  of  the  raw  material  low- 
ered it  again in November  and  December.  It 
will be noted,  therefore, that on the whole there 
has been not  a  relative  increase in  the margin, 
but  rather a slight decrease since March,  1899, 
although  the  average  margin  is  considerably 
higher  than  at any time during the  year  1898, 
and  as high  as it was during the year 1896 and 
the early part of 1897. 
~t will be noted  here  also,  as in other  cases, 
that  in  order  to  secure  the  same  profit  there 
should  be  a  slightly  greater  margin  when  the 
prices of  the  raw materials are high  than when 
they  are  low.  It  may  fairly  be  considered, 
therefore,  other things  equal,  that  profits  since 
March,  1899,  are  no  higher,  but  are  rather 
lower, than they were at that time, even though 
the  price  of  tin  plate  has  very  decidedly  in- 
creased. 
The chart  seems to show that  the  combina- 
tion  had  power  at  the  beginning  to  press  the 
advantage that came with combination.  While 
the margin may be at the present time no higher 
than it was in  1896, it is perhaps fair to assume 
that the cost of manufacture has been somewhat 
lessened,  and  that,  in  consequence,  the  profits 
would  be  now  rather  higher  than  they  were 
before  when the margin  was  the same,  if  the 
added  price  of  raw  material did  not demand an 
increase in the margin large enough to offset the 
decrease in cost of manufacture. 
The line E represents the price of  imported 
coke  tin    late per full-weight  box laid down at 
New York,  duty paid.  The line F shows the 
same  thing,  exclusive of  duty.  'The  distance, 
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then, between these two lines represents the duty 
and the average rate of  freight  from the Welsh 
port to New York.  The prices are the cost of 
importation to the jobbers without profit.  The 
McKinley tariff  of  2.2  cents  per  pound  took 
the place of  the preceding tariff  of  one  cent  a 
pound,  July  I,  1891.  It  is  noticeable,  how- 
ever,  that, anticipating the change,  the price  of 
tin plate  had  advanced  nearly a year before,  so 
that  when  the act takes  effect  the duty appears 
as  a  drop  in  line  F.  The lowering  of  the 
duty to I. 2 cents per pound,  August 28,  1894, 
is  shown  clearly  by  the  drop  in  line  E  from 
September  to  October.  The dro:,  in  price, 
however,  did  not  come,  so  that  it  shows  de- 
cidedly in monthly prices,  until  the month after 
the duty was  removed,  a  fact which  appears  in 
the sudden rise and fall of line F.  The  change 
from  1.2  cents to 1.5  cents  per  pound  in  the 
Dingley  law,  taking  effect  July  24,  1897,  it 
will  be  noted,  was  also  anticipated  some  six 
months in the increased  price,  as shown in line 
E  and the apparent drop in line F when the act 
legally took effect. Prices 
Steel  and  Wire * 
In this chart, also, the most noticeable  fact is 
the very rapid  increase in all  prices  during  the 
year  1899.  This increase  in  prices  is  to be 
chiefly ascribed  to the  enormous  demand  both 
at  home and  abroad  for  steel  of  all  kinds,  as 
was  explained  in  connection  with  the  chart 
showing  prices  of  tin  plate. 
If we note the line  H,  showing  the  margin 
between the price per  hundred  pounds  of  steel 
billets D, the raw material, and that of wire nails 
C, the finished  product, we shall note that there 
was a steady decline in this margin  from the year 
1890  to  1895,  in  the early part  of  which  the 
lowest  point  was  touched.  During  the  latter 
part  of  1895,  and  until  nearly  the  close  of 
1896, there was a very decided  rise,  not merely 
* The prices for the chart showing the  crude  and  fin- 
ished  iron  and  steel were  furnished by the editor  of  the 
"Iron Age,"  at the request of  Mr.  Gates, chairman of  the 
American  Steel and Wire Company.  Prices of  steel bll- 
lets are Pittsburg prices ;  those of  barb wire  are those  at 
mill ;  those of  smooth wire and nails are New York prices. 
In  this chart steel  billets  have  been  taken as the raw ma- 
ter;al : all of  the other articles  may be considered finished 
products.  [Report  of  Industrial  Commission,  Vol.  I., 
PP.  55, 56.1 
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in  the  price  of  wire  nails,  but  also  in  the 
margin.  This  great  increase  in  the  margin 
was  due  chiefly  to the  influence  of  the wire- 
nail  pool,  which,  during  that  period,  secured 
substantial  control  of  the  market  for  a  time, 
as is explained in detail in the chapter on Com- 
bination  and  Monopoly,  p.  62.  The sudden 
fall in  the latter part of  1896 came  at the time 
of the breaking of the wire-nail pool.  It is also 
true that  at  about  the  same  time  there was  a 
change  of  base  for  the  fixing  of  the  market 
prices of  wire nails,  but this change in the base 
did  not  modify materially the  margin  as it  ap- 
pears in the chart.  It will be noticed, however, 
that  after  the  break  in  the  wire-nail  pool  the 
margin  during the years  1897 and 1898 still re- 
mained considerably higher than it had  been  for 
three  years  before  the  formation  of  the  pool, 
with,  however, a steady though slight decline. 
The marked increase in the price of steel bil- 
lets began  in November,  1898 ;  the increase in 
the price of  wire nails followed in the  succeed- 
ing month,  and both have increased  very rapidly 
during most of  the time since.  The  American 
Steel  and Wire Company, which  controls  fram 
65 to 95  per cent. of  the output of  wire nails, 
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was formed January,  1899.  In  addition to the 
increase  in  the  price  of  steel  billets,  there has 
also been a decided  increase in the wages of the 
laborers engaged in the manufacture of wire and 
wire nails. 
The increase  in  the wages  of  the working- 
nlen  is not shown  in  the  chart,  but from  testi- 
mony  given,  the  increase  in  wages  among  the 
wire and nail workers has been greater than that 
among the workers engaged in the  manufacture 
of steel billets,  so that there would  normally be, 
on that account,  some increase in the margin. 
Another  reason for an increase in the margin 
besides that of  an increased profit is this : There 
is  always  a  considerable  waste  in  turning  the 
raw  material,  steel  billets,  into  wire  or  wire 
nails.  If,  for  example,  this  loss  were  5  per 
cent.  in the case  of  steel valued  at $15  a  ton 
the  loss  would  be  75  cents,  whereas  if  steel 
were $30 a ton the loss would be $1.50.  Steel 
has  more  than  doubled  in  price ; in  conse- 
quence, with the same profit,  the margin should 
have increased somewhat. 
On  the whole,  however,  it seems,  both from 
the chart  and  from  outside  testimony,  that the 
margin,  as  represented  by the line H,  indicates 
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also quite  a decided increase in  the profits.  It 
will  be  noted  that  in  the last  two  months  of 
the  year  1899 there was  a  decided  falling  off 
in  this  margin,  showing  that just  at that time, 
at any rate,  there  was  a  check  in  the  profits, 
the finished  product having lost a little in price, 
while steel billets had  gained.  In October the 
fall  in  price  of  billets  had  increased  profits. 
The  presumption  is  here,  as  in  the  case  of 
tin  plate,  that  there would  have  been  without 
any combination  a decided  increase,  not merely 
in  the  price  of  the  finished  product,  but  also 
in  the  margin  between  the  crude  and  the 
finished  product,  on  accourlt  of  the  enormous 
demand.  The testimony  seems  to be  uniform 
on  this  point,  that  none  of  the manufacturers 
have  been  able  to  meet  the  demand;  but  in 
this case also it seems certain that the combina- 
tion  was  able  to take  advantage  of  the  oppor- 
tunity better than individual manufacturers could 
have done. 
Another factor needs to be taken into account 
in the consideration of  the chart.  The  figures 
represented  are  those  furnished  by  the  "  Iron 
Age."  It is probable that  there  are  no other 
figures in this country that represent more nearly 
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actual  market  conditions.  At the  same  time 
each  individual  manufacturer  makes  his  sales 
independently, and these sales  are  largely  made 
by contracts  extending  over  a  period  of  some 
sometimes even  over a  period  of  one 
or two years.  In consequence of that fact,  the 
majority of  the  manufacturers of steel  may be 
selling their output on a contract price fixed six 
months  before,  while  the  few  manufacturers 
who  are  making  late  sales  may be  obtaining a 
price  50 per cent. higher.  As a matter of fact, 
the  quoted  market  prices  during  the  first  half 
of  the  year  1899  were  probably  considerably 
higher  than  the  prices  actually  realized  by  the 
manufacturers.  On the  other hand,  it  is  also 
probable that the prices  at the close of  the year 
1899  represent  much  more  nearly,  in  the 
case  of  both  the  crude  and  finished  product, 
the  real  prices  secured  by  the  manufacturers. 
While  these  different  circumstances need  to be 
taken  into  consideration,  it  is,  nevertheless, 
doubtless  true  that  the  chart  represents  fairly 
well the changing  conditions of  business during 
the period covered. 
Since  the  American  Steel  and  Wire  Com- 
pany was  formed,  January,  1899,  the  margins 
169 The  Trust  Problem 
between  the  crude  steel  and  all  the  finished 
products  seem  to  have  followed  substantially 
the  same  course,  the  relations  be~ng  especially 
close  during the  later  months.  The price  of 
smooth wire  did  not,  however,  follow  that of 
wire nails  at the  time  of  the wire-nail  pool  in 
1895-96. 
Through  ownership of  patents the American 
Steel and Wire Company has  a legal  monopoly 
in  barb wire,  so that we  should  expect  a  wide 
margin  between A  and  D,  and  possibly  an in- 
creasing  one from  the  combination of  patents. 
The line  E  shows  this  increase,  though  it  is 
not much  more  rapid  than  that  shown  by  the 
lines H,  representing the margin  for wire  nails, 
and F,  representing that for smooth wire.  On 
the  whole,  though,  the  great  increase  in  the 
price of all these finished  products is due chiefly 
to the  increase  in  that  of  the  raw  material. 
The  combination,  however,  seems  to have  en- 
abled its managers to have made the best use of 
its opportunities,  for margins  as well  as  prices 
of  products  increased  rapidly  from  the date of 
combination. 
CHAPTER IX 
THE  TRUSTS  AND  WAGES 
If  the  statements  made  in  the  preceding 
chapters  regarding the savings of  the wastes of 
are true,  it is evident  that industrial 
combinations,  through  these  savings,  create  a 
fund from which the wages  of  laborers could be 
raised, provided  it  seemed wise  to the managers 
to  raise wages  instead  of  increasing  their own 
profits or lowering prices,  or provided  the labor- 
ers were  able  to enforce  a  demand upon  their 
employers for higher wages. 
Experience  also  seems  to show  that,  when 
Trusts are first formed at any rate,  the wages of 
their  employees,  in  a  good  many  cases,  have 
been  raised,  although  later  at  times  men  have 
been  apparently thrown  out of  employment ar- 
bitrarily by the sudden closing of plants.  When 
the Whiskey Trust was first organized in 1887, 
the wages of  several classes  of  employees were 
comparatively soon  raised.  Mr. Greenhut, the 
president  of  the Trust, in his testimony before 
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the Committee  of  Manufacturers  of  Congress, 
testified  to this effect. *  He  expressed the opin- 
ion that it was but just  to give to the employees 
part  of  the  benefits which  were to come  from 
the  new form of  organization.  He stated fur- 
ther  in  conversation  that  public  opinion  was 
strongly directed against the Trusts  on the whole, 
and  that  it was  perhaps wise  to show that  the 
managers of  these organizations  did not  intend 
to conduct them  selfishly for  their own benefit 
solely,  but that  they wished  to distribute fairly 
among those engaged  in  production the  advan- 
tages which  came from them. 
It is  also  in evidence that the employees of 
the  American  Sugar  Refining  Company  have 
had  their wages  increased  somewhat,  although 
as  their  labor  is  largely  unskilled  the increase 
has not been at all great. 
According to testimony from  both  the  man- 
agers  of  the  Standard  Oil Company and  from 
its  opponents,  that  company  has  been  in  the 
habit of paying to all its employees regular stan- 
dard  wages,  and  in  many  cases  of  paying  to 
* 50th Congress, Second  Session, H. R. No. 4,165, pp. 
66,  67. 
those  who showed exceptional  diligence or skill 
in  their work very high wages.  It is  certainly 
true that they often  keep  their employees  for a 
series of years,  and that in  the case of  superin- 
tendents  or  managers or those acquiring  special 
&ill  the  ablest  men are usually chosen,  and the 
wages or salaries paid  are high.  Recently that 
compafiy is reported  in the newspapers  to have 
increased  wages  voluntarily  by  10  per  cent. 
One should  note  that dividends this  year  have 
already been  over 40 per cent. 
Within  the  last  two  or three  years the  new 
combinations in the iron  and steel and  tin plate 
industries particularly have all of them increased 
the rates of wages,  but some of  them have also 
closed plants without warning.  The president 
of  the  Tin Plate  Company  testified  that  the 
average  increase  in wages in  that  industry had 
probably  been  15  per  cent.  The American 
Steel  and  Wire  Company  had  increased  its 
wages  in  many cases  as  much as 40 per cent., 
and  in  the  other  related  industries  the  wages 
had  been  increased  all along  the  line.  It is, 
however,  just  to  the  managers  themselves  to 
state that  they did  not  ascribe this  increase en- 
tirely,  if  at all,  to the  formation of  the Trust. 
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They  say  rather  that  it  is  due  to  the  pros- 
perous  condition  of  the  busmess,  to  the  facts 
that,  owing  to the  heavy  demand,  prices  have 
been  high,  and  that  the  employees  have  de- 
manded  higher wages.  It seems to them wiser 
to make  arrangements with thelr employees  for 
an increase of  wages  than to have  trouble with 
them, especially in so prosperous times.  In  con- 
sequence terms were made,  though, in some in- 
stances  at  least,  the  demands  of  the  working 
men were not  fully granted,  the  increase  being 
rather  a  compromise than  a  surrender.  Some 
of  the  employers  said  distinctly that  these  in- 
creases in wages had  not  been  given  excepting 
as  the  result  of  demands  on  the  part  of  the 
working men themselves;  that the combinations 
made  no pretences toward generosity. 
It is probably  true that  in  most cases the  re- 
lations between  the combination~  and their  em- 
ployees have been  and will remain  substantially 
the  same  as  those  between the officers  of  any 
large  corporation  and  their  working  men.  In 
individual  instances  wages  may  be  increased 
without special demands  being  made,  but  that 
will probably  rarely be the case. 
As  the  combination  has  secured  additional 
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power  in  many instances over  the producers of 
raw material,  it is fair to ask whether this power 
will not extend  also  over  the working  men,  so 
that in the event of a disinclination to meet their 
demands  for  higher wages  or an inclination  to 
lower their actual wages, the combination would 
not have more power  in  carrying out  its wishes 
than  would  competing  corporations.  There 
seems to be little doubt that, speaking generally, 
other things being equal,  this would be the case. 
If the combination  is substantially the only em- 
ployer of  labor  in  its  special  line  of  industry, 
men trained  in that line  of  work and  untrained 
in  others  would  find  practically  only  the  one 
employer to work  for.  This would  to a  con- 
siderable extent  put them  in the power  of  that 
employer  in  the  same way that  the  consumer 
is  to  a  considerable  extent  within  the  power 
of  the combination which controls go per cent. 
or  upwards  of  the  output  of  any  industry  of 
which he must buy the product. 
A  better  means of judging  the situation will 
be found  if  we consider the actual and possible 
attitude of the combinations toward trade 
So  far  as  can be gathered from information  as 
yet accessible, while there are exceptions, nearly 
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all of the combinations have assumed no hostile 
attitude  toward  trade  unions,  but  have  rather 
dealt with  them in accordance with  the wishes 
of  their  managers.  Chairman  Gates  of  the 
American Steel and Wire Company insists posi- 
tively that his  organization  has  not  recognized 
trade unions and will not recognize them.  It will 
deal with  its employees as individuals  and  not 
with  representatives  of  the  union.  On the 
other hand,  nearly all of the other iron and steel 
combinations treat willingly and readily with the 
representatives  of  organized  labor.  This has 
been true of the American  Tin Plate Company, 
of the National Steel Company, of the American 
Steel Hoop Company, of the Federal Steel Com- 
pany,  and perhaps of  others,  there being appar- 
ently on the part  of the managers of all of these 
companies no hostility  whatever to labor organi- 
zations, but a perfect readiness to meet them and 
to deal with them as do most smaller corporations 
or individual employers. 
In case of a contest arising between the trade 
unions and  one of  the greater combinations,  it 
seems evident that, unless the unions have greater 
power  than  is  usual,  the  combination,  having 
under  its  management  a  number  of  different 
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manufacturing plants,  perhaps  from  twenty  to 
forty,  will have  a  decided  advantage  over  the 
individual  corporation  with  only  one  or  two 
If a strike were  threatened  in  one  of 
the  plants  of  the  combination,  it  could,  with 
comparatively little difficulty, transfer  its orders 
to  its  other  establishments  and  close  the  one 
involved  without  a  loss  which  would  in  any 
degree approximate  the  proportionate loss  of  a 
single  corporation  closing  its one plant in case 
of a strike.  During the last year,  this threat is 
said to have been  made in the case of the smelt- 
ers'  strike in Colorado.  The  strikers were told 
that  if  they  persisted  in  their  demands  the 
organization would  close  the  establishment  in 
which  the  strike  was  threatened  and  transfer 
the orders to other plants. 
When trade is dull,  too,  the  combination  in 
like  manner is likely,  rather  ruthlessly it seems 
at times,  to close part of  its plants with  practi- 
cally  no  warning.  Individual  employers  with 
only one plant  are  likely to hesitate  somewhat 
longer.  The  effect  on  the laboring  class  as a 
whole of a checking of  production in many in- 
dependent  ~Iants  is probably  as great  as  in  the 
effect of closing entirely one or two  plants by a 
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Trust.  It  does  not  attract  so  much  atten- 
tion. 
If the  trade  unions  were  to  extend  their 
membership  until  the  one  union  or  federation 
of unions  had  in  its membership practically  all 
of  the  workers  in  the  country  in  one  line  of 
industry,  the situation would be entirely changed. 
Under those  circumstances  a  strike in one es- 
tablishment  would  be  immediately  followed, if 
need  arose,  by  a  strike in  all  of  the establish- 
ments of  the  combination, so that  not  merely 
would  the work stop in the one place, but in all, 
and  the  effect  upon  the  employer would be as 
great,  or even to a considerable  extent  greater, 
than in the case of a strike against a single cor- 
poration which possesses but one manufacturing 
plant. 
Many of the leaders of the trade unions,  such 
as Samuel Gom~ers,  the president of the Amer- 
ican Federation of Labor,  seem to think that  it 
will be by no means impossible for the trade unions 
to  perfect  their  organization  as satisfactorily as 
can the organizers of  capital  improve theirs,  so 
that they will be able to resist the encroachments 
of  capital without difficulty.  And again, if the 
organization of capital by  means  of  its  savings 
creates a  fund  from  which  the  laborers  could 
draw if they had  the power,  these union leaders 
are inclined  to believe that they can secure their 
full share of the funds thus brought about by the 
increased savings.  They, therefore,  assume no 
especially hostile attitude  toward  the  combina- 
tions, which  they  consider  inevitable,  but  are, 
on  the  whole,  rather  inclined  to  favor  them, 
thinking  that  the  laborers  have  the  power  to 
secure  their  proper  share of any savings which 
may accrue to the community from combination. 
It will be noted,  of course,  that  if wages are 
thus  increased  to  the  wage  earners,  the result 
must inevitably be a checking of either the pro- 
fits of  the employer, or,  what  is  perhaps  more 
likely,  of the lowering  of the price to the  con- 
sumer. 
The real contest in  many cases when laborers 
press  their  employers for higher wages  is with 
the  consumers.  Wages  can  be  increased  if 
prices rise;  and employers not infrequently find 
the  consumer  more  docile  than  the  laborer. 
Under  such  circumstances  the  workman  at 
times,  as consumer,  gives  back to his employer 
a good  part of  what  he  has received from him 
as an  increase of  wages;  but  even  in this case 
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the  new distribution  proves to the advantage of 
the  laborers  as a class.  Not all  is  paid  back, 
for there are other consumers. 
If by combination of capital with its saving of 
energy a new fund of  wealth  has  been created, 
the capitalist  and employer will  try first to take 
it,  and will claim that it is theirs justly,  for they 
have by their intelligent action created this fund. 
The workmen will  strive  to  secure  it  in  the 
form of higher wages,  and cIaim that it is justly 
theirs,  for  some of  them have been thrown out 
of  employment  to  make  it,  and  theirs  is  the 
labor  that  is  used  to  better  advantage.  The 
consumers will try to secure it through demand- 
ing lower prices,  and they, too, will try to justify 
their  claim.  These  savings,  they  say,  would 
not have been  possible save under modern social 
and  economic  conditions  and  laws,  for which 
society as  a  whole,  and  no  one  special  class, 
should have the credit. 
The actual  disposition  of  the  fund  wil:  be 
arranged  by  struggle.  If the combination does 
not  succeed  in  hoiding  competition  down,  the 
largest part  will  probably in the long run get to 
the consumers in lower prices,  though, at times, 
as indicated  m the  last  chapter,  the  employer 
180 
will  take it and probably be forced to divide with 
his  workmen.  If  competition  is  kept down, 
the  employer will  take  the larger part  at first; 
but  he will  be  compelled  soon  to give  part to 
the wage earners,  if they are well organized and 
insistent,  while the consumer,  too, will  probably 
eventually  get  part  under  the  influence  of  a 
threatened competition. 
~t will probably be true that,  in the case of a 
contest between organized capital and organized 
labor,  the sympathy of the public will be on the 
side of  labor;  so that whatever benefit comes to 
either side from the  pressure  of  public  opinion 
is likely to accrue to the laborer.  There is,  to be 
sure,  on the  part  of  a  good  many  a  prejudice 
against  labor  unions,  and  particularly  against 
those that have  assumed  great  proportions  and 
acquired great strength.  It is possible that public 
opinion  might even  turn against them,  provided 
they  were  to  control  substantially  all  of  the 
working men in any line of industry.  But it is 
much more likely that,  for a long time to come, 
the aggressions of capital will arouse much more 
hostility  on the part of the public than  those  of 
iabor.  In  this  contest,  then,  between  the 
Trusts and the laborers, the advantage of public 
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opinion  will  remain  chiefly  with  the  laborer. 
But, for the present, contests between the Trusts 
and their employees  have  rarely arisen,  except, 
ing  in the  case  of  certain  classes  of  working- 
men who have been  discharged by  the combina- 
tions because their services are no longer needed. 
Attention has  already been  called to the  fact 
that  certain  classes  of  workingmen,  such  as 
commercial  travellers,  are no longer needed  in 
so great numbers by the combinations as by the 
separate  competing establishments.  It will  be 
recalled  that  the  Whiskey  Combination  was 
able to dispense with the services of  some three 
hundred travelling  men  upon  its  organization; 
that  the  American  Steel and  Wire  Company 
was able to discharge some two hundred  travel- 
ling men ;  and many other similar instances have 
been  found. 
Naturally the  travelling men  themselves,  and 
in many cases others,  are  inclined  to think that 
this  discharge  of  travelling  men  is  in  itself  a 
serious  industrial  evil.  Reflection,  however, 
will  show that if  the work is rendered  really  no 
longer necessary in order to supply the needs of 
consumers,  or if  the work  can be  equally well 
done by  fewer men, the saving of this labor is a 
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distinct  ir~dustrial  gain similar  to that which  is 
found  the introduction  of  a new machine. 
~t is true,  of course,  that suffering is likely to be 
the lot of  those  discharged;  as,  in earlier days, 
upon the introduction  of the power loom,  many 
of the weavers were reduced to poverty,  even to 
starvation.  If, however, as seems to be the case, 
a real saving is effected by  combination,  though 
individuals may suffer, the working classes  as a 
whole  will  be  benefited,  not  merely by  the  re- 
duced  price  of  the  article  itself  (if  the  Trust 
permits it to be reduced), so far as they are con- 
sumers,  but  also,  within  a  conlparatively  short 
time, by  the increased demand that will come for 
their services  through the increased demand  for 
the goods brought about by lowered prices.  The 
advocates of the combinations do not hesitate to 
claim that this will  be  the effect,  and any care- 
ful thinker will  be  inclined to agree that if  the 
saving is a real one this must be the case, unless 
the Trust itself  absorbs all the savings. 
Aside  from  the  commercial travellers,  how- 
ever,  the  class  of  employees that  seems to be 
injured most is that of the superintendents or of 
the  higher  officers  of  the  corporations  which 
enter into the  combination.  In not a few  in- 
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stances,  many  of  the  officers  have  been  re. 
moved. 
Mr. Gary, President of the Federal Steel Com- 
pany,  testified  before  the  Industrial  Commis- 
sion that large savings had been effected through 
the  displacement  of  unnecessary officers  in the 
~ompanies  which entered the Federal Steel Com- 
pany,  and  that  some  gain  had  also been  made 
by  the reduction  of  the  salaries of officers  that 
remained,  inasmuch as they were given  less  re- 
sponsible positions.  He  submitted a table show- 
ing the number of employees of  all classes dur- 
ing the years  1898 and  1899, with  their  com- 
parative  wages.  This showed  an  increase  of 
4.76  per  cent.  in  the  number  of  officers and 
clerks,  but a decrease of 6.26 per cent.  in their 
average  daily pay,  making  a  slight  decrease  in 
the  total  expenditures.  Considering  the  de- 
cided  increase in the number of laborers and the 
large  increase  also  in  the amount  of  business 
done, that seems to be a noticeable  saving. 
Mr. Gates, Chairman of the  American Steel and 
Wire Company, testified also to the same effect. 
The official organizations of  the separate plants 
that are  in the American  Steel and Wire Com- 
bination had been to a  considerable extent done 
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,,,y  with.  Each plant formerly had its  presi- 
dent, vice-president,  manager,  and other officers, 
most  of whom  had  been  discharged,  the busi- 
ness being put  in the charge of the men  in  the 
central offices  in  New York and Chicago  and 
the plants being operated under the  direction  of 
district superintendents.  He was of the opinion 
that  perhaps  50 per  cent.  of  the  high-~riced 
had been dispensed with,  as well  as the 
two hundred travelling men mentioned before. 
The  fact  that  the  laborers  discharged  by 
the  combinations  are to a  considerable extent 
s~~elintendents  and travelling men,  two classes 
of  high-priced  laborers, is likely to promote less 
hostility on the part of  the laboring classes than 
if  it  were  the ordinary workingmen who  were 
discharged.  In  either  case,  however,  the  in- 
dustrial  effect  depends,  of course,  on  the  use 
that  is made  of  these  savings.  If they go en- 
tirely to increase the salaries of  the officers that 
remain,  or perhaps  even  in  dividends  to  the 
stockholders,  the  savings will  be  considered  of 
less general industrial benefit than if they go,  to 
a considerable degree  at  least,  to the  public  in 
the  way  of  reduced  prices  or to  the  common 
laborers in increased wages. 
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The experience  so  far would  seem  to show 
that labor has been made more efficient by corn- 
binations  of  capital;  that, owing  to  the  better 
organization, there is a larger average output per 
workman; and that the benefits of this increased 
efficiency have been divided  between  employers 
and  workmen,  the  consumer  receiving  as  yet 
relatively little benefit  directly.  The last  two 
years,  however,  have been very exceptional,  and 
it is as yet too soon to speak with certainty as to 
ultimate results.  So far, at any rate, no damage 
to the laborers as a class seems to have resulted, 
either  in  the  way of  decreased wages,  in  spite 
of the classes mentioned before that have clearly 
been injured, or in the way of less steadiness of 
employment.  In fact, it is probable,  as regards 
the  latter  feature,  that  employment  may  be 
made,  and  probably  has  been  made,  somewhat 
more steady,  in  spite  of  the  fact that  in  some 
Instances individual plants have been closed,  ap- 
parently  with  no  good  reason,  excepting  to 
shorten the output  in  order that prices  may  be 
kept  up,  or,  worse yet,  to affect the stock mar- 
ket.  Such  acts  cannot  be  too  severely  con- 
demned.  Happily they are  not  common,  and 
the  evil  can  apparently  be  reached  by  legisla- 
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tion,  Numerous  charges  to  the  effect  that 
the  have  shortened  the  output in 
different industries  for  the  sake  of  putting  up 
prices have,  of  course,  been made, but a careful 
study of  all  the evidence  presented  in different 
investigations along this line seems to show that 
this  contention  is  often  not  justified.  It is 
doubtless  true  that  in  individual  cases  plants 
have been closed for the sake of cutting off some 
one rival ;  but, generally speaking, ~lants  closed 
are  either  unfortunately  situated  or  have  not 
been skilfully  managed. 
If the power of  the labor organizations keeps 
itself  commensurate with that of  the  combina- 
tions of  capital,  it is probable  that the tendency 
toward  the combination of  these two at the  ex- 
pense of  the consumer will,  for  a time at least, 
increase.  The plan  suggested  by  Mr.  E.  P. 
Smith,  of Birmingham, England, to avoid strikes 
and other difficulties between employers and their 
employees,  is of  this nature.  His suggestion is 
that  combinations  complete  enough  to control 
in good part an entire industry be  made  among 
employers  on the  one hand  and  employees  on 
the  other ;  that  a  committee representing  both 
classes  fix  the  relations  between  them  as  re- 
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gards wapes,  ar.d  to a  considerable  extent  also 
as  regards  prices,  it  being  understood  that 
wages  shall  be  fairly  high  and  profits  fairly 
large.  In case,  then,  any  new  competitor of 
the capitalistic class comes into the business, by 
agreement of  both  parties  prices  would  be  cut 
to his  customers,  if  necessary,  and  laborers in 
that line of  industry would  refuse to enter  into 
his  employ.  On  the other hand,  if laborers in 
that  industry were to increase  beyond  the  nor- 
mal  demand of  those in the  combination,  they 
would  be  opposed  by  the laborers  already  em- 
ployed, and  the employers  in  the organization 
would  refuse  to  give  them  work.  While 
this plan has been  proposed,  and  perhaps justi- 
fied,  both  in  theory  and  in  practice,  most 
efficiently by  Mr.  Smith,  it is nevertheless  true 
that  in  this  country,  in  Chicago  at  any  rate, 
similar combinations in one or two lines of  in- 
dustry  have  been  effected.  The "forgotten 
man"  in  this  case  seems to be the  consumer, 
inasmuch as the  rate  of  profits and the rate  of 
wages  being  both  fixed  by  interested  parties, 
although called  fair,  are likely to be higher than 
in  many  cases  would be considered  fair by the 
consumer. 
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An attorney of one of the prominent Trusts 
some  little time ago that,  in his judgment, 
the  outcome  of  the  combinations  of 
capital  would  be  that  their  profits  would  be 
restricted,  either  by  governmental  action  or 
otherwise,  to a  normal  rate  of  five  or  six  per 
cent.,  and  that  after  this  profit  was  paid  the 
surplus arising  from  the  savings  of  the  com- 
bination  would  be  divided  between  the  la- 
borer  in high  rates of  wages and the  consumer 
in  low  prices.  He was  not at all clear  as to 
the forces  which would bring about  this result, 
beyond the fact that in some way public opinion 
would restrict closely the profits of the employer 
to what  most  people  believed  to be a fair rate. 
It, however, seems to be an easier step to secure 
a combination of  employer and employee at the 
expense of  the consumer  than of  the employee 
and  the  consumer  at the  expense  of the  em- 
ployer.  If  the  employer  is  to  be  closely 
restricted,  it  must  doubtless be through  legisla- 
tion. Political  and  Social Effects 
CHAPTER  X 
POLITICAL  AND  SOCIAL  EFFECTS 
Whatever  may  be  the  effects  of  industrial 
combinations upon prices, or wages, or profits, or 
investors  in  stocks,  it  is thought by  many that 
they have  a  more  subtle,  and  perhaps  on  that 
account more  dangerous,  eifect upon our politi- 
cal  and social organization and upon the morals 
of individuals. 
It is a matter of  common rumor and  almost 
of  common  belief  that  the  railroads  and  the 
large  industrial  combinations  are  able  to  in- 
fluence  to a  material  extent  the  acts  of  our 
legislatures  and  even  the  decisions  of  our 
courts.  This influence is thought by  many to 
constitute their chief  menace to the integrity of 
our institutions and the welfare  of  the country. 
It is doubtless  true  that  in  many cases large 
sums are paid by corporations to  affect in some way 
or other the actions of legislatures.  The  officers 
of the corporations or their friends, if they speak at 
all on the subject, are likely to say that  strike " 
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bills are frequently introduced in  the legislatures 
for the especial purpose  of  threatening their in- 
terests,  in order that certain of the members may 
be paid to withdraw the hostile bill ;  and that it 
has  been  found  both  cheaper and  much  more 
to pay the very few people who employ 
this blackmailing  plan  than to attempt to defeat 
the hostile bill by  fair argument.  It seems also 
be true at times  that a bill which may be en- 
tirely  proper  and  even  beneficial  to the  public 
in its nature,  but  which also favors  particularly 
the interests of  some of  the larger corporations, 
may be  opposed by the  party leaders  or by  in- 
dividual  representatives,  until  an  amount  of 
money has been  paid either to party managers or 
to enough  individual members of  the legislature 
to  secure  the  passage  of  the  bill.  Not  long 
since a bill which  was said to be entirely in the 
public  interest,  as well as in that of  one of  the 
large corporations,  could be passed  in  the legis- 
lature  of  one of  our  larger  States,  it  was  re- 
ported, only hy  the payment of $15o,ooo  to the 
leader of the party in power.  Some of the larger 
corporations, business men say, expect to set aside 
for such uses  a  considerable sum to be  charged 
to business expenses. 
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Before a committee of Congress,  Mr.  Have- 
meyer testified  that  the American Sugar Refin- 
ing Company contributed  in some States  to the 
campaign fund of the Republican party, in others 
to that  of  the  Democratic party,  the intention 
being to stand well with  the dominant party  in 
each  State.  It was  presumed  that this custom 
was followed in order that,  through the influence 
of  the  dominant  party,  both  hostile  legislation 
might be warded off  in case  of  need,  and mea- 
sures,  which,  on the  whole,  were  favorable  to 
the  interests  of  the  company,  might  be  more 
carefully considered  perhaps  than  would other- 
wise be the case. 
While  it  is  probable  that  many  individual 
cases of this kind occur,  and  that corporations, 
both in self-defence  and for the sake of further- 
ing their own interests, do at times buy members 
of  legislatures,  it  is  likewise  probable  that  the 
prevalence  of this custom is not a little exagger- 
ated  by  many people,  and  especially  by  certain 
sections  of  the  press.  It is certainly true that 
the  character  of  individual legislators and their 
faithfulness to their trust are considerably better 
than is commonly assumed in popular discussion 
in the newspapers. 
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But  if  we grant that corruption of the legis- 
latures and even of the courts on the part  of the 
large corporations is not infrequent, does it follow 
that the corporations  should  themselves  be  de- 
stroyed, or that they are chiefly to  blame ?  Cer- 
tainly no distinction  can be made in this  regard 
(although in other respects,  as Mr. ?3ryan  prop- 
erly showed  at Chicago,  differences  are clearly 
to be noted)  between  the  capitalistic  combina- 
tions called Trusts, and railroads or partnerships 
or wealthy individuals,  and the evil seems to be 
common  to all.  The fault seems to be rather 
with the legislatures and the character of the men 
whom  we,  the  public,  send  to them,  or  with 
our ethical and  social standards, than  with  cor- 
porations  as  such.  If the  combinations  have 
good  features about  them,  it would certainly be 
unwise to attempt to destroy  them  because  our 
legislators  were  dishonorable  men.  A  much 
wiser  as  well  as  a  much  more  certain  and 
probably  an  equally  practical  measure,  would 
be  to endeavor  in  some  way  to improve  the 
character  of  our  legislators  by  better  methods 
of election, or by general educatim, or to lessen 
the opportunities,  through  rules  of oBlr  legisla- 
tures or otherwise,  of those who are unscrupulous 
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enough either to blackmail  a  well-meaning  cor- 
poration,  or  to  take dishonest pay  from  a  dis- 
honorable  corporation.  That the  political evil 
exists,  is  beyond  question.  That  its  cause  is 
mainly  the  Trust and  its  only remedy  the  de- 
struction  of  the  Trust by  no  means  follows, 
although that seems to be a normal presumption 
by very many. 
Of  much greater significance on the whole is 
the  effect of  industrial  combination  upon  our 
social  organization.  The democratic  social 
systems of the United States and of many of the 
newer English colonies,  seem to have developed 
a power of  self-control  and of  self-direction  in 
the individual citizen which can rarely be  found 
elsewhere  in  the world.  This power  of  self- 
direction  is  found  to a remarkable extent often 
in local  governments,  and  in  individuals,  espe- 
cially  in business men.  The  chief purpose even 
of our school systems,  in the judgment of many 
of our ablest and most  high-minded  teachers, is 
to develop among our rising citizens this  power 
of  self-control.  In fact,  M.  Demolins, in  his 
most interesting book, "  Anglo-Saxon  Superior- 
ity,"  ascribes the success of  the English-speak- 
ing  peoples  in  self-government  and  in  the 
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establishment of colonial systems largely to  this 
independent  spirit,  which  he  thinks  has  been 
developed  in our systems of education, both that 
of  the  schools  and  that  of  the  home,  in  the 
inclination  of  parents  and  teachers  to compel 
children,  especially the boys,  to rely upon them- 
selves in all the ordinary emergencies of life. 
It is  thought  by  many  that  competition  in 
industry develops this power  of  individual  self- 
direction,  while  the  Trust system  destroys  it. 
Under the  competitive  system,  each  cares  for 
his own.  The one  who  shows  on  the  whole 
the greatest power of self-reliance,  self-direction, 
and  skill-the  fittest-is  the  one  who,  in  the 
competitive struggle,  survives.  As  his  weaker 
rivals fall out,  the plane of efficiency  is elevated 
and  the  whole  industrial  structure  is  raised. 
This  competitive  struggle  among  individuals 
may be cruel in its effects upon those who lose, 
but from the strictly economic point  of view it, 
so far at least,  has generally seemed best for so- 
ciety,  inasmuch as it has resulted in the success 
of  the  one  most fit  whenever  the  competition 
has been legal and just. 
When,  on  the  other  hand,  combinations 
among  competitors  are  first made,  the weaker, 
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instead  of  being  forced  to the wall,  are  saved, 
although their  establishments  may be closed  by 
the  combinations, and  although  they may have 
been taken into the combination on terms,  rela- 
tively speaking, unfavorable.  When the Whiskey 
Combination was organized  with  its eighty sep- 
arate  distilleries,  of  which  nearly  seventy  were 
almost immediately closed or dismantled,  un!ess 
in  fact  they had  been  closed  before,  dividends 
were paid equally upon all the property, although 
the  absolute  amounts  paid  to the stockholders 
who had  put  in their plants at low prices were, 
of  cGurse,  comparatively  small.  When,  in 
1887,  the  Sugar  Trust  was  organized,  the 
weaker  competitors  were  not  forced  to  the 
wall,  but were  taken  into the combination,  al- 
though,  doubtless,  at a low valuation. 
Aside  from  the  effect  upon  individual  char- 
acter,  consider  first  whether  the  community 
loses  or  gains  economically  by  this  apparent 
preference of the combination to buy up weaker 
establishments  rather than  to force them out of 
existence  by  a  more  determined  competitive 
struggle.  From the standpoint of  the creditors 
it is  probable  that  there  is  comparatively  little 
difference in the methods employed.  If compe- 
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tition should continue, and the weaker producer 
be  forced into  bankruptcy,  so that  his creditors 
would receive  but  fifty cents on  a  dollar,  they 
would lose by so much.  If, on the other hand, 
with the man's  business in the same low condi- 
tion, the establishment is bought up at fifty cents 
on the cost  price,  if  the  man is  honestly eager 
to pay his debts, the situation is probably not ma- 
terially different.  A  man who is  compelled  to 
sell to a combination  at what  he believes  to be 
less  than  the value  of  his  establishment  under 
the  competitive  system,  may,  of  course,  have 
feelings  of  bitterness  toward  the  combination 
that the bankrupt would not have toward any of 
his competitors; but the economic result to him 
and to his creditors would not be materially  dif- 
ferent.  Both lose in either case. 
During  the  continuance  of  the  competitive 
struggle  between  rivals  who  eventually enter  a 
Trust,  or between  a  large  combination and its 
outside rivals who are being gradually forced out 
of  business,  prices  to consumers  are  likely  to 
range  low  for  a  considerable  period.  Under 
those circumstances, it would seem that the con- 
sumers,  for the time  being  at least,  gain  more 
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effected,  without  any of the  competitors  being 
driven into bankruptcy.  On the other hand,  it 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  most  vigorous 
competition  is  almost  of  necessity  wasteful. 
While  on  the  one hand  the  ablest  competitors 
rely  upon  excellence  for  their  success,  many 
others,  especially in  the last  stages before they 
yield,  resort  to questionable  practices.  Cheap 
devices are sometimes employed which are likely 
to result in imperfect goods.  The manufacture 
of  shoddy  instead  of  genuine  goods  is  some- 
times encouraged.  Desperate means to secure un- 
warranted credits are often resorted  to;  and the 
loss  from  these  sources,  as  well  as  the  direct 
loss  to the  competitors themselves,  is  likely to 
more than offset the gain to the consumers from 
the  temporary  lowering  of  price until  the pro- 
ducers  are,  many  of  them,  driven  into  bank- 
ruptcy.  Besides  this,  the  combination  or  the 
surviving competitor is likely,  when the fight is 
won,  to recoup his  losses by  demanding  an in- 
demnity, not from the vanquished as does a vic- 
torious nation,  for that would be a vain attempt, 
but from  the  onlookers,  the  consumers.  The 
victor will  ask,  too,  why the  consumers  ought 
not  to pay  the  indemnity.  They have  been, 
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through  low  prices,  the  beneficiaries  of  the 
conflict. 
A reasonable  competition,  which may  indeed 
force  out  one by  one  individual  producers,  is 
clearly  a  healthful  influence  in  the  industrial 
community,  stimulating the better ones  to their 
best efforts  and  raising the plane  of  efficiency. 
A  competition  of  this  nature  where,  one  by 
one,  the weaker competitors drop out and more 
efficient ones come into the industry  from  time 
to time produces no crisis in that industry.  On 
the other hand,  fierce  competition among rivals 
nearly equal,  especially when  large  amounts  of 
fixed capital are involved, not merely leads to  the 
wastes already mentioned of ill-advised  methods 
and measures, and losses to practically all of the 
competitors  themselves,  but,  further,  leads  to 
genera1  depression  in  the  line  of industry in- 
volved.  This depression will lead to shifting of 
capital  from  that  industry into  other lines  for 
which,  under normal conditions,  there is not so 
great need in the community,  and this,  in itself, 
involves  another  industrial  loss.  For  these 
reasons it  is probable that, when competition  is 
of this nature,  the community will gain from the 
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stops the  competition before  it  has reached  the 
ruinous  stage,  even  though  it  does involve  for 
the  time being  the  taking  of  some plants that 
are comparatively useless.  The value  of  those 
plants will,  in part at least, be saved by employ- 
ing  them  in  other lines  of  industry;  but  even 
where the  loss  is  temporarily a  total  one,  it  is 
likely to be less to the community as a whole as 
well as to the combination itself than would  re- 
sult from  a  continuance  of  the competition  to 
the ruin  of  a  large  proportion  of  the  competi- 
tors.  When unfair and illegal methods of com- 
petition are  employed,  such  as the  use  of  dis- 
criminating rates on railroads,  or any dishonorable 
practices,  the above  discussion  does  not apply. 
Such unfair and illegal  methods put the question 
rather  into  the  field  of  criminal  law  or social 
ethics.  Such  practices  are  under  no circum- 
stances to be justified  or defended. 
But aside from  the effect of  the avoidance of 
bankruptcy  on the part  of  numbers in the com- 
munity,  it is  often  urged,  and  that  with  much 
reason, that under the present system of produc- 
tion on a  Iarge scale, an individual  cannot start 
independently in business, unless he has large cap- 
ital or is in some way personally in favor with the 
managers of the larger combinations.  We  have, 
therefore,  in  the  community,  it  is  said,  a  few 
magnates  in  productive  activity,  together  with 
multitudes of  men of  sound judgment,  capable 
of  managing  large  enterprises  independently, 
who are reduced to the position  of employees- 
their individuality dwarfed,  the  development  of 
their  marihood checked-all  this,  of  course,  to 
the detriment of the State. 
SO far as this contention is true  (and  there is 
much truth in it),  it is perhaps the most serious 
objection that can be made to the  present  sys- 
tem  of  industrial  combination.  It is  a  well- 
known fact  that  the  high  officials in  our large 
insurance  companies,  in  our  railroad  systems, 
in  our  banks,  and  in  other  great  industrial 
enterprises,  do  give  opportunities to their chil- 
dren  and  their  friends  for  advancement in the 
direction  of  industrial  enterprises  which  could 
not  so  readily  at  least  be  secured  by  others. 
On the other  hand,  it is  doubtless  true that  if 
these  scions  of  the  industrial  magnates  show 
themselves incompetent,  they often will be soon 
removed from  their  positions,  or dropped  into 
others  of  less  responsibility,  while  the  more 
capable  men  who  have  earned  their  positions 
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take  their  places.  If  such  a  course  is  not 
taken, the rivalry of old or new capital will soon 
make itself  felt.  The savings of  combination 
before  mentioned  will  be  more  than  offset  by 
the  losses  arising  from  incompetent  manage- 
ment,  and  the combination will  fall  before  its 
smaller rivals.  That this tendency in great cor- 
porations  toward  nepotism  is  strong cannot  be 
doubted.  If it is not largely  overcome through 
the variety of interests in the combination itself, 
it will be an easy matter for competition to hold 
its own in another short generation. 
On the  other  side,  however,  of  this  vital 
question, there are one or two  matters for con- 
sideration.  Many men are now- trying to work 
independently  who  are  industrially  fit  only  to 
work  under  direction.  Any  careful  business 
man or observer of business conditions can prob- 
ably name  among  his  acquaintances men who, 
good workmen  perhaps,  are fit to be carpenters 
or machinists or tailors while working under the 
direction  of  others,  but  who  wish  to becomc 
and  at  times  do  become  contractors,  or who 
open stores of their own where they are in posi- 
tions of  financial responsibility as  heads  of  es- 
tablishments,  and  who,  whenever  they  secure 
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such independent positions,  invariably bring dis- 
aster  upon themselves  and  consequent  discom- 
fort to their  families and loss to their  creditors. 
There can be no question that,  from the strictly 
economic  point  of  view at  least,  the  endeavor 
of  these  men  to  manage  a  business  indepen- 
dently, when they are  fit  only to be  workmen 
under the direction  of  others,  is a distinct evil. 
Unless  the waste is needed  to enable society to 
select  the business  leaders,  or  unless men who 
work  under  the  supervision  of  others  are  de- 
prived of their individuality,  the loss is probably 
great  enough  to  overbalance  any  gain  which 
society derives from  their attempts at managing 
a business for which they are not fit. 
The fact should  not be overlooked  that  per- 
sons  holding  subordinate  positions  are  usually 
granted much  more  independence in work than 
is  often  thought.  In  a  large  mercantile  or 
manufacturing  establishment  the  heads  of  de- 
partments  ordinarily  have  full  discretion in the 
management  of  their  departments  as  long  as 
they  prove  successful.  Their employers  look 
for results.  They are given  general  directions 
in  order  that  they  may  fit  properly into  their 
places in the  great  organization,  but  they have 
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full discretion as regards the details  of  manage. 
ment,  and in most cases have as great  opportu- 
nities  for showing  their  originality and  for test- 
ing their powers of combination and organization 
as  it  would  be  possible  for  them  to have  in 
managing  with  entire  independence  a  much 
smaller  business. 
When a number of small railroads are brought 
together into a large system,  a number of presi- 
dents of  railroads  lose  their  positions  as presi- 
dents to be sure,  but most  of  them are retained 
as division superintendents, managing  the same 
lines  of  road  which  before  they  managed  as 
presidents,  employing for the most part the same 
men,  receiving  as  good  pay,  and  being given 
almost  if  not  quite  as  much  discretion  as be- 
fore in the general management  of  their  roads. 
It is  true  that  they must  report to a superior, 
but it must  not be forgotten  that  as  presidents 
of the roads they also reported to their directors, 
and  that  their  work  was  subject  to  criticism 
even before the combination was made. 
Indeed,  comparatively few men in  important 
positions at the present time are entirely without 
responsibility  to  others.  The president  of  a 
railroad  reports to his  directors;  presidents and 
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professors  in  universities,  superintendents  of 
schools, heads of practically all governmental de- 
partments, are subject to  control, and more or less 
subject to direction.  The  art of managing one's 
superiors by tact, honesty, and excellence in serv- 
ice is also an art which develops individuality, per- 
haps to even as great an extent as the power of 
acting with entire independence, owing responsi- 
bility to none,  excepting perhaps to one's  credit- 
ors through the action of a court.  A wise super- 
intendent of schools, to show his power over his 
trustees, said to a friend some time ago that they 
had never refused  any request that he had  made. 
His thoughtful friend replied,  "Then  you have 
been exceedingly wise in making your requests." 
The wise  executive  officer  has  little  difficulty 
with his superiors,  and one cannot say  that  his 
individuality :S  in any way weakened by the fact 
that he is held responsible by those superiors. 
The  weakness of most employees is, that they 
do not attempt  to think  independently  in their 
work,  and  that  they make no effort to exercise 
original power ill the performance of their duties. 
There arc:  few  positions  in which  independent 
thougllt (not, of course, independent action with- 
out consultation) will not count.  The  employer 
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is rare who will  not trust to the fullest extent any 
employee  who  shows  himself  fully  worthy  of 
confidence, and who will  not give him every op- 
portunity to develop original independent power. 
Of course the fact is not overlooked that much 
work  is  largely routine,  but  the statements are 
not too strong when one speaks of opportullities 
for  independent  thought  under the competitive 
system as compared with those under the combi- 
nations.  Under  both,  the  great  majorit;7  are 
not expected  to do much planning. 
As the  system  of  industrial  combination  de- 
velops, it seems now that there will be  man7 of 
these positions to be held  by  subordinate  super- 
intendents,  which  will  be  equally  satisfactory 
from the financial point of view as the headship 
of  small  establishments,  and  which  in  most 
cases  will  afford  an  opportunity  for  enterprise 
and  independent  judgment  not  materially less 
satisfactory,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  there 
will  be  created  some  positions  which  are  far 
greater prizes in the industrial world  than could 
ever be  found under the former system of  com- 
petition;  and  yet  experience  has  not  so  far 
shown that favoritism instead of  excellent work 
will not for a long time fill many of these 
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To  those,  again,  who are of the opinion that 
the  large  corporations  often  compel  their em- 
~loyees  to engage  in practices which are not in 
accordance  with  the  strictest  morals-for  this 
complaint  is  sometimes  made-it  may be  said 
that one is as seldom  urged  to do wrong by  his 
employers as by the system under which he works. 
The pressure  of  competition  against  the indi- 
vidual  producer  not  infrequently  leads  to mis- 
representation  regarding  credit and to dishonor- 
able  practices  in  methods  of  manufacture and 
sale  of  goods.  How  many  of  our taxpayers 
deal fairly and openly by  the State ?  The sys- 
tem  of  combination  may,  and  does  indeed  in 
many cases,  lead to wrong  acts on  the  part of 
individuals.  If our eyes are open, we  may  see 
that it  is questionable  whether  the  competitive 
system  leads  to fewer.  There is much to be 
done  in the way of  improving  our standards of 
business  morals ; and  yet it  is probably not too 
much  to  say that  on  the  whole,  whatever  the 
form of  our present  industrial  system,  they are 
improving,  in  spite  of  the  many evil  practices 
which  we  see.  A  high  standard  of  business 
character  probably  never  before  counted for so 
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In estimating  the  extent  of  both  the  econo- 
mic  and  social  effects  of  industrial  combina- 
tions  it  is  essential  to  note  that  their  activity 
is  limited  now  to only a  part of  the ifidustrial 
field;  and there  seems no likelihood  that  they 
will in this era, if ever, cover it entirely.  So far, 
at least, they have proved to be most successful, 
with  apparently a  degree of  permanence,  only 
in those  industries which  require  much  capital 
for  successful  prosecution ;  in  which  the  pro- 
duct is  utliform in its nature and the productive 
work  of  a  routine  character ; those  in  which 
the product is hulky and there  is  a  wide  distri- 
bution of freight ;  or those in which other some- 
what similar characteristics of  a  special nature, 
such  as  very  expensive  advertising,  patents, 
etc.,  sellre  to encourage  the  combination  of 
capital. 
On the  other  hand,  there  have  been  few 
combinations,  as yet,  at  least,  in  agriculture. 
It is true that there has been  an occasional cor- 
ner of wheat in some one market.  In some of 
our larger  cities  there  have  been  combinations 
which to a  considerable  extent  have controlled 
the  supply  of  milk  in  that  locality.  At  the 
present time there is a large  combination in the 
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manufacture  of  flour,  but  that controls only a 
small proportion of the market,  and is even now 
in  financial  straits.  Speaking  generally,  food 
products of all  kinds  that  come  from the farm 
and from the small  producer are largely beyond 
the control of the combinations,  though the pro- 
duction of dressed beef  seems  to form a partial 
exception in the opinion  of some observers. 
So, again, in lines of manufacture in which little 
capital is  needed  to start a successful  establish- 
ment, although there may be large combinations, 
competition against them is so easy that they com- 
parative!y  seldom secure  control of a very large 
proportion  of  the market,  and  the  evils  from 
them to the  community  can be  only  compara- 
tively  small. 
When goods  produced  are of  such a nature 
that a person  can  stamp his  individuality  upon 
them-as  in all work that  is essentially artistic, 
including  even  millinery and fashionable tailor- 
ing-or  when  individual  work  is  required  in 
production,  it  seems  clear as  yet  that  there 
can be  no monopoly that will  be  dangerous  to 
the  community,  or  any monopoly  at  all,  with- 
out government aid and support, which can ma- 
terially affect the life of the  communitv.  The 
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monopoly  of genius is  individual,  and cannot be 
effected by  a combination, though  the combina- 
tion may sometimes buy  its service. 
Experience  only  can  show the  limit  of  the 
field of combination.  There can,  however,  be 
little doubt, on the basis even of our present ex- 
perience,  that its field is considerably more lim- 
ited than has been thought by  many  during  the 
past decade,  and that there still  remains  oppor- 
tunity  to find  his  place  for  each  one  who  is 
capable  of  independent  work.  On the  other 
hand,  it seems equally  true  that,  whenever  the 
nature of the industry is one which is peculiarly 
adapted for organization  on a  large scale,  these 
peculiarities  will  so  strengthen  the  tendency 
toward a virtual monopoly that, without legal aid 
and without special discrimillations or advantages 
being granted  by  either the State  or  any  other 
influence, a  combination  will  be  made,  and,  if 
shrewdly  managed,  can and,  after more experi- 
ence in this line has  been  gained,  probably  will 
practically  control permanently the market,  un- 
less special legal efforts better directed than any 
so far attempted shall prevent.  Even when the 
combinations exist,  however,  the  social  effect, 
while in certain directions exceedingly unpleasant, 
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especially to those who are in competition when 
the  organization  begins  its  work,  is yet nct all 
evil.  The Trusts  afford  greater  scope  for 
individual  power  and  independent  manage- 
ment  than  has  been  ordinarily  supposed,  al- 
though  they  are  practically  certain  to  bring 
most  positive  injuries  to society,  unless  they 
can  be  brought,  better  than  they  now  are, 
under  social  control.  Although,  as  has  been 
shown, their  power  is  much  more  limited  in 
the long run by business conditions than has been 
supposed by many,  and although, as their meth- 
ods  become  better  known,  their influence will 
be still  more  restricted  without  positive action 
against them,  their power over prices and wages 
and social  and  business conditions  is  sti::  too 
great  to be  left  in  the  hands  of  interested 
parties without  legislative check.  One of  the 
leaders  of  a  great  combination  said  of  their 
industry  some  six  months  ago:  "We  control 
conditions."  Such power should at least be put 
under supervision of those who represent society. CHAPTER XI 
LEGISLATION 
Some  of  the  platforms  of  political  parties 
speak of the Trusts as if they were unmitigated 
evils.  Others  attempt  to distinguish  between 
good  Trusts and  bad  Trusts.  If the opinions 
expressed in the preceding  pages  are  true,  it  is 
probable  that  few Trusts are  entirely evil,  and 
that  none  are  all  good.  We need  rather  to 
recognize  that  from  the  viewpoint  of  social 
prosperity the modern system of industrial com- 
bination  has good qualities and bad  ones.  Be- 
fore undertaking a discussion  of  legislation that 
may serve as a proper remedy for the evils of in- 
dustrial combinations, it will be well,  therefore, 
to summarize their good and their evil qualities. 
We  may recognize as good qualities the  sav- 
ing of the wastes of competition.  These wastes 
are  many  and  often  great.  The combination 
saves a waste of capital by the prompt abandon- 
ment  of  poor  or  badly  situated plants  and  the 
concentration of energy in the best  ones  which 
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can  be  run to their full capacity and all of  the 
tlme ;  by  making the best ~ossible  use of  waste 
material through the production of by-products; 
by  pushing,  often  at  much  expense,  markets 
into  new  fields,  both  at  home  and  abroad, 
through  the  employment  of  the  ablest  men 
and  the best  advertising  devices,  which  could 
not so well  be  afforded  by smaller  institutions. 
There is great saving of energy in the elimina- 
tlon of cross freights ;  in the  best possible  divi- 
sion of labor,  and the organization of correlated 
branches to the best advantage ;  in the securing 
of  the  best  ability  to  manage  industries;  in 
making the best distribution  of managing ability, 
giving to each person the work for which  he  is 
best  adapted ; in  furnishing  opportunities  fit 
for  the  employment  of  the  greatest  capacity 
in all  fields  of  business  management,  opportu- 
nities which could not be  furnished without  the 
enorrnous power that  comes  from  the concen- 
tration of capital. 
Enormous as these benefits to society may be 
from  this  better  organization  of  capital  under 
the  new  regime,  no  less  pronounced  are  the 
evils.  (I) Investors of capital are often  griev- 
3usly  wronged  through  concealment  of  facts 
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and deception practised  by  promoters and direc. 
tors  at  the  time  an industry is organized,  and, 
later, through misrepresentation of the col.dition 
of business and of the methods in which a busi- 
ness  is  carried  on.  The g eatest  evil  at  the 
time  of  the  organization  or extension  of  the 
business  probably comes from stock  watering,  a 
process which could not profitably be  carried on 
without concealment and deception. 
(2)  A second class of  persons  injured is that 
of the stockholders.  Directors not infrequently 
manage  the  business in their own interests,  re- 
gardless of those of the stockholders.  At times 
it is  really  made less profitable, or is so managed 
as apparently to  be  less  profitable,  in  order  to 
depress the stock on the market and to enable the 
directors through  gambling  speculations to reap 
large  profits.  Or, again,  if  the business itself 
is successfully managed, its methods of manage- 
ment  may  be  kept  secret,  and  the  directors, 
through  their  exclusive  knowledge,  will  reap 
large profits  by buying  or selling at the expense 
of  their  fellow  stockholders,  who,  from  the 
nature  of  the  case,  cannot be so well  informed 
as  they. 
(3) Persons,  not  members  of a  corporation, 
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may  be  injured  as  consumers  by  high  prices, 
which  can  be  kept  high,  provided  the  com- 
bination can secure  monopolistic  power.  The 
temptation to keep prices  above former competl- 
tive rates is, of course, greatly increased when the 
corporation has issued large amounts of watered 
stock. 
(4)  The producers  of  raw  material  may be 
injured  by low  prices,  which  the  combination, 
by  virtue  of  its  being the largest,  if  not almost 
the sole buyer,  can compel the producer  to ac- 
cept. 
(5)  The  combination  may  so  increase  its 
power as to injure the wage  earners by compel- 
ling  them  to  accept lower  wages  or to  work 
under  less  favorable  conditions than  would  be 
granted  by  competing  concerns.  So,  too,  the 
power  exercised,  apparently arbitrarily at times, 
of closing part of the plants to avert a strike, or 
even to affect the stock market, is dangerous. 
(6)  It may  happen  at times  that  the  larger 
organizations will exert so powerful an influence 
on  our  political  organizations  that the  purpose 
of  the  State  will  be  directed  away  from  the 
common weal. 
(7)  The mental  tone  of  the  business  come 
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munity may be lowered by depriving individuals 
of  the  privilege  and  of  the  power  to enter 
independently into  business  as  readily as  could 
be  done  were  capital  less  concentrated.  It 
should be borne  in  mind that this evil,  while  it 
exists,  is  offset,  in  part,  by  some  of  the  ad- 
vantages mentioned above. 
(8)  And,  again,  the  moral  tone  of  business 
may  be  lowered.  If the  larger  organizations 
employ  unscrupulous  methods  in  dealing  with 
competitors,  or  customers,  or  laborers,  their 
greater  power,  especially  if  it  is  great  enough 
to  give  them  a  partial  or  complete  monop- 
oly  for  a  time,  will  have  a  much  more  detri- 
mental influence than the same  acts  of  an  in- 
dividual,  both  on  account  of  the  range  of  its 
application  and  of  the more powerful influence 
of its example.  Here  again  it  may be well  to 
state that there is no reason  to believe  that  in- 
dividuals managing these  large  combinations  of 
capital  are worse moralIy,  or have more evil in- 
tentions  as  regards  competitors  or  the  public 
than  managers  of  small  establishments.  Both 
classes  look  carefully after  their own interests, 
and  feel  themselves justified  in  so  doing;  but 
the power of  the manager of  the large corpora- 
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tion is greater,  and the injuries,  both  economic 
and moral,  to  the  ~ublic  from  his  selfish  acts 
may be  much more severe. 
Many of those who are most inclined  toward 
the doctrine of  freedom  in  industry  think  that 
the wisest policy  in dealing  with  the  combina- 
tions  is  the  let alone  policy,  except  so far as 
advantages  are  secured  by  the  combinations 
thr~ugh  certain restrictive provisions in our laws, 
such as tariffs  or patents.  Such advocates,  of 
course,  advise the removal of these discriminat- 
ing favors.  Some of those persons,  on the other 
hand,  who are most  impressed with the evils of 
the combinations,  have advocated their absolute 
destruction by legislative measures. 
Twenty-seven  States  and  Territories  have 
passed laws intended  to destroy such  industrial 
combinations as now  exist,  and  to prevent  the 
formation  of others.  Fifteen States have sirni- 
lar  provisions  in  their  constitutions,  although 
four of these have not enacted statutory measures 
to  carry  out  these  constitutional  provisions. 
Besides this legislation on the part of our States, 
we have a Federal Anti-Trust  Act (the so-called 
Sherman Act of 1890)  ;  and certain provisions of 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Law  of  1887,  by The  Trust  Problem 
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checking discriminations,  work against industrial 
combinations.  A study of these statutes arid of 
the decisions of  our courts of  last resort  which 
have been  mzde under them, will show that they 
have  had  comparatively  little,  ~racticall~  no 
effect,  as  regards  the  trend  of  our  industrial 
development. 
It is true that through these acts of legislatures 
and  courts the  form of  combination  has varied 
more or less.  Through the influence of these stat- 
utes also the tenets of the common law regarding 
monopoly and restraint of trade have been slightl! 
changed.  Under the common law restraint of 
trade needed to be unreasonable in order to be con- 
demned ;  under some of these statutes all restraint 
of trade,  whether reasonable or unreasonable,  is 
condemned.  Some of the statutes have gone to 
such extremes that, had they been literally inter- 
preted, they would practically have stopped many 
of  the  ordinary  agreements  in  business  which 
are necessary for its successful  prosecut;on,  and 
which are without any intention or any effect of 
monopoly or of other practice which would ted 
in any way to the injury of the community.  In 
the interpretation  of  the statutes,  however,  0111 
courts have regularly been rather more conserva- 
218 
tive  than  the  lawmakers,  and  have  practically 
insisted that there should be monopoly,  either in 
intent or to a certain degree at least  in fact,  be- 
fore  an  industrial  organization  should  be  held 
illegal.  It may  be  said  therefore  that,  so  far 
as State  legislation  is  concerned  at  least,  this 
destructive  tendency in  legislation  has  perhaps 
already  accomplished  its  utmost,  unless  more 
power  be  granted  the  States.  If  Congress 
were to give to the States control over interstate 
traffic carried on within their borders, as has been 
advocated,  possibly still  more might  be  done in 
that direction. 
So  far  as  the industrial combinations are the 
result  of  special  advantages  granted  to  indi- 
viduals or to corporations,  whether by the State 
or  by  others,  it  is  probable  that  in  most  in- 
stances the evil effects  would  be lessened, if not 
even  completely  removed,  by  the  removal  of 
such  discriminating  favors.  If  railroads  are 
giving  special  rates  to  large  shippers,  and  are 
thus  building  up  monopolistic  organizations, 
such  discriminations,  which  are  illegal  now, 
should  be  stopped  by  the  application  of  more 
effective remedies.  It is probable that the hands 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission can be 
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by  law materially strengthened, and thereby this 
evll materially lessened.  If enacted into law by 
Congress,  the  recommendations  of  the Indus- 
trial Commission-that  the Interstate Commerce 
Commission be given the power of  audit of  ac- 
counts of railroads, and that its decisions regard- 
ing freight rates go into force and remain in force 
until reversed by  a decree of court on the appeal 
of the  shipper,  as  well as  the still further sug- 
gestion  that  penalties  be  fines against the cor- 
poration and not imprisonment of the official-it 
is probable,  would materially  lessen,  at any rate, 
this  evil  of  freight  discriminations  in  favor of 
the  combinations.  The bill  lately  passed  by 
the  House of  Representatives  looks  somewhat 
in the same  direction,  but  possibly attempts to 
go further than is wise.  It is well  to be tem- 
perate in legislation which affects profoundly the 
whole industrial  structure, and to  make haste 
slowly."  The end  will  often  be  sooner 
reached. 
Likewise,  the monopoly that comes from the 
holding of patents, as in the case of wire fencing, 
or as has  been the case with the telephone,  can 
perhaps be removed by amendments to our patent 
laws.  It has been suggested that instead of oul 
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granting  a  legal  monopoly  to an  inventor,  the 
production of  the invention should  be  left free 
to all who stand ready to pay him a royalty fixed 
by  the law.  He would  thus  be  made  surer of 
his reward,  while the public  would  be  benefited 
by  cheaper patented goods instead of injured  by 
the patent monopoly,  as seems  now at times to 
be the case.  The  details of such an amendment 
to the patent law may well afford a  subject for 
careful study. 
So far as the remedy of a removal or lessening 
of  the  tariff on products which are largely con- 
trolled  by  industrial  combinations is concerned, 
that  has alreadj been  discussed  in  Chapter 11. 
It is in all probability  true that by  such removal 
of  the tariff the evil effects of  the higher  price 
would,  for the time being at any rate,  be  mate- 
rially lessened,  and the suggestion of this remedy 
is certainly good,  provided the remedy were ap- 
plied with reasonable  discretion and a reasonable 
judgment regarding present industrial conditions. 
But, on the other hand, as has been said before, it 
must be  perfectly evident that the removal of the 
tariff  would  not  destroy  in  this  country  an 
industrial  combination  without  first  destroying 
its  surviving  rivals-while  it  might  also  very 
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readily be in many cases the one incentive needed 
toward bringing  about a world-wide combination 
against  which tariffs could not avail. 
Amendments  to the corporation  laws which 
would hold  officers and directors and  promoters 
to  more  direct  responsibility would  be  service- 
able,  and  should  be  especially  directed  to the 
prevention of their activity in the stock market. 
That end can probably  be  attained  by  the  next 
remedy suggested. 
A remedy which would strike  directly at  the 
~aost  crying evils of  the industrial combinations 
is  publicity,  which has been so often  advocated 
during  the  past  year.  Publicity  regarding  the 
organization of a business, which should compel 
promoters  to show clearly to investors the basis 
on which  a  large  corporation  or a combination 
of corporations is organized, would certainly put 
careful investors into a position to protect them- 
selves.  Of course there would  still be  foolish 
people who would  buy %ambling stocks,  credu- 
lous ones who,  without investigation,, would be- 
lieve  any story told  in  the  papers.  The  State 
cannot  well  protect  such,  without  destroying 
personal freedom.  It  is  doing enough if  it en- 
ables a careful man to protect himself. 
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More frequent reports regarding the condition 
of  a business,  carefully audited by persons work- 
ing  in  the  interests  of  the  stockholders,  and 
quite possibly  under the supervision of  the gov- 
ernment, as  has  been  lately  advocated  by Mr. 
Bird  S.  Coler,  the  Comptroller  of  the City of 
New York,"  will  still  further  protect  stock- 
holders  against  the  corrupt  practices  of  direc- 
tors.  Excellent,  however,  as  is  the  general 
purpose of  Mr. Coler's  plan,  and sound  as  are 
many of his arguments,  he goes so far as,  under 
our  present  conditions,  to run  the  risk  of  ex- 
posing  every  sound  conservative  business  to 
the danger of blackmail,  and in one or two par- 
ticulars at least to hamper unnecessarily a sound 
and beneficial  business.  There is  decided ob- 
jection  to putting  too much power in the hands 
of government inspectors with discretion,  when 
the  same  end  of  government  enforcement  of 
publicity  can  be  better  accomplished  in  other 
ways.  It is  of  course  possible  that  if  Mr. 
Coler were to put his views  into a definite bill, 
some  changes  in  them would  be  made,  or  his 
opinion would  be  more clearly understood. 
The publicity also which should show with a 
*  See Appendix C. 
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reasonable degree of detail the profits of the larger 
combinations would, in case of the abuse of their 
power,  so  stimulate  competition  against  them, 
either  actually  or  potentially,  that  consumers 
would  to  a  great  degree  be  protected  against 
excessive increase in prices. 
At the same time the laborer, through his ful- 
ness of knowledge regarding the financial condi- 
tion of his employer,  would be enabled to make 
his  demands at times  when  it would be wise to 
grant  them,  and would  avoid  the  mistakes  too 
frequent  at  present,  of  striking  on  a  falling 
market when his employer's  losses are such that 
he stands ready to close his establishment if any 
excuse is offered him. 
The  degree  of  publicity  needed  and  the 
method of its enforcement as regarded by others 
who recommend publicity, can perhaps be shown 
best by the study of the bill drawn for Governor 
Roosevelt, The  New York Business Companies' 
Act:  1900." 
It is interesting to note,  too,  that Mr. Bryan, 
while  advocating  national  regulation,  has  also 
publicity in mind as a chief remedy  for the two 
great  evils  of  stock  watering  and  monopoly. 
* See Appendix D. 
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A national government license, he thinks, should 
be secured, before a corporation should be allowed 
to do business outside the State of its origin.* 
This is  not  the  place  to go into a  detailed 
discussion of the legal  questions  regarding  the 
scope of  federal  legislation  as  compared  with 
that of  the  States,  nor  to discuss  the  amend- 
ment to the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
proposed  by  the  Judiciary  Committee  of  the 
House of Representatives  at  the  last session of 
Congress.  It is  purely  a  legal  question  as  to 
whether publicity can be enforced at present by 
the  federal  courts  or under  a  law  passed  by 
Congress without an amendment to the  Consti- 
tution. 
It may be said, however,  that if three or four 
of our largest States,  such as New York,  Penn- 
sylvania,  Illinois,  and  Massachusetts,  were  to 
enact laws along  somewhat similar lines,  which 
should  afford  the  greatest  facilities  to corpora- 
tions organized  honestly for the purpose of con- 
ducting a legitimate business,  while at the same 
time they should  compel a reasonable  degree of 
publicity  regarding  both  the  organization  and 
the management,  much could be accomplished, 
* See Appendix E. 
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even  though  the  legislation  were  not  uniform 
in all the States.  Our States  can  impose  con- 
ditions  upon  which  they  will  permit  foreign 
corporations to do business within their borders, 
except so far as that business is of  an  interstate 
nature.  A  few of  our larger  States so uniting, 
would control so large a part of  the  business of 
the nation that,  if  their provisions regarding the 
legitimate  employment  of  honest  capital  were 
liberal  and  fair,  corporations  organized  with 
speculative ends in view would be so discredited 
that the larger part of their evils would be swept 
away. 
Through  this  publicity  thus  secured,  we 
might  well  secure  other  information  which 
would lead as time  went on to regulation  more 
definite  and  more  rigorous.  But  for  the  time 
at least,  it is probably  unwise to enter upon any 
measure  beyond  those  mentioned,  until our in- 
formation is somewhat more  complete.  There 
remains beyond doubt,  as soon as our knowledge 
is sufficiently  definite regarding the workings of 
these organizations,  a  taxing  power  which  can 
compel,  and  that  readily,  a  distribution  of  any 
surplus  profits to the community.  It is  prob- 
able,  however,  that  before  this  remedy  would 
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need  to be  applied  to any rigorous degree,  this 
same  distribution,  as  soon  as  the  conditions 
were  fully known,  would be  made  more  equit- 
ably and  more justly under the  simple  pressure 
3f  public opinion,  through  lessening  prices and 
higher wages.  That result,  however,  desirable 
as it is,  and one upon which our eyes should be 
fixed as  the  ultimate goal,  is  one which  can be 
secured by legislation without grave harm to our 
delicate  industrial  machinery  only  through  the 
knowledge  that comes  from a wider and longer 
experience. Industrial  Combinations in  Europe 
CHAPTER XI1 
INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS  IN EUROPE  * 
The study  of  industrial combinations under 
the differing conditions in Europe serves to con- 
firm to a material extent the conclusions reached 
in  preceding  chapters.  It is  probable  that  in 
Germany and  Austria,  if not even  in  England, 
industrial  combinations  cover as many different 
industries,  and  control as large a portion of the 
manufactures  in  each industry as is the case in 
the United States. 
On the other  hand,  in England  only is  the 
form  of  combination generally  that of  a single 
corporation  owning  many  separate  establish- 
ments.  In  all  of  these  countries  are  found 
numerous  combinations  of  the  primitive  form 
mentioned  in  the  earlier  chapters,  which  are 
merely agreements-often  local in their nature- 
among different manufacturers or dealers to limit 
*Material  for this chapter  was  gathered  primarily  for 
the United States Industrial Commission in Europe in the 
summer of  1900.  Printed material has been collected since. 
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the amount of their output or to maintain prices 
at a rate agreed  upon.  But in all of the coun- 
tries also, aside from this loose and often merely 
local  arrangement,  there are large combinations 
controlling ninety per cent. or more of the entire 
output  of  a  single  product  within  the country 
named,  in  many  cases  having an international 
influence. 
The  causes of combinations as given by those 
who  have  been  most  active  in  forming  them 
and  in  managing  their  affairs  are  substantially 
the  same  everywhere  as in  the United  States, 
shawing that the principle of combination itself 
is  one  which  seems  normally  fitted  to  our 
present  stage of industrial development and one 
which is not dependent upon  mere  local condi- 
tions or legislation. 
The desire  to avoid  ruinous competition  is 
practically always mentioned  as the chief cause, 
With  that  are  associated  the  various  savings 
spoken  of  in  Chapter II., although  naturally 
some  of  these savings are  dependent  to a con- 
siderable  extent upon  the form  of  combination 
itself,  and  therefore  in  many  individual  cases 
are  not  found.  Speaking generally,  however, 
the  opportunity  of  avoiding  cross  freights,  of 
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running plants to full capacity and on full time, 
of special adaptation of  machinery,  and special- 
ization of different plants upon special products, 
with  the  corresponding  specialization  of  indi- 
vidual  skill on  the  part  of  the  managers  and 
workmen,  the common use  of  patents, brands, 
etc.,  the savings in advertising,  the lessening of 
the  cost  of superintendence,  the  possibility  at 
times  of saving  of  labor,  particularly  of travel- 
ling men,  and the other savings enumerated, are 
some of them found ~ractically  everywhere, and 
practically all of  them  are  found somewhere in 
studying the different combinations. 
Certain local circumstances in Europe, rarely 
found in the United  States, are met with which 
tend  somewhat  to check  their  growth.  For 
example,  in most of the older countries, a manu- 
facturing  firm  is  frequently  found  which  has 
been  established for several generations,  possibly 
even for centuries.  The  members of the family 
naturally take great  pride  in  their business,  and 
the  business  itself  becomes  to  a  considerable 
extent  hereditary.  Often,  beyond  doubt, 
through this business  inbreeding,  careless habits 
and wasteful methods creep in, and at times the 
sons or lineal descendants of the able founders of 
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the business  prove  to have  much  less business 
skill than their predecessors.  In more than one 
instance  men  have hesitated  to enter combina- 
tions,  because,  as  they said,  they had  hoped  to 
hand their business down to their sons, but they 
knew that  if  a  great  combination was formed, 
the  officers of  which  must  be  selected on the 
ground  of  business  capacity,  their  sons  must 
either  withdraw  or  take  a  subordioate  place. 
From the point  of  view of  economic efficiency, 
it  is doubtless  desirable  in  many of  these cases 
for the firm to be  replaced  by the combination. 
Some  of  these  same  influences  too,  taken 
with  others,  such  as  the  corporation  laws,  the 
attitude  of  the  courts,  and  the  state of  public 
opinion,  while not lessening materially the drift 
toward  combination,  have  nevertheless  affected 
decidedly the form which the combinations have 
assumed.  Not having yet felt the pressure of 
competition to quite so great a degree perhaps, as 
have manufacturers in the United States in many 
instances,  and not having  so often  the habit of 
conducting various  kinds of enterprises jointly, 
and,  in consequence,  of  submitting  one's  indi- 
vidual  will  in  many matters  to what  seems  to 
be the joint  interest  of  a  group,  the  individual 
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manufacturers in  nearly all  of Europe  seem  to 
struggle  more vigorously against  selling  out  or 
against subordinating themselves to the direction 
of a single  managing head than do the indepen- 
dent manufacturers in the United States.  One 
can hardly ascribe this difference to a greater spirit 
of  independence,  in  the  proper  sense  of  that 
word,  than exists in the United States, as  is  so 
often claimed by  the foreigners  themselves; but 
a less degree of willingness to abide by the deci- 
sion of a majority and to cast one's  own lot  in 
with that of others  seems  to be  clearly notice- 
able. 
The law  has  apparently  also  in all  of  the 
countries,  although,  as will be seen later,  there 
are  some  apparent  exceptions,  been ready  to 
uphold  contracts  to  limit  the  amount  of  the 
output, or even  to sell  goods at a certain  fixed 
rate-contracts  which  in  the  United  States 
would  be held  contrary to many of  our  newer 
anti-Trust  laws,  and which even would, in cer- 
tain instances at least,  come under the common 
law  principle  forbiding contracts in restraint  of 
trade.  It has not been  necessary,  therefore,  in 
order to bring about a uniform management, that 
the separate establishments  sell out  completely; 
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it suffices often if they agree one with the other 
upon  the  percentage  of  the  entire  output that 
will  be produced  by  each member of  the com- 
bination,  and then put into the hands of a com- 
mon selling bureau organized  in the interests of 
all  and  with  its managers  elected  by them  all, 
the selling of their entire product, as well as the 
allotment  to  each  of  his  quota  of  production 
whenever a change in circumstances arises. 
This is the form of  combination most gener- 
ally found  in Europe-a  central selling bureau, 
to which is given  the  power also  of  fixing the 
output,  while  in  the  organization  agreement 
itself the proportional  share of  each  member in 
the entire output is laid down. 
Often with this  general agreement, there are 
certain  local  peculiarities  or  variations depen- 
dent upon the nature of  the combination itself. 
For example,  in  the case  of  the  coal and iron 
syndicates,  ordinarily,  while  the  entire product 
offered for  sale within  the home  country must 
go through the hands of  the bureau,  reservation 
to the producer is regularly made of the materia: 
or fuel used within the establishment itself.  In 
the  Austrian  iron  combination  each  member 
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In the case of  the  powerful  sugar combina- 
tions of Austria  and  Germany, the  refiners  of 
sugar  guarantee  to  the  producers  of  the  raw 
sugar a certain fixed minimum  price.  In case 
the price fixed in  the world's  market,  as repre- 
sented by the market at Magdeburg in Germany, 
or Vienna  in  Austria,  is  below  this minimum 
price,  the refiners must make up the difference, 
and recoup  themselves  by  higher  prices  to the 
consumers  for  the  refined  product.  Such  a 
plan  of  working  has  for  many  years  proved 
eminently  successful  in  Austria,  and  there 
seems no  reason  to doubt  that a similar result 
will be reached in Germany. 
Speaking  generally,  even  in  the  case of  the 
greater  combinations  in  England,  which  have 
assumed the  corporate form,  it is  probable that 
to the managers of the individual plants a some- 
what  greater  degree  of  independence  is  per- 
mitted than  is  the  case  in  the  United  States. 
The managing directors of the Bradford  Dyers' 
Association  say that  in that business,  where iti- 
dividual  taste  is  of  so great  importance,  they 
have found it wiser to encourage each individual 
superintendent  to increase  his sales as much as 
possible by  exercising his inventive  skill in pro- 
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ducing a special quality  of goods.  They stimu- 
late him  still  further  to  good work  by  paying 
only  a  small  fixed  salary  and  then  making  a 
large percentage of  his income  dependent upon 
the profits of his separate plant.  A rigid system 
of comparative  book-keeping  among the differ- 
ent  establishments  is  maintained,  so  that  the 
managing  directors  and  the individual superin- 
tendents  are  able  to affect work  to a  material 
extent through this stimulus of rivalry. 
In  Austria  and  Germany  there  are  several 
combinations,  although  they  are not among the 
largest,  which  have taken  the form of  corpora- 
tions, such as the brush manufacturers of Niirn- 
berg and the soda water manufacturers of Vienna, 
but these are exceptional.  In England,  on the 
other  hand,  the  greatest  of  the  combinations 
have  taken  this  form,  and  their  reasons  for 
doing  so  are  substantially  those  given  in  the 
United  States-that  thereby  they  can  make 
more  savings,  and  they  can  enter  thus  more 
effectively  into the world's  markets. 
Very peculiar in its form,  and  so far as I am 
aware,  entirely  unique  in its  methods  and re- 
sults,  is  the  brass  bedstead  combination  in 
Birmingham,  England,  organiaed  and  largely 
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managed by  Mr.  E.  J. Smith.  As  a  result  of 
much  observation,  Mr. Smith  had  reached the 
conclusion  that  ruinous  competition  was  often 
the result of ignorance and careless management 
on the part  of  some  competing  establishments, 
they  never  having  taken  the  pains  to figure 
accurately their exact costs of  production.  He 
believes  that  it  is  not  merely  good  business 
policy to get fair  profits,  but  that it is  also im- 
moral under ordinary circumstances for a manu- 
facturer  to sell  his  goods  below cost with  the 
certainty of ultimate ruin before him if  he con- 
tinues  the  practice.  He  likewise  is  of  the 
opinion that  the laborers  should have  an active 
interest in the business  and should prosper with 
the  prosperity  of  their  employer.  Acting  on 
these principles,  he  has organized  several com- 
binations on substantially the following plan. 
In  the first place,  the laborers of all the plants 
entering the combination must be  organized into 
a union so that they can act as a unit as well as 
do their employers.  In the second place,  each 
establishment  must  make a very accurate state- 
ment of its actual cost of  production,  including 
interest on  capital invested,  a fair  salary to the 
manager,  even  though  he be the owner,  a rea- 
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sonable amount  for  depreciation  of  plant,  and 
even at  times  a  certain  allowance  to the em- 
ployer above his actual salary for  the added ex- 
pense to which he is  put by  virtue of his higher 
social  station.  On the  basis  of  these returns, 
then,  a minimum  cost for  the  product is fixed 
for all of the establishments,  and no one is per- 
mitted to sell  below a certain  percentage  above 
that  rate.  Each  employer  manages  his  own 
establishment,  sells  his own goods, acts entirely 
independently in every way,  with  the exception 
that  he must  not cut his  price  below a  certain 
percentage of  profit  on  this agreed-upon  mini- 
mum cost.  If,  with the market rate thus fixed 
substantially  by  the  cost  of  production  in  the 
poorer plants, one can make his products cheaper 
owing to greater skill,  his  profits will  naturally 
be larger. 
The laborers  benefit also from the combina- 
tion  in  like  proportion,  inasmuch  as  starting 
with  agreed-upon  normal  wages  on  the  basis 
of  a  minimum  price  and  normal  profits,  they 
receive a bonus  of an increase of wages in pro- 
portion  to  every  increase  in  profits  made  by 
their employer.  The workmen  agree  to work 
for  no  one  excepting  employers  belonging  to 
237 The  Trust  Problem 
the association,  whereas the employers,  on their 
part,  agree to hire no one excepting men belong- 
ing to this union.  It is thus a coalition between 
employers and employees to secure  high wages, 
and at any rate reasonable  profits,  although  this 
may well be at the expense  of  the general con- 
sumer.  Mr. Smith says that  he  does not con- 
sider one of  his  combinations a success until  it 
has  shown  itself  able  to increase  prices.  He 
does not think that the consuming public  ought 
to be aggrieved at any normal increase  in  price 
thus made,  because he believes that laborers and 
capitalists are  worthy  of  their  hire,  and  that 
consumers ought to be willing to pay not merely 
cut-throat  prices, but what he calls  reasonable 
prices. " 
It  is  true  that  he  acknowledges  that  the 
average  profit  agreed  upon  for  the  bedstead 
combination was about  10 per cent.  on the en- 
tire cost of  production,  and that in the industry 
in question a turn over  of  the  capital  was  ex- 
pected  from two to three times each year,  mak- 
ing certainly  a  profit  that  would,  by  most 
consumers,  at  any  rate,  if  not  by  others,  be 
considered  plenty  high  enough.  This plan  of 
Mr. Smith's  seemed to have worked  very  suc- 
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cessfully  for  some  ten  years  in  the  bedstead 
trade,  and  to  have spread successfully  in  other 
lines;  but  within  a  few  months  misfortunes 
have come and the combination  has  been,  tem- 
porarily,  at any rate, under somewhat of a cloud. 
It is  probable  that  in  Europe  capitalization 
is,  relatively  speaking,  not  so  high  as in  the 
United  States.  This is  due  in  part  to busi- 
ness habits-more  particularly,  probably,  to the 
greater degree of  publicity  required  for corpora- 
tions as well as for most other forms of business 
enterprises.  In England,  when one of the large 
corporations  has  been  formed,  there  has  been 
made pretty regularly a careful appraisal  of  the 
value of the separate  plants  as  going  concerns 
with a capitalization at  a  moderate rate  of  the 
earnings of  the separate plants for several  years 
preceding  the  combination.  It  is  doubtless 
true that in  a  good  many  instances  these  ap- 
praisals are made rather high; but  so far as one 
can learn,  it  has  been  only  in  the rarest cases 
that  there  has  been  issued  watered  stock  to 
double or treble or  quadruple  the  value  of  the 
tangible  assets,  and  rarely  also  is  the  stock 
issued  beyond  an  amount  upon  which  there 
might be reasonable  hope  of  paying  dividends. 
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In Germany,  Austria,  and France, whenever 
the combinations  have  assumed the  form  of  a 
stock corporation, the rigid laws have practically 
held capitalization down to the actual cash value 
of the assets,  estimating  the  establishment  as a 
going concern, the  promoter  receiving his pay, 
if he receives it at all,  either in some fixed sum 
for his trouble or in the  profit  that would come 
from selling shares at a premium. 
The  effect of the  combinations in Europe on 
prices  of  the  product seems  to have been,  on 
the whole,  substantially  that which has been in- 
dicated in Chapter VIII.  as  the  effects  of  the 
United States combinations.  Managers call at- 
tention  to the savings  of  combination,  and  to 
the fact  that  at  times prices  are  lowered;  but 
perhaps  more  frequently,  when  one  considers 
the matter with  them  dispassionately,  they will 
acknowledge that they believe the former profits 
were too low,  and that their prices have,  on the 
whole,  been slightly increased  as a result of the 
combination.  Almost  invariably they  add that 
they hope ultimately to be able to reduce the ab- 
solute prices more  rapidly  than they could have 
done without the combination;  but they expect, 
practically in  all cases,  to maintain  the margin 
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between  the cost  of  the  raw  material  and  the 
price  of  the  finished  product  at  a  somewhat 
higher  rate  than  existed  before.  Practically, 
however,  in  every  case,  they  believe,  that  by 
their adaptation  of the supply of the product to 
the  market  demand  they  will  be  able  to keep 
prices  much  steadier  than  before,  and to keep 
their  labor  more  regularly  employed,  thus  not 
merely ensuring  somewhat  more  secure  profits 
for  themselves,  but  also  protecting  to  a  very 
material extent  both  the  laborers  and the con- 
suming public against the ill effects  of commer- 
cial crises brought  on  often by  unregulated and 
ignorant over-production. 
More  interesting  in  certain  ways  than  the 
mere  study  of  domestic  prices  is  the  subject 
of  export  prices  and  the  relation  of  the  tariff 
to prices.  Of course  it  has  been  the custom 
in  most  countries,  not  merely  in  the  export 
but also in the domestic  trade,  when customers 
are  somewhat widely  removed  from  the manu- 
facturing establishment and it is somewhat diffi- 
cult to secure their  patronage,  to make particu- 
larly low prices in  order  to get rid of  a surplus 
stock.  It  has  regularly  been  explained,  and 
doubtless with  much  reason,  that  this  disposal 
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of  a  surplus  stock  at  low  rates,  even  indeed 
below cost,  does  not  increase  the  price  of  the 
I)roduct  to  home  consumers,  inasmuch  as  by 
exporting  the  surplus  the  plant  can  be  run to 
1t3  full  capacity  when  otherwise  it  is  neces- 
sarv to close  it  down  at  intervals  in  order to 
i 
plevent  an  accumulation  of  surplus  stock. 
The cheaper  production  coming  from  running 
the  plant  all  of  the  time  at  full  capacity  may 
thus so lessen the cost of  manufacture  that  the 
domestic  product  may sell  lower,  even  though 
the profit  on it is paying  for  the loss of the ex- 
port  goods,  than would  have  been  possible had 
a much  smaller  product  been  manufactured  at 
the increased cost brought about by  only a  par- 
tial use of the producing  capacity. 
Many persons,  however,  have  been  inclined 
to  criticise  the  combinations  by  asserting  that 
owing  to  their  monopolistic  power  they  were 
able to secure abnormally high prices from con- 
sumers at home,  and that when they sold abroad 
at somewhat lower rates, they were still not sell- 
ing at a loss,  but were thus showing merely the 
degree of oppression which they were exerclsing 
upon  the home consumer. 
This argument has frequently been combined 
with that  made in connection with a protective 
tariff.  When  in  a  protected  industry relieved 
of foreign competition  domestic  prices are kept 
materially higher  than  export prices,  it  is  per- 
haps  a  not unnatural conclusion  that the tariff 
is  fostering  monopoly,  and  that the  monopoly 
is  making  huge  profits  at  the  expense  of  the 
domestic consumer.  Doubtless in certain cases 
there is a very considerable  element  of  truth in 
the charge,  but  the  reply is ordinarily given  as 
above. 
Herr Wittgenstein,  the  founder of  the great 
iron  combination  in  Austria,  explains that  the 
protective tariff was needed for the  sake  of  the 
industry,  and  had  been  levied  by the  govern- 
ment  because  it was wise.  Ought not,  there- 
fore,  the manufacturer to meet the expectations 
of the law-givers by adding to the price at which 
foreign goods might without the protective tariff 
be sold in the country the amount  of  the  tariff 
itself?  In  case  this  were  unreasonable,  why 
was  the  tariff  levied  ?  If it  proved  unreason- 
able,  let  it  be  lowered.  So far  as  selling the 
goods in foreign markets at lower  rates  is  con- 
cerned,  not merely  do  the  iron manufacturers, 
but many  others,  say that, as has been intimated 
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above,  only by such  low  prices  can  they enter 
the foreign  markets at all and  dispose of  a sur- 
plus  which,  if  it  had  to be  sold  in  the  home 
country, would compel the partial closing of the 
plants  to the  great  detriment  of  numbers  of 
laborers,  and with  the  result  of  increasing  de- 
cidedly the cost of production. 
The  iron  manufacturers in Austria and Ger- 
many and  France  do not  hesitate  at all to say 
that in  fixing  their  prices  they practically  take 
the price of  the chief competing foreign coun- 
try  and  add  to that  the  costs  of  freight  and 
their own home tariff.  They believe  that they 
are justified  in  so  doing.  In individual cases, 
as,  for  example,  that of  the  iron  combinations 
in Germany, the combination has even found it 
wise,  as did  the  distillers  in  the United States 
under  the  old  Whiskey  Pool,  to assess  them- 
selves in order to pay export premiums to those 
of their  numbers who  are  selling  their surplus 
stock in the foreign market at a loss. 
Beyond  much  question,  in  two  or three  of 
the European  countries  at  least,  the  desire  to 
secure somewhat greater power in contests with 
the labor unions has  exerted a noticeable  influ- 
ence toward forming the combinations.  Never- 
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theless,  speaking  generally,  the  combinations 
seem to be  ready to recognize trade unions and 
to deal with them on reasonable terms.  In the 
case  of  the  coal  syndicate  of  Germany,  the 
manager says  that  in  his judgment  the leaders 
of the  union  believe  that  the  combination has 
been  to  their  advantage;  that  it  has  been  so 
managed as to give the men steady employment 
at, on the whole,  steadily increasing wages;  and 
that it is likely in the future to prevent industrial 
crises which will lead  to more unfavorable con- 
ditions for them.  They, therefore,  are,  on the 
whole,  inclined to favor the syndicate.  In the 
case  of  the  Bradford  Dyers  in  England,  the 
workingmen and employers have a joint  bureau 
for the settlement  of  disputes which may arise, 
with a  fund  on  both  sides  to  pay  damages  in 
case of dispute,  and  the  two classes seem to be 
working together with  mutual  respect,  and,  on 
the whole,  in harmony. 
It has already been noted that the E. J. Smith 
combinations  were  founded  upon  an  alliance 
between  the  workingmen  and  the  employers. 
Generally speaking,  throughout  Europe,  so far 
as one can gather,  there  seems to be little hos- 
tility  on  the  part  of  the  laborers  toward  the 
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combinations,  and  so  far,  indeed,  as  one  can 
see,  there is not  in  Europe the  same  degree of 
host~lity  on  the  part  of  the  public  toward  the 
concentration of capital that exists in the United 
States. 
It is true that the people  in England complain 
at times of  the  number of  members  of Parlia- 
ment  who  hold  directorships  in  corporations, 
but  they  evidently  consider  this  rather  a  hint 
toward political corruption than an attack upon 
combinations as such; and they do not have any 
especial fear of the power of monopoly. 
In France some of the leaders of the Radicals 
seem  to believe  that  the  government  ought to 
take certain  active  measures  toward investigat- 
ing the question  of combination with the possi- 
ble thought  of  protecting  the  people;  but here 
again those  of  socialistic  tendencies  are  rather 
inclined to welcome  the  drift  toward combina- 
tion  as a first  step  toward  state  socialism,  and 
do not  apparently have  any fear  of  losing  per- 
sonal liberty through such influence. 
Similar are the conditions in Austria and  Ger- 
many.  In Austria  there  has  apparently  been 
a somewhat greater feeling of dread and of hos- 
tility  toward  the  combinations  than  in  any 
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other  European  country.  It  is  possible  that 
here  the  movement  may  have  been  almost  as 
active at  times  as  in  the United States.  The 
opponents,  however,  find it much more difficult 
to  bring  about  legislation  than  in  the  united 
States,  so  that  comparatively  little  has  been 
done,  and  whatever  agitation  there  may  have 
been  has been  limited  largely  to editorials  and 
speeches without any very effective results. 
In  Germany  the  high  price  of  coal  during 
the last  two years  has,  by  many,  been ascribed 
to the coal  syndicate,  and there  has been much 
bitter  complaint.  On the  other  hand,  how- 
ever,  those who  have  looked  most  closely into 
the  matter-chambers  of  commerce,  members 
of  the  government, and  others-seem  to have 
reached the conclusion  that  the increased price 
of  coal  is  due  rather  to the  extraordinary  de- 
mand which  has  come  from the present period 
of prosperity.  They caIl  attention  to  the fact 
that, although  the  price  has  increased,  the in- 
crease is much less rapid than it was in the sev- 
enties and eighties  under  somewhat  similar cir- 
cumstances,  and  that  as  yet,  at  any  rate,  the 
price has  not  reached  so  high  a point.  They 
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opened new mines,  and has  increased  its output 
to a greater  extent than  have  the  independent 
coal producers.  On  the whole,  they are rather 
inclined  to  give  the  syndicate  the  credit  of 
checking  an  abnormal  tendency  toward  over- 
production and  speculation, with the  danger of 
a  consequent  crisis,  than  to  blame  it  for  the 
course that it has followed. 
Questions  in  the  House  of  Representatives 
of Prussia and  in  the  Imperial  Reichstag have 
called  from  the   minister  of  Commerce words 
of defence  and  even  of  commendation  for the 
syndicate. 
With  the  exception  of  the  coal  syndicate, 
there seems to have  been  relatively little  com- 
plaint  made in  Germany against  the  combina- 
tions. 
So  far  as  actual  or  contemplated  legislation 
is concerned, a little more may perhdps be said. 
In England,  the amendments of  the year 1900 
to the  stock  corporation  law have  been in the 
direction of enforced publicity to a much greater 
degree.  The earnings  of  promoters  must  be 
laid  bare;  and  the  regular  profits  or losses  of 
the business,  if  the  law is enforced with a rea- 
sonable degree of care,  may  certainly be lcnown 
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to the stockholders  and  to the  general  public. 
Legislation  against  combinations  as  such  has 
not been  made,  but  under the  old common law 
monopolies  and  contracts  in  restraint  of  trade 
are,  of  course,  forbidden  or declared  invalid. 
Nevertheless,  the  English  courts have taken  a 
position somewhat  d~fferent  from  that followed 
by the courts of the United States.  They seem 
rather to be  of  the  opinion  that  an agreement 
for the protection  of  one's  own business,  even 
though  it  may  seriously  injure  competitors,  is 
not to be looked  upon  as a combinat~on  in un- 
reasonable  restraint  of  trade,  but  rather  as  a 
justifiable  measure  of  protection  and  one  that 
should be considered valid. 
In France, the provision of the French Penal 
Code,  which  forbids  coalitions  to raise  prices, 
especially if fraudulent representations are used, 
has,  beyond  doubt,  had  a  very  deterrent effect 
toward open  agreements  on prices.  Combina- 
tions have  either  taken  the  form of single cor- 
porations,  or,  like the  Comptoir MCtallurgique 
de Longwy,  have  organized a selling  bureau as 
an  independent  establishment  which  buys  and 
sells the products  of  the  different  members,  or 
e!se,  like  the  sugar  combination,  they take the 
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form of  an  agreement  regarding output and al- 
low the prices  to be  regulated  thereby without 
any formal contract on that subject being made. 
The  drift toward  combination  in  France is un- 
mistakable,  but  it  is very evident  that  this law 
has checked  the  open  movement,  and  has also 
affected to a considerable degree the form which 
combinations assume. 
In Germany, the courts  have  upheld,  in one 
or two very striking decisions, the principle that 
agreements to prevent ruinous competition,  and 
to maintain  prices  so that  there  shall be a rea- 
sonable return upon capital,  are to be considered 
valid,  and that  penalties  in  such agreements in 
the nature of fines upon those who violate them 
may be enforced by law.  The  court in one de- 
cision says: ''  When in a branch of industry the 
prices of the product  fall  too low,  and the suc- 
cessful conduct of the industry is endangered or 
made impossible,  the  crisis  setting in as the re- 
sult of such a state  of affairs  is  detrimental not 
only to individuals, but also to  society as a whole, 
and it is therefore  in  the  interests  of the com- 
munity  that  improperly  low  prices  should  not 
exist in a certain branch  of  industry  for a long 
time.  'Therefore,  it cannot be  simply and gen- 
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erally considered  as  contrary to the interests of 
the community when  entrepreneurs interested in 
a certain branch  of  industry unite with  the ob- 
ject  of  preventing  or  moderating  the  mutual 
underselling,  and  as  a  result  of  the  latter,  the 
fall  of  the  prices  of  their  products.  On the 
contrary,  when  prices  are  for  a  long  time ac- 
tually  so  low that  financial  ruin  threatens  the 
etztrepreneurs,  their  combination  appears  to  be 
not merely a legitimate  means of  self-preserva- 
tion,  but also a measure serving the interests of 
the community." 
In Austria, as  has  been  intimated,  the  feel- 
ing against combinations  has  been considerably 
stronger.  In  1897  the  combinations  among 
brewers,  sugar  refiners,  and  others  seemed  to 
the government to threaten  somewhat the inter- 
ests of the treasury,  inasmuch as if prices should 
be increased and, in consequence, the consump- 
tion  should  fall  off,  the  tax  levied  upon those 
products  would  be  materially  lessened.  With 
this  thought  in  mind,  the  Finance  Depart- 
ment proposed  a bill  placing  these combinations 
whose  goods were  subject  to the  consumption 
tax  under  the  somewhat  rigid  supervision  of 
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reasonable  measures  were  taken,  the  govern- 
ment might  forbid a contract or might give the 
fullest degree of  publicity  to all of  the business 
of the combination.  Owing in part to the polit- 
ical condition of  Austria,  in par: also,  perhaps, 
to the fact  that  the  law was  not  more general 
in its application,  nothing  further  has come of 
this.  Meanwhile  the  Department  of  Trade 
and  Industry  more  than  a  year  ago appointed 
a special  committee  to consider  the subject of 
the regulation of the combinations.  This  com- 
mittee,  after  careful  discussion  of  the  whole 
question,  has  lately  handed  in  its report to the 
Section for Industry,  Manufactures  and Trade, 
and  has  made  the  following  recommenda- 
tions : 
"  (I) That the  combinations  be  recognized 
as  legal  organizations,  and  be  put  in  conse- 
quence into legal form. 
"  (2) That every combination be  obliged to 
record its  founding with  a  combination bureau 
or court,  which  shall  be  given  certain judicial 
powers. 
"  (3)  This combination  court  should  have 
also the powers  of  a court  of  the first instance 
to  settle  primarily  all  controversies  at  private 
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law arising in the course of  the business of the 
combination. 
"  (4) For  the  checking  of  any tendency to- 
ward  monopolistic  prices  on  the  part  of  the 
combination through its  limitation of free com- 
petition,  measures in the direction of the modi- 
fication  of  import  duties,  and  of  freight  rates 
on the State  railroads,  should be taken,  as well 
as measures  looking  toward  the furtherance of 
unions to oppose  the  combinations.  (Presum- 
ably organizations among dealers and others.) 
"  (5)  For the  purpose of  deliberating and of 
deciding regarding  the  measures to be taken by 
the  administration,  there  should  be  created  a 
Monopoly  and  Combination  Council,  which 
should be a consultative organ  of  the Ministry 
of Trade and Commerce. 
"  (6) Finally,  the  government  was  formally 
requested  on the  basis  of  this report to prepare 
a bill  for  a  law on combinations to be laid  be- 
fore  the Committee on Combinations  for con- 
sideration. " 
This so  far  seems  to be  the most advanced 
step  taken  in  any European  country regarding 
restrictive  legislation.  It seems  not at all im- 
probable that,  as the result of this careful study 
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on the part of  the government, some legislative 
measures  may be  passed  within a year  or two. 
It should be  noted  that  the result of this study 
-and  one  may say that  similar  opinions seem 
to  be  prevalent  also  elsewhere  in  Europe-is 
that  the  combinations are  not  to be set aside, 
but are to be  recognized  as normal institutions 
in modern industry, and are to be restricted only 
by  certain measures  on the part  of the govern- 
ment,  which  will  prevent  abuse  of the power 
which they undoubtedly possess. 
APPENDIX APPENDIX  A 
FORMULATION OF SUGGESTED 
METHODS  FOR  THE SOLUTION 
OF  THE TRUST  PROBLEM 
BY WILLIAM  WIRT HOWE, 
Permanent Chairman of the Chicago Conference on Trusts 
WHEN  I  came  to  this  meeting  as  a  dele- 
gate from the New Orleans  Board  of  Trade, I 
prepared, at the request of the Civic Federation, 
a paper on  some  of  the  questions  here  in  de- 
bate ;  but  when  by your  kind - ess I was  called 
to preside over your deliberations, it was deemed 
more becoming  that your  chairman  should  not 
undertake to express  any views  on  these  ques- 
tions,  or undertake,  even  if  I  could,  to  influ- 
ence any opinion.  And so, with a little of that 
paternal  anguish  which  may  have  visited  the 
soul  of  Abraham when he  thought  himself  in 
conscience  bound  to sacrifice  his  son,  I  sup- 
pressed the little  paper.  The suppression  was 
fortunate, because if  the paper were to be writ- 
ten  this evening  it would  be  a  better  one,  for 
the  reason  that  its  author  has  learned  a  good 
deal  in  the  last  four  days. The Trust  Problem  Chicago Trust  Conference 
In what are called  courts  of  conciliation,  in 
some jurisdictions,  the constant aim of  the pre- 
siding  magistrate  is  to  note  those  admissions 
and concessions of the contending parties them- 
selves which may be  found  even  in  apparently 
hopeless  disputes,  and  to  make  those  admis- 
sions  and  concessions  a  basis  for  a  judgment 
substantially just. 
Now,  following  this  sensible idea,  where do 
we stand  after  four  days  of  discussion,  always 
~nteresting, often  profoundly  scientific,  and 
sometimes  passing  into  the  brilliant  sphere  of 
oratory ?  It seems to me-simply  as  an  indi- 
vidual,  of  course-that  almost  every  paper  or 
address we  have  heard  has  made  some admis- 
sions  or  concessions  which  may  form  a  basis 
for  some conclusions,  and if  you will allow me 
I will formulate some of them only, as follows: 
I.  Combinations and conspiracies in the form 
of  trusts  or  otherwise  in  restraint  of  trade  or 
manufacture,  which by the consensus of judicial 
opinion  are  unlawful,  should so be declared  by 
legislation, with  suitable sanctions, and,  if  pos- 
sible,  by a  statute  uniform  in all  jurisdictions, 
and  also  uniform as to all  persons,  and  such  a 
statute  should  be  thoroughly enforced,  so  that 
those who  respect  it shall  not be at a disadvan- 
tage as compared with those who disregard it. 
2.  That the organization  of  trading  and in- 
dustrial  corporations, whether  under  general or 
special  laws,  be  permitted  only under a system 
of careful governmental control, also uniform,  if 
possible,  in  all  jurisdictions,  whereby many  of 
the evils of  which  complaint is now made  may 
be avoided. 
3.  The objects of  the corporation  should be 
confined within limits definite and certain.  The 
issue  of  stock  and  bonds,  which  has  been  a 
matter of so much just criticism and complaint, 
should  be  guarded  with  great  strictness.  If 
mortgage bonds seem to  be required,  they should 
be allowed  only for a moderate  fraction  of  the 
true  cash  value  of  the  property  that  secures 
them.  As for  issues  of  stock,  they should  be 
safeguarded  in  every  possible  way.  They 
should only be allowed  either for the  money or 
for property actually received  by the  company, 
and dollar for  dollar,  and when  the  property is 
so conveyed it should be on an honest appraise- 
ment  of actual value,  so that  there may be  no 
watering of stock. 
4.  And  finally,  there  should  be  a  thorough 
system of  reports and governmental  inspection, 
especially as  to issues  of  bonds  and stock and 
the status  and value  of  property,  whether  cor- 
poreal or incorporeal.  Yet,  at the same  time, 
in  the  matter  of  trading  and  industrial  com- 
panies,  there  are  legitimate  business  secret4 
which  must be respected by the general public. 
In short,  we  need  to frankly recognize the fact 
that  trading  and  industrial  corporations  are 
needed to organize the activities of our country, The Trust  Problem 
and that they are  not  to  be  scolded  or belied, 
but  controlled, as  we  control  steam  and  elec- 
tricity,  which are also dangerous,  if not carefully 
managed, but of wonderful usefulness,  if rightly 
harnessed  to the car of progress.  APPENDIX  B 
PRELIMINARY  REPORT OF  THE 
INDUSTRIAL  COMMISSION 
The act of  June  18,  1898,  creating the In- 
dustrial  Commission,  authorizes  it  to  "report 
from time to time to the Congress of the United 
States."  As  the  subject  of  "Trusts,"  or 
Industrial Combinations,  seemed to be one upon 
which there was pressing demand for trustworthy 
information,  your  Commission  gave  it  early 
attention.  Although  we  have examined sixty- 
two witnesses  on trust topics,  whose testimony 
is  herewith  submitted,  our  inquiry  has  been 
limited  to  eleven  of  the  more  prominent,  but 
typical,  combinations.  This leaves quite a large 
field  for  further  investigation,  but  the  urgent 
demand for information leads us to submit what 
we have  in  hand  at this  time.  As a result  of 
our investigation of industrial combinations thus 
far, your Commission are of opinion that certain 
evils in connection with them should be checked 
by  appropriate  legislation.  Experience  proves The  Trust  Problem  Report  of  Industrial  Commission 
that  industrial  combinations  have  become  fix- 
tures in our business life.  Their power for evil 
should  be destroyed  and  their  means  for good 
preserved.  As  a  result of further investigation 
on  our  part,  or  of  further development on the 
part  of  the  combinations,  it  may  be  possible 
later  to propose  additional  measures  for relief 
without running the risk of increasing the evils. 
At present  we propose the following,  which,  if 
severally adopted by the States,  or so far as pos- 
sible by  the Federal Government,  we are confi- 
dent  will  be  of  great  service,  and  will  not 
endanger business prosperity. 
To  prevent  the organizers of corporations or 
industrial combinations from deceiving investors 
and  the  public,  either through  suppression  of 
material  facts  or  by  making  misleading  state- 
ments,  your Commission recommend : 
(a) That  the  promoters  and  organizers  of 
corporations  or  industrial  combinations  which 
look to the public to  purchase  or deal  in  their 
stocks or securities should be required to furnish 
full details regarding the organization,  the prop- 
erty,  or  services  for which  stocks  or securities 
are to be issued,  amount and kind of  same,  and 
all other material information necessary  for safe 
and intelligent investment ; 
(b)  That  any prospectus or announcement of 
any kind  soliciting subscriptions,  which fails  to 
make  full  disclosures  as aforesaid,  or which  is 
false,  should  be  deemed  fraudulent,  and  the 
promoters,  with  their  associates,  held  legally 
responsible ; 
(c)  That the  nature  of  the business  of' the 
corporation or industrial combination, all powers 
ganted to directors and officers thereof,  and  all 
limitations  upon  them  or  upon  the  rights  or 
powers of the members,  should be required to be 
expressed  in  the  certificate  of  incorporation, 
which instrument should be  open  to inspection 
by  any investor. 
The affairs  of  a  corporation  or  industrial 
combination should be carried on, without detri- 
ment to the public,  in the interest  of  its  mem- 
bers,  and under their  lawful  control.  To  this 
end the directors or trustees should be required : 
(a) To  report  to  the  members  thereof  its 
financial condition in  reasonable  detail,  verified 
by a competent auditor,  at least once each year; 
(h) To  inform members regarding the method 
and conduct of business by granting them,  under 
proper restrictions,  access to records of directors' 
meetings,  or otherwise ; 
(c)  To provide  for  the  use  of  members, 
before  the  annual  meetings,  lists  of  members, 
with their addresses,  and their several holdings; 
and 
(d)  To  provide,  in whatever other ways may 
be  named  in  the  certificate  of  incorporation, 
means  whereby  the  members  may prevent the 
misuse of their property  by  directors or trustees. 
The  larger corporations-the  so-called trusts- 
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should be required to publish annually a properly 
audited report,  showing in reasonable detail their 
assets  and  liabilities,  with  profit  or loss ; such 
report  and  audit  under  oath  to be  subject  to 
Government inspection.  The purpose  of  such 
publicity  is  to  encourage  competition  when 
profits  become  excessive,  thus protecting  con- 
sumers  against too high prices  and to guard the 
interests  of  employees  by  a  knowledge  of  the 
financial  condition  of  the  business  in  which 
they are employed. 
From the  testimony  given  before  the Com- 
mission,  and  herewith  submitted,  it  has  been 
proved  that, before the passage of the Interstate 
Commerce  Act,  discriminating  freight  rates 
were frequently secured by large shippers.  Other 
evidence herewith submitted, to be supplemented 
by  additional testimony which will be laid before 
the  Congress  shortly,  seems  to  show that like 
discriminating  favors  are  even  now  granted. 
Believing that these discriminations clearly tend 
toward  the  control of  business by large combi- 
nations,  your Commission further recommend : 
(a) That the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
sion  be  given  authority,  not  only  to  prescribe 
the  methods  of  keeping  accounts  of  the  rail- 
roads and  to demand reports in such detail as it 
may require,  but also to inspect  and audit  said 
accounts ; 
(b) That the  Interstate  Commerce  Law be 
so  amended  as ts make  the  decisions  of  the 
Commission operative at a day  fixed  in  the de- 
cisions and until reversed by  the  United  States 
courts,  on appeal ; 
(L)  That the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
sion be authorized to prescribe classifications  of 
freight  articles,  and  to make rules and  regula- 
tions  for  freight transportation,  throughout the 
United States ;  and 
(d)  That penalties for violations of the Inter- 
state Commerce Act should be appropriate fines 
against  the  carrier,  and  not  imprisonment  of 
officials. 
JAMES  H.  KYLE, Chairman. 
BOIES PENROSE. 
J. J. GARDNER  (as to trusts). 
*WM.  LORIMER. 
L.  F.  LIVINGSTON. 
JNO.  C.  BELL. 
THEO.  OTJEN. 
LEE  MANTLE. 
A.  L.  HARRIS. 
ELLISON  A.  SMYTH. 
JOHN  M. FAR~HAR. 
EUGENE  D.  CONGER. 
THOS.  W.  PHILLIPS. 
C.  J.  HARRIS. 
M.  D.  RATCHFORD. 
JOHN  L.  KENN~DY. 
f ALBERT  CLARKE. 
* I  concur  in  the  recommendations  of  the The Trust  Problem 
Commission  on  industrial  combinations,  but 
withhold  my  judgment  on  transportation  cor- 
porations  until testimony  now  being  compiled 
by  Commission is  submitted to Congress,  with 
recommendations. 
WM. LORIMER. 
t I concur in all, except paragraph marked (b), 
page 238.  It seems to me better that rates fixed 
by  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  should 
not go into effect in case of appeal until affirmed 
by  court,  and  that  trial  on  appeal  should 
expedited. 
ALBERT  CLARKE. 
APPENDIX  C* 
PLAN  OF  BIRD  S.  COLER,  COMP- 
TROLLER OF NEW YORK CITY, 
FOR  THE  REGULATION  OF 
TRUSTS t 
Whatever  the State  creates  it  should  either 
or control.  Government was created 
for the protection of  all  and not that the repre- 
sentatives of  the people  should barter away the 
public rights and utilities in perpetuity.  Every 
corporation should  have a definite period  of ex- 
istence and the right of renewal should rest with 
the state and not with  those in interest.  Busi- 
ness  that  requires  secrecy of  management  and 
manipulation of  securities  is  not entitled to the 
protection  of  the  State,  and  should  be  refused 
corporate powers. 
No corporation  should  be  allowed  to  issue 
securities  except  for  actual  value,  and  these 
should  not  be  placed  upon  the  public  market 
until  the  end  at  least  of  one  actual  business 
year,  and then  only after  public reports by cer- 
*The arguments and  comments are omitted,  as in  the  other 
appendixes.  The plan 1s given In full. 
t "Congressional  Record,"  Fifty-sixth  Congress, first  nessioo. 
v.  33, P. 6,926. 
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tified accountants under employment of the state 
and  bearing  its  seal.  This  to  check  stock 
jobbing  and  to  foster  legitimate  business  and 
investment,  and  also  to  provide  definite  in- 
formation  upon  which  to base  assessment and 
taxation.  . . . 
Places  of business  and  location  of  factories 
should be named  at  time of  incorporation,  and 
no removal of  same  should  be allowed without 
consent of the State.  . . . 
From its beginning the accounts of every cor- 
poration  obtaining  a  charter  privilege  from  a 
State government should be open at all times to 
examination and regulation by properly appointed 
public officers.  . . . 
Chartered companies  should  be compelled to 
confine  their  investments  and  development  to 
the legal and proper conduct of the business for 
which they were created and for the prosecution 
of  which-the"  have  received  from the govern-  - 
ment special brivileges  and powers.  . . . 
Uniform laws compelling publicity  of impor- 
tant matters of management,  frequent examina- 
tions by State officials prescribing honest systems 
of keeping accounts,  and such other restrictions 
as  exigencies  may require  for the good  of all, 
including  the  protection  of  such  communities 
as have  been  huilt  up  by the establishment  of 
business  concerns  and  the  forbidding  of  their 
abandonment  without  the  consent of  the State 
authorities  and  for  adequate  reasons  shown, 
should  be  immediately enacted  throughout  the 
Union.  . . . 
The  sovereign State  has  the  power  to grant 
charter privileges  for  purposes  that are in con- 
sonance  with  the  general  welfare  and  not  in 
violation of  the  constitutional  rights of the in- 
dividual.  The power  of  regulation  is implied 
in the act of creation. 
The  abuse of  the privileges derived from the 
people by these  favored  combines merits severe 
punishment,  and  necessary legislation  for  such 
purpose is clearly within  the scope of the legis- 
lative  power  of  the  State.  The opinion  that 
Congress is powerless  to remedy  this evil with- 
out constitutional change  is generally conceded, 
but the right of the sovereign State in the prem- 
ises is unquestioned. 
The  different sections of our country,  having 
varying industries,  such as cotton and  its prod- 
ucts  in  the  South,  know  best  how  to control 
them. New York  Companies'  Act 
APPENDIX  D 
THE PROPOSED  NEW YORK  BUSI. 
NESS  COMPANIES'  ACT * 
Powers  and   purpose^ 
Under the  title,  Powers  and  Purposes,  the 
usual  provisions  regarding  legal  standing  and 
* This bill  which was framed to carry out the su  gestions in 
Governor  ~dosevelt's  annual  message  sent  to  the &cgislature 
lanuary, 1900,  was in form a complete Business Corporat~on  Law: 
it  was intended  not  to repeal the present  law. but io provide an 
alternative  law under which  corporations  that wished  to do so 
might organize and act -  others might act under the present law. 
As will be been. the p;oposed  act gives much greater privileges 
to corporations in man  particulars than does the present law.  In 
other respects, especiafiy as regards publicity of  accounts and of 
business  methods, the responsibility of  directors,  etc., it is much 
more ngid.  Corporations of  the hrghest type as regards financial 
stabilit  and  management, having  nothing to conceal for which 
the bilrcalls,  might well wish  to organize under it to give them 
standing as well as  to secure its privileges.  Speculative corpora. 
tions could not well do so.  The line would thus be drawn between 
the two classes, to the manifest advantages of  investors and of  the 
public. 
The provisions  giving privileges  to sound  corporations  under 
proper restrictions were largely suggested  h  James B. Dill  Esq. 
of  the New York  Bar, author of "Dill  On Kew Jersey  cdrpora: 
tions." and they are to a considerable extent modelled after the New 
Jersey,laws with additional safeguards for  the public interests.  The 
provlslons regarding Promotion, Auditing, and the Annual Report 
are taken largely from the Corporation Lawsof Victoria  modelled 
after thoseof England.  All theorovisions of the bill werekubmitted 
to many personsqualified  to ciiticise them-corporation  lawyers, 
professors of  corporation law, lawyers with no interest in corpora- 
tions, prominent  business men, chartered accountants,  and others- 
and valuable suggestions were received  from all, the effort being 
made to make the act as  rigid regardingpuhlicity as  it could he made 
without endangering the lnterestsof sound business.  It is believed 
that the enforcement of  such a law would gradually do away with 
a large  part of  the evils of  the Trusts. 
acts  are  made,  and  the  following  special ones 
are added: 
To acquire  by  grant,  gift,  purchase,  de- 
vise or bequest,  to hold,  use,  mortgage,  pledge, 
and to dispose of any property,  real or personal, 
and  any  rights  or claims thereupon, therein or 
thereto,  by any legal title to the same extent that 
a natural person  might or could do. 
To contract,  incur  obligations  and  bind 
others in its favor to the ~am~extent  and in the 
same manner that a natural person might  do.* 
It may  exercise the same powers outside the 
State of its origin as within it, subjectalways to 
the  laws  of  the  State  in  which  it  is  doing 
business,  but  no  corporation  shall  possess  or 
exercise  the  above mentioned or any other cor- 
porate powers, except such  incidental powers as 
shall be necessary to the exercise of  its  powers 
above  mentioned,  unless  they are contained  in 
the certificate  of  incorporation. 
Corporations  are  forbidden  to do banking or 
L, 
insurance business,  or  to  take  names  implying 
such powers ;  but they may be formed to act as 
registration  companies undkr this act. 
As the author of  this hook  took  the final responsibility of  the 
acceptance or rejection of  all suagestions made in its preparation. 
he has  felt  at lilxrty to make cllangc\  in  the parts here reprinted 
and to add some brief explanatorv notes.  The onlvoarts of  the bill 
p;inted  are those that are not  found in the Corpdrat~on  Laws of 
ew York  or those that are needed to show the spirit of  the act. 
The most ;mportant provisions are ~rinted  in full. 
It will be observed that large powers are conferred :  but these 
powers must be fully declared  in  the certificate of lncorporatlon, 
and very rigid provtsions to prevent abuses are  made. The  Trust  Problem  New  York  Companies'  Act 
Registered  O$ce  and  Agent * 
Every  corporation  organized  under  this  act 
shall  have  and  keep  continuously  a  registered 
office  in  this  State,  and  an  agent  in  charge 
thereof, which agent must sign the certificate of 
incorporation.  The name  of  the  corporation 
shall be conspicuously displayed  at the entrance 
to such office,  and the address of the office shall 
be printed  upon all letter heads  used by the cor- 
poration.  This office must be kept open regu- 
larly  during  ordinary  business  hours  and  the 
agent  must  be  present  to  perform  the  duties 
required. 
In the registered office  in  charge of its regis- 
tered agent must be kept the stock  book  and  a 
transfer book  of the corporation,  written up to 
date,  open  to  the  inspection  of  all  bona  fide 
stockholders, and ready to be used  for the trans- 
fer of  stock.  These books  must  show  at  all 
times all transfers and stockholdings. 
The  name of the registration agent,  and  the 
office  address  shall  appear  in all reports of  the 
corporation ;  otherwise they will not be received 
by  the State officers. 
Every  registered  agent  shall,  during  the 
* The provisions regarding a registration office and agent will 
enable any person who has aright to know. to secure regularly and 
easily  any  information needed, and  will  enable the  State  much 
more readily to enforce its restrictive regulations.  This provision 
is from the New Jersey law, with addltiona! regulations. 
month of April of each year, file a statement * as 
of  the  first  of April,  under  oath,  with  the 
Secretary  of  State  of  New  York,  which  shall 
specify : 
I.  The names of  the  corporations for which 
he is the registered agent. 
2.  Whether such  corporations  have or have 
not made their annual report. 
3.  Whether the names of  these  corporations 
have  been  at  all  times  displayed  before  their 
registered  office. 
4.  Whether the provisions rega ciing the keep- 
ing  and inspection of  stock and  transfer  books 
have been  fully complied with. 
Such report  shall  be verified  by the  agent as 
true to the best of  his knowledge  and  informa- 
tion and belief,  and shall be in such form as the 
Secretary  of  State  shall  prescribe,  and on  such 
blanks  as  the  Secretary  of  State  may  furnish. 
No fee shall be charged for filing such report. 
For failure  to file said  statement, the  regis- 
tered agent  shall  be  liable  for a  penalty  in  the 
sum of one hundred dollars,  to be  sued for and 
recovered by  the Attorney General or other of- 
ficer designated by him, or by the district attorney 
of  the county in  which  the  registered  ofice is 
located. 
* This provision is entirely new, and is intended to aid in secur- 
ing groper annual reports. The  Trust  Problem  New York  Companies'  Act 
Certifcate of Incorporation * 
The  certificate  of  incorporation  shall  be 
signed  in  person  by all  the  subscribers  to  the 
capital stock named therein and by the registered 
agent. 
The certificate of incorporation shall contain : 
I.  The name  of  the  company,  which  shall 
not be the same  as  that  of  any other company 
registered in this State or likely to be niisunder- 
stood therefor. 
2.  The location,  town  or  city,  street  or 
number,  if  there  be number,  of  its  registered 
office in this State. 
3.  The name  of  the agent  therein  and  in 
charge thereof  and  upon whom  process  against 
the  corporation  may  be  served,  in  accordance 
with the provisions of this act. 
4.  The principal  purpose  or  purposes  for 
which  the  company may be  formed,  and  such 
subsidiary purposes  and  special  powers  in con- 
nection with the  principal  purpose  or purposes 
as the incorporators may see fit to  insert therein, 
in accordance with the provisions of this act. 
* It was thought wise to encourage  the formation of  corpora- 
tions wishing to  do a  sound  conservative  business  and throueh 
publicity  to  d~scourage the  purely  s  eculative  oAes.  The  fz11 
statements required in the certificate ofincorporation, which is ac- 
cessible  to any person, would  in very many cases  make clear to 
investors and the public the nature of the business and the protec- 
tion afforded shareholders, and would warn careful people against 
nsks. 
5.  The  amount of the total authorized capital 
of the corporation, which shall not be less 
than one thousand dollars. 
6.  The number  of  shares  into  which  the 
same is divided,  and the par value of each share, 
to be not  less than  ten  dollars nor  more  than 
one thousand dollars. 
7.  The amount of capital stock which is  sub- 
scribed by the incorporators,  which shall not be 
less  than  one  thousand dollars in  all,  nor  less 
than one share for any one. 
8.  If there be more than one  class of  stock, 
a description  of  the  respective  classes with  the 
terms  upon  which  the  respective  classes  are 
created. 
9.  The names  and  post  office  addresses  of 
the  incorporators,  not  the  registered office,  and 
the  number  of  shares  subscribed  by  each,  to- 
gether  with  the  designation  of  the  kind  of 
shares subscribed. 
10. The period  of duration of  the company, 
limited or unlimited. 
The certificate  of  incorporation  may  con- 
tain  any  provision  riot  inconsistent  with  this 
act,  which  the  incorporators  may  choose  to 
insert for the regulation  of  the business and for 
the  conduct  of  the  affairs of  the  corporation, 
and  must  contain  all  the  provisions  creating, 
defining,  limiting  and  regulating  the powers of 
the company, the directors and stockholders, and 
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right or rights of specific stockholders.  No  pro- 
vision  creating,  defining,  differentiating,  limit- 
ing  and  regulating  the  powers of  the corpora- 
tion,  the directors, the stockholders,  or any class 
or classes of  stockholders,  shall  be valid  unless 
inserted  in the certificate  of  incorporation or in 
an amendment thereof. 
The certificate of  incorporation must be exe- 
cuted by natural  male  persons who must be  of 
full  age,  but  without  restriction  as  to nation- 
ality,  citizenship,  or residence. 
The  certificate  of  incorporation  shall  be 
proved  or  acknowledged  as  required  for  deeds 
of  real  estate,  and  filed  in  the office  of  the 
Secretary  of  State.  Said  certificate  or a  copy 
thereof  duly certified  by the  Secretary of  State 
shall be evidence  in  all  courts  and  places.  A 
copy of the certificate must  also  be  kept in the 
registered  office  of  the  company,  and  a  copy 
must be  furnished by the registered agent to any 
person  demanding  the  same.  on  payment of  a 
charge of not more than one dollar. 
Incorporation  Fees * 
On filing  the certificate of  incorporation the 
incorporators  shall  pay  the  Secretary  of  State 
suitable fees for the use of the State. 
*These fees are placed at the rates now paid in New Jersey. 
Amendment of Certificate * 
Every  corporation  organized  under  this  act 
may  change the  nature  of  its business,  change 
its name,  increase its capital stock,  decrease  its 
capital stock, change the par value of the shares 
of  its capital  stock,  change  the  location  of  its 
registered  office in this State,  extend its corpo- 
rate existence,  create one or more classes of pre- 
ferred  stock,  and  make such other amendment, 
change  or alteration as may  be  desired,  in  the 
general  manner  provided  in  the  New Jersey 
law,  except that  it  is  provided,  that  such  cer- 
tificate  of amendment, change or alteration shall 
contain only such  provision as it would be  law- 
ful  and  proper to insert  in  an  original  certifi- 
cate of  incorporation made at the time of  mak- 
ing  such  amendment ; and  provided  further 
that in case the corporation by such amendment 
proposes to undertake  business  which is not of 
the  same  general  character as that provided  in 
the  original  certificate,  or creates one  or more 
new classes of stock,  or gives to certain classes 
of  stock  or bonds  new  privileges,  or  increases 
the amount of  the capital stock, a vote of four- 
fifths of  each class  shall  be  required,  and  any 
dissenting  stockholder  may  declare  his dissent 
* While  the interests of  minority stockholders have been fully 
protected by requiring a four-fifths vote and the purchase for cash 
?t,an appraised valuation of  the stock of  dissenting stockholders, 
lt 1s  recognized that a few ought not to be permitted to block the 
plans of a large majority. 
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in  writing at the meeting  called for the purpose 
of  amendment,  and  may  sell  to  the  company 
and the company shall buy for cash his holdings 
of stock at a valuation  appraised in the manner 
provided  for  dissenting  stockholders in  case of 
merger or consolidation of companies.  If such 
dissent is declared in writing at the meeting,  the 
subsequent  proceedings  for  appraisement  and 
purchase  may  be  enforced  at  the  instance  of 
either party. 
R~incorporation  under  Act  * 
Any  company  in  this  State  or any  foreign 
corporation,  whether  organized  under  special 
charter or under a general law,  which would be 
qualified  to organize  under  this  act,  may,  by 
complying  with  the procedure in the  foregoing 
section,  and  stating also  the  facts,  and  giving 
the information necessary to be contained in an 
original  certificate  of  incorporation  under  this 
act,  be  registered  and  incorporated  under  this 
act,  and  from the date of  filing said certificate, 
this  act  shall  apply.  A  domestic  corporation 
reorganizing under this act will be exempt from 
payment of incorporation  fees. 
* The intention was to encourage foreign corporations, wishing 
to do a  conservative business, and domestic corporations of  like 
character,  to reincorporate  under this  Act.  Thls section  would 
make the process a very simple one. 
Act  Optional * 
All  companies existing  at the  coming  into 
force  of  this  act,  and  all  companies hereafter 
organized under the present business corporation 
laws,  unless  they  elsct to put  themselves under 
the  provisions  of  this  act in  the  manner  pre- 
scribed in  the  preceding  sections,  shall  remain 
subject to the other corporation laws relating to 
them,  as if this act had not been passed. 
Directors 
No by-laws  adopted by  the board of directors 
regulating  the  election  of  directors  or officers 
shall be valid, unless a copy thereof shall be  de- 
livered  or mailed  to each stockholder of record 
at least thirty days before  such election. 
Every stockholder shall be entitled  to receive, 
and  every  corporation  by  its  officers and board 
of directors shall be bound to furnish any stock- 
holder upon request,  at the expense of  the  cor- 
poration,  a copy of the certificate of  incorpora- 
tion and of the by-laws. 
Any corporation organized under this act may 
classify  its  directors  in respect to  the time for 
* The act was to be an optional  one.  A  radical  revision of a 
general  corporation act, without  due warning, could  not fail to 
work  injustice in many cases.  A  good  law which should  encour- 
age sound business would  throw discredit upon unsound methods. 
Later, other acts might, with due warning, be repealed. 
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which they may hold  office,  the several  classes, 
however,  to be,  as nearly as is numerically pos- 
sible,  equal in number and  elected  for  different 
terms.  Provided, 
I. That no class shall be elected  for a period 
shorter than one year except at the first election, 
for the first year,  or  for  more  than  five  years, 
,  and 
2.  That the  term  of  office  of  at  least  one 
class shall expire each year. 
Any corporation which shall have more  than 
one kind of stock,  by making suitable provision 
in  its  certificate  of  incorporation,  may  confer 
the right to choose the directors upon the stock- 
holders  of  any  class  or  classes,  or  upon  the 
bondholders,  to the exclusion of others, subject, 
in case  this power is granted by amendment,  to 
the right  of  minority  stockholders  provided  in 
the  previous  section  regarding  amendments  to 
the certificate of incorporation. * 
Duties  of  Directors  Regarding  Elections 
No  stock  shall be  voted  on  at  any  election 
which has been transferred on the books of  the 
corporation within  twenty days  preceding  such 
election ;  nor  shall  any  stock  which  has  been 
* Through the classification of d~rectors,  incorporators  at times 
extend the11 power through a long serles of  years.  These provl- 
slons, ~t 1s  thought, would prevent many such abuses, whlleretain. 
lng the benefits of  classtficatlon. 
issued,  whether  original  or  otherwise,  within 
twenty days of the said election, be voted upon. 
~hk  directors  of every  company  orgaiized 
under this  act  shall  cause the registered agent, 
or  other transfer  agent  designated  by  them  as 
having  charge  of  the  said  books,  to make,  at 
least ten days before everv election after the first 
election,  a full,  true and complete list,  arranged 
in  alphabetical  order,  of  all  the  stockholders 
entitled to vote at the ensuing election,  with the 
post  office addresses,  not the registered office of 
the  corporation,  of  each,  and  the  number  of 
shares of each kind of stock held by each, which 
list shall.  at all times during.  the  isual  business 
0 
~  ~ 
hours,  be  kept at such registered office open  to 
examination by any stockholder. 
The board  of  directors  shall  produce  at  the 
time  and  place  of  everv  elect&  of  directors. 
such books and such list, there to remain during 
the election.  A copy of such list shall be mailed 
to  any  stockholder  within  five  days  after  his 
request is received,  upon payment in advance of 
cost of copying at not over  ten  cents  per  folio 
of one hundred words. 
The neglect or failure of the said directors of 
a corporation  with  a capital  stock of  five  hun- 
dred  thousand  dollars  or upwards  to cause the 
said  books  so  to be  kept,  or  to cause  the said 
list  to be  so made and  filed,  or to produce  the 
said books or said list at the time of any election, 
shall  render  them  ineligible  to  hold  office  as The  Trust  Problem  New  York  Companies' Act 
directors,  or any other office in the company for 
the period  of one year thereafter.*  In addition 
to the penalty above named  for failure the sum 
of  one  hundred  dollars  each  may  be  collected 
from any or all of  the  directors  at  the  suit  of 
any stockholder,  for his own use.  Delinquent 
directors of corporations with a capital stock  of 
less than five hundred thousand dollars  shall  be 
subject to the last  named  penalty only. 
Besides the usual officers an auditor  or audi- 
tors  shall  be  chosen  by  ballot  by  the  stock- 
holders at their annual meeting,  and  no  person 
or firm  or  corporation,  a  member,  director  or 
officer of which is a director of  the company to 
be  audited  shall  be  eligible.  Corporations 
organized under this act with a capital stock  of 
one hundred thousand  dollars or upwards,  must 
select  as  auditor  or  auditors  a  person,  firm  or 
corporation  duly  qualified  and  engaged  in  the 
practice  of  public  accounting  and  auditing  in 
this state.  And the auditor or auditors selected 
'This  penalty was introduced in igoo  into the Corporation Law 
of New Jersey, and has already proved verv effective in preventing 
nrgligence in carrying out the provisions <f that law. 
t The provisions  regarding  aud~lors  are intended  to protect 
shareholders against misuse of power by directors.  Every effort 
1s  made to Identify the interestsof auditorsand shareholders.  The 
provisions regarding bonds of  auditors will make their responsibil- 
ity a real one.  The further provisions regarding officers are like. 
wise needed to hold them responsible to shareholders. 
by a corporation whose capital stock amounts in 
all to one million dollars or more must have his 
or their financial responsibility secured by a bond 
of fifty thousand dollars of some surety company 
authorized  to do business  under  the  insurance 
laws of this state ; and for a corporation whose 
capital stock is less than one  million  dollars  by 
a bond amounting to at least five per centum of 
the  capital  stock  and  approved  by  the  share- 
holders either at a meeting,  or through  a  com- 
mittee  selected  for this  purpose.  The above 
provisions regarding bonds may be waived by the 
written consent of  every shareholder. 
Corporations with five hundred thousand dol- 
lars  capital  stock  or  upwards  must appoint  a 
general counsel,  who shall be counted in the list 
of officers. 
Any stockholder shall be  entitled  upon  pay- 
ment of cost of  copying at not over ten cents a 
folio  of  one  hundred  words,  to a statement at 
any  time  of  all  salaries  paid  to any officer  or 
officers of the corporation, together with a state- 
ment of  all  contracts  or  agreements  in  which 
any officer of  the corporation may be interested 
either as a contracting party with the corporation 
or as an officer or stockholder in any other  cor- 
poration contracting with the  company. 
The salaries  of the officers shall be  fixed  at 
the annual meeting unless the articles of  incor- 
poration  provide  otherwise.  In case,  however, 
salaries  shall  be  increased  at  any  time  by  the 
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board of directors under provision  of the articles 
of incorporation,  report thereof must be made at 
the next annual meeting to the stockholders and 
laid before them for rat~fication.  Their action 
shall be conclusive in all particulars. 
If the  number  of  directors  is  increased  be- 
tween annual  meetings,  or by the directors,  the 
places must be filled by vote of the shareholders. 
If any certificate  made,  or any public notice 
given by  the officers or directors of any corpora- 
tion  in pursuance of  the  provisions  of  this act, 
shall be  false  in  any material representation,  all 
the officers  or directors who  shall have  signed 
the same,  knowing it to be  false, shall be jointly 
and severally liable for  all the debts of  the cor- 
poration contracted while they were directors or 
officers  thereof,  as  a penalty enforceable in the 
courts of this state only. 
Meetings 
The first  meeting  and  the  annual  meetings 
of  stockholders  must  be  held  at  the registered 
office;  directors'  meetings  may  be  held  else- 
where. 
At the regular annual meeting, for which pro- 
vision must be  made in the certificate of  incor- 
poration  or  in  the  by-laws,  the  shareholders' 
balance sheet prepared and certified by the audi- 
tors as  provided  later  must be  presented  to the 
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shareholders.  If the  directors or  other officers 
of any corporation organized under this act shall 
fail  or neglect  to call  in  the manner  provided 
by  law the  annual stockholders'  meeting at  the 
time appointed in the certificate of incorporation 
or in the  by-laws  and shall  not  hold  the  same 
accordingly thereupon,  from the time when said 
meeting was appointed to be held until the meet- 
ing shall  actually be held  thereafter,  all salaries 
of  president,  vice-presidents,  secretary,  treas- 
urer,  and  directors  shall  cease  and  determine, 
and  it shall be unlawful  for  any corporation  or 
its  officers or  directors  to pay directly or  indi- 
rectly any salary or compensation to any of the 
above-named  officers or to any director  for ser- 
vices rendered  in the interim. 
At the  annual meeting  any shareholder shall 
be  entitled  to require  from  the  company,  and 
the  directors  shall  be  bound  to furnish  him 
with a copy of  all or any parts of the directors' 
records of meetings. 
Stock  and  Certificates 
If provided  in  the  articles of  incorporation, 
preferred and common stock may be issued ;  but 
liability of holders of  all classes is limited to the 
payment for the stock itself at par value.  Bond- 
holders  may  be  given  voting  powers  equal  to 
those of stockholders. The  Trust Problem  New York  Companies'  Act 
Every stockholder shall  be entitled to receive 
a certificate of  stock  signed  by  two officers of 
the corporation.  Every certificate of stock and 
every bond  shall  specify the  amount of  capital 
stock authorized  to be  issued  by  said corpora- 
tion,  the amount of  each class,  if there is more 
than  one  class,  also  the  amount  of  each  class 
issued for cash and  for other consideration,  the 
par value of  each share, and the location of the 
registered office of  the  company,  and  shall dis- 
close fully and fairly any qualification or restric- 
tion contained in the certificate of  incorporation 
affecting the right of the stockholder,  or in case 
of  bonds  of  the  bondholder,  by  way  of  voting 
power or otherwise. * 
Any corporation or  individual  countersigning 
the said stock or  bonds,  either as transfer agent 
or as registrar of  the stock,  shall be deemed to 
guarantee the  legality and  regularity in  all par- 
ticulars  of  the  transfer,  unless  the countersign 
itself shall give notice  in  clearly legible charac- 
ters that said countersigning  agent  limits or re- 
fuses responsibility. 
Every share  of  stock  shall  be  deemed  to be 
issued and shall be  held  subject to the payment 
of its par value  in  cash,  unless before the issu- 
ance of said stock a contract sha1I be  filed in the 
registered  office  of  the  company  which  shall 
truly and  fully disclose  in  detail  the considera- 
*A new provision.  It will  be  noted  that  the certificate gives 
each investor full information ;egarding his rights. 
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tion for which the said stock  is issued,  whether 
the same be for property, services or otherwise. 
In case any stock  is  issued  for consideration 
other than cash,  every share of stock shall have 
stamped  across  its  face  a  statement  that stock 
has  been  issued  in  accordance with  a  contract 
filed in the  registered  office  and the proportion 
of shares of each class so issued. 
Every such contract so filed  in the registered 
office shall truly and  fully disclose the consider- 
ation for which said  stock  is  issued,  the parties 
to  whom  such  stock  is  issued,  and  the  real 
parties in interest.  Such contract shall be open 
during regular office  hours  to the inspection of 
any one  and  a  copy thereof  shall  be furnished 
by the registered agent of the corporation to any 
one  requesting  it  and  advancing  the  cost  of 
making  a  copy  thereof,  which  cost  shall  not 
exceed  the sum  of  ten  cents  per  folio of  one 
hundred words. 
In every annual report made by the company, 
the amount of capital paid in cash and the amount 
otherwise  issued in pursuance of  the provisions 
of the foregoing sections shall be stated, together 
with the specific amounts issued during the two 
years next  preceding. * 
The  judgment  of the  board of directors as to 
the value  of  the  consideration  other  than cash 
* This provision is substantially that of  the law of  Victoria and 
in substance has been adopted by the new amendment of  xgm  to 
the English  Act.  If  even fairly enforced  it will largely destroy 
the power of the dishonest promoter and director. The Trust  Problem  New  York  Companies'  Act 
thus received by  the company shall be final and 
conclusive  upon  all  parties,  provided,  that  all 
the  provisions  of  this  act  relating  thereto  be 
fully carried  out,  and  that  the  contracts  fairly 
and fully disclose the real nature of  the bargain 
thus recorded. * 
Where the whole  capital  of  the corporation 
shall not have been  paid in, and the capital paid 
shall be insufficient to satisfy its debts and obli- 
gations,  each stockholder shall be  bound  to pay 
on each share held by him the sum necessary to 
complete the amount of  such share,  as fixed by 
the charter of  the  corporation,  or  such propor- 
tion of that  sum as  shall  be  required  to satisfy 
such debts and obligations. 
No loan  of  money  shall  be  made  to  any 
stockholder to enable such  stockholder to with-  --  ~ 
draw in effect any part of the money paid in by 
him  on  his  stock; t  and  if  any  such  loan  be 
made,  the  officers  who  make  it  or assent to it 
shall be jointly  and severally liable to the extent 
of such loan and interest for all the debts of the 
* The limitation of  liability of  shareholders and the acceptance 
of the judgment of  directors as to values of  property are very lib- 
eral provisions.  Under present laws the practice is much the same 
as it would seem to be under this bill so far as stock-waterin  goes, 
but the provisions  of  thrs bill  regarding  puhlicrty  would  krgely 
remove the tem  tation to water stock  and would  render the prac- 
tice innocuous iBit were continued.  Moreover, when there is dan- 
ger arising from a failure of  judgment or a misunderstanding  on 
the part of  directors, the more conservative and canscientious men 
often refuse such positions, thus putting the management of our 
corporations into the hands of the.recklessand  unscrupulous.  This 
bill tries to recognize actual bus~ness  conditions, and  not to put 
penalties upon honesty. 
t A not uncommon practice now. 
corporation until the repayment with interest of 
the sum so loaned. 
Penalty for  Delinquent  O$cials 
The president  and  secretary,  or  treasurer, 
upon  the  payment  of  the  amount  of  capita] 
subscribed  in  the  certificate  of  incorporation, 
whether up to the amount authorized by its cer- 
tificate or in addition thereto, if increaskd in the 
manner provided  by  this  act,  shall  make a cer- 
tificate stating,  in  addition  to the requirements 
of section  eighteen  of  this  act,  the  amount of 
capital so pzid,  whether  paid  in  cash or other- 
wise;  the total  amount of  capital,  if  any,  pre- 
viously  paid  in  and  reported,  with  the  date of 
such report,  and also stating with regard  to any 
such additional stock  thus  issued for considera- 
tion otherwise  than  cash,  the  date of filing  the 
contract determining  such  issue.  This certifi- 
cate shall be signed  and  sworn  to by the presi- 
dent and secretary or treasurer,  and the directors 
shall,  within  ten  days,  cause  the  certificate  to 
be filed  in  the  office  of  the  Secretary of  State 
and a copy thereof in the registered  ofiice of the 
company.  In  case of their failure so to do, the 
directors of  the company whose terms shall ex- 
pire at the  next  annbal -election shall each and 
all be disqualified  for a  period  of one year from 
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of the corporation; but a director may avoid the 
penalty by showing his efforts to have the certi- 
ficate filed and furnishing the information. 
If any of  the said  officers  or directors  shall 
neglect or refuse to perform  the duties required 
of them in section seventy-five  for ten days after 
being requested in writing so to do by any cred- 
itor  or stockholder  of  the corporation,  the  di- 
rectors  so neglecting or refusing shall be jointly 
or severally liable for  all  the  debts of the com- 
pany contracted before the filing of such certifi- 
cate and until the same shall be filed. 
Powers  of  Grporation to  Buy  and  Sell Stock 
Any corporation,  if proper  provision  is made 
in  the certificate of  corporation, shall have the 
power  to  purchase,  hold,  sell,  assign,  transfer, 
mortgage,  pledge  or  otherwise  dispose  of  the 
stock or  securities of  other corporations,  and, 
while  the owner thereof,  to vote upon them to 
the  same  extent  as  natural  persons  might  or 
could do. 
Every  corporation  shall  have  the  power  to 
purchase  or  otherwise  acquire  its  own  capital 
stock,  but  only  out  of  its  surplus  earnings  or 
in payment  or  satisfaction  of any debt due the 
company to such  extent  and  manner and upon 
such terms  as  the board  of  directors  by  two- 
thirds vote  shall  determine,  and  to  reissue  the 
said stock so  acquired.  Any such  purchase or 
reissue of  stock together with price and consid- 
eration paid  and  for which  the reissued stock is 
sold shall be noted in the annual report.* 
Dividends 
The provisions  for the payment of dividends 
are the usual  ones  providing  that they must be 
paid  only  from  profits,  and  holding  directors 
liable for misuse of power. 
Promotion t 
Every  prospectus,  announcement,  or  adver- 
tisement of whatever kind, howsoever published, 
printed,  circulated,  or  issued  after  the  com- 
mencement  of  this  act,  provided  the  same  is 
published  or  issued  with  a  view  of  obtaining 
subscriptions for shares  or bonds in  a company 
organized under this act, or directly or indirectly 
* These provisions have been thought dangerous.  They might 
be so,if it were not for other provisions of  the act regarding pub- 
licity and the power of  stockholders to know and  control the acts 
of d~rectors. With  those provisions the danger  is  removed, and 
these provisions become a safeguard against speculative or illdis- 
posedstockholders. 
-  - 
.t  These rigid  provisions regarding promotion and auditing are 
no more than are required in some other countries.  The forms for 
reports have been passed upon by competent auditors, and all agree 
that n:,  conservative, well-managed  company can properly object 
to  such reports going to stockholders.  No proper  buslness secrets 
are disclosed.  A sound  company  and a promoter who is not  pri- 
marily a speculator  will rarely b;  injured by  any of  these provi- 
sions, while the pro;isions  are needed to block evll practices which 
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inviting persons to subscribe for shares or bonds 
in a company so organized shall specify: 
I.  The  names and addresses of the promoters 
and directors and  the  number of  shares held  or 
agreed to be taken  up  by them respectively and 
whether  wholly  paid  up  or partly paid  up and 
the  consideration,  remuneration,  or  reward,  if 
any,  to the  incorporators,  directors,  promoters, 
underwriters  or others  respectively  for  becom- 
ing  incorporators,  directors,  promoters,  under- 
writers or members of the company; 
2.  The date and  the  names of the parties to 
any  contract  directly  or  indirectly  relating  to 
the  company  or  to the  promotion  thereof  en 
tered  into  by  the  company  or  the  promoters, 
directors,  or trustees thereof  or any person  act- 
ing  as a  trustee  or agent  for  or  on  behalf  of 
them  or any  of  them,  and  whether  such con- 
tract  be  entered  into  with  the  promoters  or 
directors  or  any  of  them  or any other  person 
whomsoever  within  two  years  before  the issue 
of such prospectus whether  subject to adoption 
by the  directors  of  the  company or otherwise, 
and shall also state a place where  such contract 
if  in  writing  may  be  inspected,  which  place 
must  be  the  registered  office  of  the company, 
if that is yet  organized,  proviled  that this sub- 
division of this section shall not apply to a con- 
tract entered  into by the company after  its in- 
corporation in the ordinary course of the business 
carried  on  by  the  company,  unless  stock  or 
bonds are issued or to be issued as a considera- 
tion ; 
3.  The  contents of the articles of incorpora- 
tion,  if  any,  with  the  names  and addresses  of 
the subscribers thereto and the number of shares 
subscribed  for  by  them  respectively,  together 
with the number  of  shares  fixed  as the qualifi- 
=ation of a director. 
4.  The  consideration paid  or to be  paid,  and 
if  so,  how  and  when,  for  any  property  pur- 
chased  or acquired  or to be  purchased  or  ac- 
quired  by  the  company  and  from  whom  and 
when  purchased  or  acquired,  with  a  brief  de- 
scription of  the  nature  of  the  property and  its 
location if  physical  property,  and  whether  any 
part and if so,  how much of  such consideration 
money  is for good will; 
5.  The amount,  if  any,  payable  as commis- 
sion, bonus or reward for subscribing or agreeing 
to subscribe or procuring or agreeing to procure 
subscriptions for or for underwriting or guaran- 
teeing the sale of  any shares in the company or 
the rate of any such commission. 
6.  The minimum  subscription  upon  which 
the  directors  will  allot  the  shares  subscribed. 
and begin business ; 
7.  The minimum  amount  payable  on appli- 
cation and allotment on each share; 
8.  The number and  amount of shares issued 
or agreed to be issued  as fully or partly  paid up 
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the extent to which  they are so paid up,  and in 
either case the  consideration  for which  and the 
person or persons to whom such shares have been 
issued or are proposed  or intended to be issued; 
9.  The names  and  addresses  of  the vendors 
of  any  property  purchased  or acquired  by  the 
company  or  to  be  so  purchased  or  acquired, 
which is to be  paid  for wholly or partly out of 
the proceeds of the issue offered for subscription 
by the prospectus or the purchase or acquisition 
of which has not been  completed at the date of 
publication  of  the  prospectus  and where  there 
is more  than  one  vendor  or  the  company is a 
sub-purchaser,  the amount payable  in money  or 
shares to each vendor; 
10.  The  amount or estimated amount of pre- 
liminary expenses ; 
I I.  The  amount paid or  intended to be  paid 
in  cash  or shares  or  otherwise,  to or  for  any 
promoter and the consideration therefor; 
12. The amount  intended  to be reserved  for 
working capital ; 
13.  The  proposed application of the proceeds 
of the issue of the shares;  and 
14. The names and addresses of the auditors 
or intended  auditors,  if any,  of the company. 
A prospectus which does not comply with the 
preceding  section shall be  deemed to be fraudu- 
lent on the part of the responsible parties know- 
ingly  issuing the same. * 
* Parties are fully defined In bill. 
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Every  person  taking  shares  on  the  faith of 
such prospectus unless  he  had  actual notice of 
the particulars omitted from the prospectus shall, 
in  addition  to any other  remedy  he  may have, 
be entitled to sue  for  rescission  of  his contract 
to take shares. 
In the event  of  non-compliance  with any of 
the  requirements  of  this  act with  respect  to a 
prospectus,  any  person  aggrieved  shall  be  en- 
titled to compensation  from  any person  know- 
ingly  issuing the  same,  unless in ways enumer- 
ated  in  the act he can fully exonerate  himself. 
Provisions are fuily made also to prevent fraud 
through  the acts of  irresponsible persons acting 
as virtual agents. 
This section shall  not  apply to a  circular or 
notice issued to and inviting only existing mem- 
bers  of  a  company  to  subscribe  for  further 
shares,  but,  subject  as  aforesaid,  this  section 
shall  apply  to any  prospectus  whether  issued 
on or with reference  to the formation of a com- 
pany or subsequently ;  provided that 
I. The  requirements  as  to the certificate of 
incorporation and  the  qualification  of directors, 
the  names  and  addresses  of  directors  and  the 
shares  held  or  to be  taken  by  them,  and  the 
amount or estimated amount of preliminary ex- 
penses  shall  not  apply  in  the  case  of  a  pros- 
pectus published  more  than  one year  after the 
formation of the company;  and 
2.  In  the  case  of  a  prospectus  published 
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more  than  one  year  after  the  formation  of  a 
company,  the obligation  to disclose all material 
contracts and  facts  shall  be  limited to a period 
of one year  immediately preceding  the piblica- 
tion ofthe prospectus.  - 
- 
For the purpose of this act every contract and 
fact is  material which would  influence the judg- 
ment  of  a  prudent  investor  in  determining 
whether  he  would  subscribe  for  the  shares 
offered by the prospectus. 
Any  condition  requiring  an  applicant  for 
shares  to waive,  and  any agreement  to waive, 
due  compliance with  this  act  or purporting to 
affect him with notice of any document or mat- 
ter not specifically referred  to in the prospectus 
shall be void. 
Every promoter is  in  a  fiduciary relation to- 
ward  a  company which  he  is  engaged  in pro- 
moting,  and  consequently  he  must  make  full 
disclosure as provided in the bill of his relations 
to and dealings with the company. 
Balance  Sheet * 
Every  company and  the  directors  and man- 
agers thereof- 
* It will be observed that this balance sheet is not published, but 
is given to the shareholders.  Of  course, in the case of  large com- 
panles whose stocks are on the stock market, this is equivalent to 
puhllcation: while a small private corporation with but few mem- 
bers would be able to confine knowledge of  its affairs to its few 
stockholders and the proper officers of the state. 
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I.  Shall  cause  to  be  kept  proper  books  of 
account  in which  shall  be  kept  full,  true  and 
complete accounts of the affairs and transactions 
of the company,  and 
2.  Shall once at least  in  each year cause the 
accounts of  the  company to be  balanced and a 
balance-sheet  in this act referred  to as the share- 
holders'  balance-sheet  to  be  prepared,  which 
balance-sheet  after  being  duly audited  shall be 
laid before the members of the company in next 
general meeting;  and 
3.  Shall  cause  a  copy of  such shareholders' 
balance-sheet  so audited to be sent to the regis- 
tered address of  every member of  the company 
at least seven days before  the meeting at which 
it is to be laid  before  the members  of the com- 
pany and a copy to be deposited at the registered 
office of  the  company for  the inspection of the 
members of  the  company during a period  of at 
least seven days before  that  meeting,  and every 
shareholder in  the  company or  any person act- 
ing in his behalf shall be entitled to other copies 
thereof on payment of twenty-five  cents each. 
The shareholders'  balance-sheet  shall  be  in 
such  form  as  is  directed  by  the  certificate  of 
incorporation or  the  by-laws  or by a resolution 
of the company and  shall  show in every case- 
I.  The  amount  of  share  capital authorized, 
the  amount  issued,  and  the  amount  paid  up 
thereon, distinguishing the amount of share cap- 
ital  paid  up  in  money  and  the  amount  paid The  Trust Problem  New York  Companies'  Act 
otherwise  than  in  money,  with  statement  of 
nature of  the  consideration  and  the  arrears  of 
calls due, and the specific amounts issued during 
the two years next ~receding; 
2.  The amount  of  debts  due  by  the  com- 
pany,  specifying  the  security  if  any,  allocated 
for each debt  and  distinguishing the amount of 
mortgages,  debentures,  and  floating  charges 
against the  general  assets  of  the company,  the 
amount  of  the  reserve  fund,  if  any,  and  the 
amount of any contingent liabilities. 
3.  The amount  of  all  current  assets,  after 
making a proper deduction  for debts considered 
to  be  bad  or  doubtful;  any  debts  due  from 
directors or other officers to be separately stated. 
4.  Whether the  assets  other than  debts due 
to the  company are  taken  at cost  price  or by 
valuation, or on what other basis they are reck- 
oned,  and whether  any and  if  so what  amount 
of  percentage  has  been  written  off  and  what 
other provision,  if  any,  has  been  made  for de- 
preciation. 
5.  The gross amount of  the year's  earnings, 
the  deductions  made  from  the  same  for  fixed 
charges of  interest  and  taxes  and  the  surplus, 
~f  any,  available for dividends. 
6.  The amount by which  the gross value of 
the  assets  of  the  company  has  been  increased 
since the  last  balance-sheet  in  consequence of 
any increase in the valuation of real or personal 
property belonging to the company. 
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7.  The  amount of property, if any,  for which 
shares  were  issued,  which  has  been  sold  since 
the last report with a full disclosure of the con- 
sideration therefor  in  detail,  the  parties  to the 
contract and the real parties in interest. 
The shareholders'  balance-sheet  shall  be ac- 
companied  by  a  certificate  signed  by  two  or 
more  of  the  directors  on  behalf  of  the  board 
stating that in their opinion  the balance-sheet  is 
drawn up so as to exhibit  a  correct view of the 
state of the  company's affairs  and  that in their 
opinion the statement is correct. 
A copy of  the  balance-sheet  shall be sent to 
each director at least ten days before the annual 
meeting,  and  unless  he  formally  at  or before 
the  meeting  makes  statement  to the contrary, 
he shall be held to have also signed the report. 
Duties  of Auditors 
The  auditors of every company : 
I.  Shall  use  reasonable  diligence  with  the 
view of ascertaining that  the books of the com- 
pany have  been  properly kept  and  record  cor- 
rectly the  affairs  and  transactions  of  the com- 
pany ; 
2.  Shall  examine  the  shareholders'  balance- 
sheet and any accounts presented to the members 
of the  company,  and  shall  report  in writing to 
the members of the company when the balance- 
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sheet is  transmitted,  that  the balance-sheet  and 
accounts have been drawn up in accordance with 
the provisions of the New  York Companies' Act, 
and when taken  together with any explanations 
attached thereto,  present  a  correct  view of the 
state of the company's affairs;  or if the auditors 
are unable to make such  a  report they shall re- 
port in writing when the balance-sheet  is trans- 
mitted  in  what  respects  the  balance-sheet  and 
accounts fail to comply with these requirements, 
and shall sign a certificate at the foot of the bal- 
ance-sheet  stating whether  or  not all their req- 
uisitions as auditors,  including their requisitions 
with regard to the private  balance-sheet  herein- 
after mentioned,  have been  complied with;  and 
3.  Shall report in writing to the members all 
material  information which  they have  observed 
or have  become  acquainted with with regard to 
the books, accounts, securities, vouchers, papers, 
writings and documents examined by them,  and 
for this purpose they shall  at all times have ac- 
cess to all  the  books,  accounts,  and  records of 
the company and  to the minute book and shall 
be empowered to require  from the directors and 
other officers  such  information and explanation 
as may be necessary for the performance of their 
duties-. 
If for any reason  it  prove  impossible for the 
auditors to mepare  their  report  before the date 
L. 
mentioned  above,  then the;  shall submit at the 
general  meeting  the  reasons  for their  failure. 
The  shareholders shall  then  take action and fix 
a later date at which a report shall be  submitted 
either by the said auditors or by their successors 
in office. 
If  the  auditors  or  any  one  of  them  think 
there is just cause  to disapprove of any part of 
the said  accounts  presented  to the members of 
the company, they or any one of them may dis- 
allow  any  part  of  the  said  accounts  so  disap- 
proved  of  and  shall  report  their  or his  disap- 
proval  in writing  on the accounts and balance- 
sheet. 
Every such report  and  balance-sheet  shall be 
read  before  the  company  at the  next  general 
meeting. 
Any  auditor  who  shall  wilfully  or  through 
gross negligence  certify that  any  false  or frau- 
dulent  balance-sheet  or account is correct,  shall 
be civilly responsible to any party injured. 
Private Balance  Sheet 
The  auditors of every company before making 
a report  pursuant  to the  last  preceding section 
shall require,  and the directors and president  of 
the  company  shall  without  unnecessary  delay 
supply to the  auditors,  a  balance-sheet,  in  this 
act referred to as the private balance-sheet,  giv- 
ing the details  on  which  the  shareholders'  bal- 
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other things  the  amount  of  deduction,  if  any, 
for debts considered  to be bad  or doubtful. 
The private balance-sheet  must be signed by 
the president,  treasurer,  and  by  at  least two of 
the  directors  of  the  company  when  there  are 
not more  than  three  directors,  and  by  three  at 
least when there are more than three directors. 
The auditors may require  the directors,  trea- 
surer,  and president  of  the  company to  supply 
in writing,  signed as hereinbefore provided,  any 
further details  or  information  affecting the bal- 
ance-sheet  or  any  particular  item  comprised 
therein,  and  shall  sign  a  certificate  at the foot 
of the private  balance-sheet  stating  whether or 
not all  their  requisitions  as auditors  have been 
complied with. 
The private balance-sheet  shall not be issued 
to the  members  of  the company,  but  shall to- 
gether with all such further details and informa- 
tion as aforesaid be kept by the directors as part 
of the records of the company. 
Annual Report 
Every  corporation  organized  under  this  act 
shall annually file in the office of the Secretary of 
State for use of the Comptroller and other state 
officials acting in their official  capacity, but not 
for public  inspection,  and  also in the registered 
of the  company, a report,  which said  re- 
port shall be at all times open to the  inspection 
of  the  stockholders,  upon  request,  and  a  copy 
of such report  shall be furnished  to any stock- 
holder by the corporation upon the pre-payment 
of  a  reasonable  charge  for  making  the  same, 
which charge shall  not  exceed  the  sum  of  ten 
cents per folio of one hundred words. 
Said report shall be  filed within three months 
after the first of January  in  each year;  shall be 
authenticated by the  signatures of  the president 
and one other officer of the company, or by  any 
two directors and shall contain : 
I.  The name of the corporation. 
2.  The location,  town  or  city,  with  street 
and  number,  if  any  there  be,  of  its  registered 
office, with the name of the registered agent. 
3.  The  names of all the directors and officers 
of the  company and  the  date of  the expiration 
of their terms of office. 
4.  The post  office  address  of  each,  not the 
registered office of the company. 
5.  The  character  of  the  business carried on 
by the company. 
6.  The  location of any and all transfer offices 
within and outside the state. 
7.  The last shareholders'  balance-sheet. 
8.  The day  appointed  for  the  next  annual 
meeting of the  stockholders  for the election of 
directors. 
For failure to file  the  annual report the cor- 
303 The Trust  Problem 
poration  shall  forfeit  $300,  and-besides  what 
is far more important- 
If such report be not so made and filed before 
the time  appointed  for  the  holding of the next 
annual  election  bv  the  stockholders,  all  of  the 
directors  of  any  such  domestic  corporation  in 
office  during  the  default  shall  at  the  time ap- 
pointed  for  the  next  election,  and  for a period 
of one  vear  thereafter.  be  therebv rendered  in- 
eligible for election or appointment to any office 
in the company as directors or otherwise.  -. 
But  provision  is  made  to exempt  a director 
who is not at  fault,  and who  makes personally, 
so far as possible such a report. 
The Secretary of State shall upon application 
furnish blanks  in  proper  form  and  shall safely 
keep in his office all  such statements,  and  issue 
to the corporations filing the same his certificate 
therefor. 
Merger  and  Dissolution 
Corporations  may  be  merged;  but  only  on 
vote of two-thirds  of  the stock of each corpora- 
tiorl,  and  any dissenting  stockholder  is to have 
his stock taken  for  cash  at  an appraised valua- 
tion. 
Provision  is  made  for  voluntary  dissolution 
of corporations. 
New  York  Companies'  Act 
MonopoIy  Act  not  Repealed 
Nothing in this  act  shall  be construed to re- 
pal  any of  the provisions  of  the existing laws 
of this State  regarding  monopoly or  the forma- 
tion of monopolies. Mr.  Bryan's  Plan 
APPENDIX  E 
SUMMARY  OF  PLAN  OF  WILLIAM 
JENNINGS  BRYAN  FOR  THE 
REGULATION OF  TRUSTS  * 
Congress  should  pass  a  law  providing  that 
no corporation organized in  any state should do 
business  outside  of  the  state  in which  it is or- 
ganized until it  receives  from  some power cre- 
ated by  Congress  a  license  authorizing it to do 
business outside of  its own state.  Now,  if the 
corporation must come to this  body created by 
Congress  to secure  permission  to do business 
outside  of  the  state,  then  the  license  can  be 
granted upon conditions which  will,  in the first 
place,  prevent  the  watering  of  stock;  in  the 
second place,  prevent  monopoly  in  any branch 
of  business,  and,  third,  provide  for  publicity 
as to all  of  the  transactions  and  business  of 
the corporation.  . . .  And  then provide  that 
if  the  !aw  is  violated  the  license  can  be  re- 
voked.  . . . 
If  you  once  establish  the  system  and  re- 
quire the license,  then Congress can,  from year 
to year,  add  such  new  conditions  as  may  be 
necessary  for the  protection  of  the public  from 
the greed  and  avarice  of  great  aggregations of 
wealth.  I do not go so far as some do and say 
that there shall be  no  private  corporations,  but 
I say this,  that a corporation is created by law, 
that it is  created  for the  public  good,  and that 
it should never  be  permitted  to do a thing that 
is  injurious  to the  public,  and  that  if any cor- 
poration enjoys  any privileges  to-day  which are 
hurtful to the  public,  those  privileges  ought to 
be withdrawn from  it.  In other words,  I  am 
willing that we should  first see whether we can 
preserve the benefits of the corporation and take 
from it its possibilities for harm. 
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APPENDIX  F 
THE UNITED  STATES  STEEL COR- 
PORATION 
Since the first edition  of  this book was pub- 
lished,  the United  States Steel  Corporation has 
been  organized.  As this  is  by  far  the  largest 
and in many ways the most  important industrial 
combination  yet formed,  a  few facts  regarding 
it will be of value. 
It was  organized  February 23,  1901,  in the 
first place with the nominal  capital  of  $3,100, 
which was  shortly thereafter increased  to $I,- 
~oo,ooo,ooo,  of-which authorized capital stock 
$550,ooo,ooo  was preferred and $550, ooo,ooo 
common stock.  The charter  is drawn  in  the 
broad  terms  of  the  New  Jersey  charters,  the 
special purpose named being the manufacture of 
iron,  steel,  and  other  materials,  with  the right 
to do practically  everything else  which  can be 
brought into connection with that work. 
To avoid  some  of the  difficulties  met  with 
by earlier  large  corporations,  it is provided  that 
whenever  all  quarterly dividends  accrued  upon 
the preferred  stock  for  previous  quarters  shall 
have  been  paid,  the  board  of  directors  may 
declare  dividends on the common  stock out of 
any remaining surplus of net profits. 
An act of the legislature of  the State of New 
Jersey passed  March  22,  1901,  was,  it was sup- 
posed,  passed  at  the instance  of  the promoters 
of  this corporation,  in order  to enable  them to 
manage  the  affairs  of  so great a  body  without 
being hampered  by the possible difficulties of get- 
ting a large meeting of stockholders.  The  new 
provision  of  the law provides  that "any  action 
which  theretofore  required  the  consent  of  the 
holders of two-thirds of the stock,  at any meet- 
ing after notice to them given,  or required their 
consent  in  writing, to  be  filed,  may  be  taken 
upon the consent of,  and the consent given and 
filed by,  the holders of two-thirds of the stock of 
each class represented at such meeting in person 
or  by  proxy."  Whether  such  a  liberalizing 
provision  would  be safe in  case  of  all corpora- 
tions may perhaps be questioned. 
In form this corporation resembles that of the 
Federal  Steel  Company  already  explained  in 
Chapter  VII.  The United  States  Steel  Cor- 
poration  has  bought  the  stock  of  its  different 
constituent companies,  and  controls these com- 
panies  by virtue  of  being  practically  the single 
stockholder  in  each case.  The rates at which 
the stock  of  the various  constituent  companies 
was  exchanged  for  that  of  the  United  States 
Steel  Corporation,  together  with  the  amounts 
and increase of  stock of  both  kinds,  appear  in 
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the following  table,  taken  from  the review  of 
evidence in  the report of  the United States In- 
dustrial  Commission  on  trusts  and  industrial 
combinations.  It  will  be  noted  that  at  first 
seven  companies entered  the  combination,  and 
that  two  others were  thereafter  acquired.  It 
will also be  noted from the last paragraph  given 
with this table,  in connection with the Carnegie 
Company,  that  a  large surplus  seems to be left 
in  the  hands  of  interested  parties  to acquire 
other properties. 
Comparison of  stocks of  first  constituent members of 
United States Steel Corporation and shares given 
in exchange therefor : 
(From circular letters issued  by J. P. Morgan & Co., and figures 
verified by officials of  United States Steel Corporation.) 
Name of 
Company. 
Federal Steel Co.:  ......  Preferred 
Common.. ..... 
American Steel & 
Wire Co. :  ......  Preferred  .......  Common 
Amount  of  new  stock 





National  Tube 
Co. :  ...  preferred. .....  Common.. 
National  Steel 
Co. :  ....  Preferred..  .......  Common 
American  Tin 
Plate Co. :  ....  Preferred.. 
Common ....... 
American  Steel 
Hoop Co. :  ....  Preferred.. 
.....  Common. 
American  Sheet 
Steel Co. :  ....  Preferred..  .......  Common 
Amount  new 
stock  required 
to  make  ex-' 
change, totals.. 
Present  issues of 
the seven com- 
panies, totals 
Increase  in  ca  i 
talization  i% 
seqen  com- 
panles 
Total  Increase 
common  and 
preferred stock, 
seven  com- 
panies. 
Amount  of  new  stock 
required  to  make  the 
exchange. 












47,om,om  ............. 




















33,750,000  ............. 
22&06,250 
5,600,000 
14,mo,ooo  ............. 
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In a circular  letter  issued  by  J. P.  Morgan 
&  Co.,  March  2, 1901,  it was stated that the 
bonds  of  the United States Steel Corporation 
are to be used only to acquire bonds and 60 per 
cent.  of  the stock of the Carnegie  Company." 
It has been frequently stated on excellent author- 
ity,  though not published  by  the company,  that 
the  bonds were exchanged at par,  and that Mr. 
Carnegie received for each  $1,000 of  his  Car- 
negie stock,  bonds at $1,500.  At those  rates 
he would have received  for 
Bonds of  U. S. Steel 
Corporation. 
...........................  160  ww ww bonds..  $160.ooo,mo  ..............  $$g6:-:-  stockat 150 in bonds  144,000,000 
Name of 
Company. 
Corn  anies added 
a/.?  Organi- 
zafiox. 
American  Bridge 
Co. : ......  Preferred  .......  Common 




Amount  new 
stock required. 
Present issue  for 
two companies, 
total 
Increase in  ca  i 
talization 
two companies. 




Increase,  two 
companies 
Total  increase, 
nine companies. 
Total  increase, 
preferred  and 
common 
Amount  of  new  stock 
required  to  make  the 
exchange. 
As this  sum agrees exactly with  the  amount 
of bonds issued,  it  seems a reasonable  interpre- 
tation. 
It  is  generally  supposed  with  good  reason 
that  most  of  the  remainder  of  the  Carnegie 
stock was taken at 150 preferred stock, with an 
equal bonus of common, though some little was 
bought for $I,  200 or $1,300  cash.  Assuming 
all taken at the first rate, and that $25,00o,ooo 
cash  was  raised  with  $25,ooo,ooo  par of pre- 
ferred, with equal bonus of common, a generally 
accepted  and  doubtless  correct inference,  the 
remainder  of  the  Carnegie  holdings  and  the 
cash would have cost as follows : 
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New STOCKS. 
Preferred.  Common. 
For  z5,momo  cash.. ..  ...  .  .  ..  ..  ...  ..  $zg,ooo,ooo  $as,ooo,mo 
For %64,ooo:m Carnegie stock.. ..  ..  ..  96,ooo,mo  g6,m.- 
at 150  each 
$1z1,ooo,mo  $IZI~~~~*OM 
Stocks of  the nine companies.. ..  .  .  .  ..  336.581.8~8  342,~67~or~ 
P- 
Total to pay for purchases. ...  .  .  .... ..  $457,581,848  $463,567.01~ 
Taking these sums, which,  as will be seen, are 
partly estimates, known to be not quite accurate, 
but  probably  too  large,  from  $~50,000,000 
each of preferred and common, the total amount 
authorized, there is left for the pay of the syndi- 
cate and as treasury stock to be used  in future: 
Preferred ...................................... $9~~418,152 
Common ......................................  86,432,981 
The main  advantages  of  so large a corpora- 
tion, as explained by the President, Mr. Charles 
M. Schwab, to the United States Industrial Com- 
mission,  are found chiefly,  perhaps,  in  the fact 
that it has so complete a control of the different 
varieties  of  ore and  other raw  materials that it 
remains  in its business almost entirely indepen- 
dent  of  other  organizations.  It has  also  the 
opportunity,  to a much greater  degree than has 
a  small  organization,  of  turning  its  different 
plants  to work  upon  the  product  that  for the 
time  being  seems  most  profitable,  though  this 
power  is  limited  by  the  nature  of  the  plants. 
It has  also  the advantage of  owning  to a con- 
siderable extent its needed  transportation  facili- 
ties, both in its fleet on the lakes-and in its rail- 
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ways.  Of course, all  of  the other  advantages 
of  savings  from  organization,  distribution  of 
talent,  concentration of  production, and  so  on, 
are  likewise obtained.  With the exception  of 
the first named advantages,  and  perhaps  also of 
a somewhat  monopolistic  control of  raw mate- 
rials hinted at by Mr. Schwab,  it has no advan- 
tage over its various constituent companies, ex- 
cepting that which comes from the added power 
of the greater capital. Federal  Legislation 
CHAPTER XI11 
FEDERAL  LEGISLATION 
In Chapter XI. a summary has been made of 
the evils of Industrial Combinations as they affect 
investors,  stockholders,  consumers,  wage  earn- 
ers,  etc.  In  the same chapter the remedies for 
these evils,  so far as  they can be accomplished 
by state legislation  or by  changes  in the patent 
laws,  amendments  to the  interstate  commerce 
law,  the  tariff,  etc.,  have  been,  perhaps,  suffi- 
ciently  discussed.  In that  chapter it  seemed 
inadvisable  to discuss  in  detail  the legal ques- 
tions  regarding the scope of federal  legislation. 
The experience of the last two years,  however, 
and more detailed  study of  this subject by legal 
experts,  have  made  it  possible now to express, 
without discussing legal technicalities,  somewhat 
positive  opinions  regarding  remedies  for Trust 
evils  which  may  be  provided  by  the  Federal 
Government  aside  from  amendments  to  the 
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tariff,  patent,  and  interstate  commerce  laws 
already  discussed. 
It seems  to be  established  that  there  is  no 
hope of the several States uniting within any rea- 
sonable time upon any form of corporation  law 
which will prcve  efficient  in  preventing abuses 
arising  from  Industrial  Combinations.  The 
different States,  in  order  to secure the location 
of these combinations within their borders,  will 
rather bid  one  against  the  other  for  these cor- 
porations by  offering  liberal  charters,  low taxa- 
tion, and other similar attractions.  The  only pos- 
sibility,  therefore,  of uniform  regulation  seems 
to be through  the  Federal  Government.  The 
United States Industrial Commission in its final 
report  presents  two  very  complete  legal  argu- 
ments by Mr. F. J. Stimson, the counsel of the 
Commission, and Prof. E. W.  Huffcut of Cornell 
University,  which  seem  to show beyond much 
question that Congress, under  the powers given 
it  to  regulate  commerce  between  the States, 
may  provide a  sufficient  control  for  these  cor- 
porations. 
This legislation  might, if it seemed desirable, 
take  the  form  of  relinquishing  to the  several 
States control over interstate commerce,  so tha, 
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any State might  exclude corporations organized 
in another State from  doing  business within its 
borders,  even though  that  business were of the 
nature of  interstate  commerce.  This remedy, 
however,  although  it  might  be  constitutional, 
would lead to interminable confusion in legisla- 
tion  as  well  as  in  business,  and  seems utterly 
impracticable. 
It would  probably aIso  be  possible  for Con- 
gress to go far in the way of destroying monop- 
oly  by  forbidding to monopolistic  corporations 
use of the  mails;  or,  on  the  other hand,  there 
is  a  possibility  that,  if  great  corporations  or 
combinations seemed  really to menace the pub- 
lic welfare,  the United States Government might 
undertake the  socialistic  plan  of  itself entering 
upon  certain  lines  of  business  that  seemed  to 
have become so monopolistic as to endanger the 
public welfare.  It  would be expected, of course, 
that if such an extreme,  and for the present,  at 
least,  doubtless  unwise  measure  were  to  be 
undertaken,  the Government  would begin  with 
the purchase of the telegraphs,  then of the raj!- 
roads,  and  so  on,  until  it  had  gone  as  far  as 
the people would permit.  This so-called remedy 
of the  Socialists  may also  be  set  aside without 
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discussion  as,  for  this  time  at  least,  utterly 
impracticable.  There  remains  the  probably 
practicable measure  of  laying  down  collditions 
under which  corporations  may be  permitted  to 
engage  in  interstate  commerce, and  of forbid- 
ding any person or corporation to engage in such 
commerce untll these conditions have been met. 
The Judicial  Committee  of  the  House  of 
Representatives two years  ago recommended  an 
amendment to the  Constitution  giving to Con- 
gress  plenary  power  over  industrial  combina- 
tions.  President  Roosevelt,  in  the summer of 
1902,  also suggested  this  as a  possible remedy 
if  it  proved  that  Congress  had  not  sufficient 
power  without  it.  In his  last  message,  how- 
ever, he expresses the opinion that Congress has 
sufficient power.  Many of  the best authorities 
agree with him.  Under those  circumstances it 
would  clearly be  unwise  to wait for a constitu- 
tional amendment before taking action.  More- 
over,  such an amendment would be almost revo- 
lutionary in its centralizing tendency and should 
not be  made,  if other means will suffice. 
The present  Sherman  anti-trust  law  forbids 
monopolies or even  agreements  tending toward 
monopoly  in  interstate  commerce.  The Su- 
319 The  Trust  Problem  Federal  Legislation 
preme Court has upheld the constitutionality of 
the act, and has decided that such combinations 
are illegal,  even though they may be reasonable 
when  considered  from  the  business  point  of 
view.  The questions  that  now remain,  then, 
are not  those  purely of  a  legal  character as to 
what Congress may do; but, assuming that Con- 
gress has the power to lay down conditions un- 
der which corporations  may engage in interstate 
commerce,  the  question  is  rather  what  con- 
ditions should be imposed,  what action is wisest. 
Among the numerous suggestions that have been 
made,  three or four are of chief importance, and 
we should attempt to weigh carefully the relative 
merits of these. 
I.  Attorney-General  Knox,  on  October 
14,  1902, made a notable address at  Pittsburg, 
in which he told what the Government had done 
under  present  laws  in  restraining Trusts,  and 
indicated in  general  terms what more Congress 
might  do  in  providing  additional  legislation. 
He seems to have amplified  the views of  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt.  Although his recommendations 
were not specific,  his suggestions seem to mean 
this : 
(a)  Under  the Sherman Act  it has been de- 
320 
cided that combinations in restraint of interstate 
commerce, whether reasonable or unreasonable, 
are illegal and  punishable.  In his judgment- 
and in this judgment  most thoughtful men since 
the decision in the Addyston  Pipe case agree- 
it is wise to permit any partial or even complete 
restraints of  trade  that  are in  their nature rea- 
sonable,  while punishing severely those that are 
unreasonable.  The courts,  as under the com- 
mon  law,  should  determine what  is  reasonable 
and what is unreasonable. 
(b) His chief recommendation, however, looks 
toward extension  of  the scope of  the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act.  Following a line of argument 
imson  parallel  with  that  used  by  Mr. F.  J.  St' 
and Prof.  E.  W.  Huffcut,  mentioned above,  he 
expresses the opinion that Congress has the power 
to lay down the conditions under which corpor- 
ations may engage  in  interstate commerce,  and 
to prescribe  penalties  for  the violation  of such 
conditions.  The  constitutional power seems to 
be  clear;  but  he  does  not  state  categorically 
what conditions he wcluld  impose.  The  impli- 
cation  in  his  address,  however,  from  the evils 
enumerated  and from 'the ~rinciples  discussed, 
is that corporations doing  an interstate business 
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ought to be  required:  (I) "To  do business in 
every State and locality upon precisely the same 
terms and conditions.  There should be no dis- 
crimination~  in  prices,  no  preferences  in  ser- 
vice.''  (2)  They should  be  subject  to "visi- 
torial  supervision";  secrecy in  the  conduct or 
result  of  their operations  should  be  prohibited 
by law. 
These conditions might  be  enforced only by 
penalties imposed by the courts after a violation 
of the act  had  been  proved  in  a  specific case 
brought by an injured party or by a government 
attorney,  as the Sherman Anti-Trust  Act is en- 
forced.  This plan  would  be  conservative;  it 
would leave the  burden  of  proof  on the prose- 
cutor, and probably would not be generally effec- 
tive.  It would,  however,  be  certain  in course 
of  time  to give  us  some  extremely  important 
decisions and indications for further action. 
Congress might,  however,  following the plan 
of several States in  dealing with insurance com- 
panies,  partly shift the burden by  providing  that 
before  any  corporation  engaged  in  interstate 
traffic it should procure a permit or license from 
some  authority  duly  established  in  the  act  (a 
bureau of  the  new Department  of  Commerce, 
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an  officer  of  the Treasury,  or  otherwise).  It 
then  regularly  furnish  such information 
regarding  its  business  as the law demanded;  it 
bc regularly  inspected  to enforce  compli- 
ance  with  the  conditions  laid  down;  and  any 
corporatioll  engaging  in  interstate  commerce 
without  such  license would  be  at once subject 
to  penalty.  The conditions  could  be  made 
whatever Congress deemed wise. 
The important  conditions  named by the At- 
.  torney-General  which  might  be  enforced  by 
either of the methods mentioned  merit consider- 
ation  from  the  economic  as well  as  from  the 
legal point  of view. 
The publicity  implied  in  the  words  "visi- 
torial supervision"  is  a remedy which has been 
long and  ably advocated, and  beyond  question, 
if it could  be  properly enforced,  would be very 
serviceable.  The extent  and  nature  of  the 
publicity which is perhaps desirable may be found 
indicated  in  Appendix  D.  The corporations, 
however,  which  most  abuse  their power would 
make  every  effort  to evade  such  supervision, 
and,  as appears later,  in  many  cases  such  eva- 
sion would be easy. 
Discrimination  in  prices  between  different 
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customers for the purpose of crushing rivals and 
strengthening monopoly,  as  Professor Clark of 
Columbia University has ably shown, is of three 
kinds:  First, the great corporation sells at rum- 
ously low rates  in  localities where  rivals are at 
work,  while recouping itself  for the loss by de- 
manding  high  prices  elsewhere;  second,  with 
many kinds of products at its disposition,  while 
its smaller rival has  only one or two classes,  it 
may,  to destroy the rival,  make ruinously low, 
though  everywhere  uniform  prices  for  these 
specific classes, while keeping high prices on its 
other products;  in the third place,  it may grant 
especially  favorable  terms  to  those  purchasers 
who buy only its goods.  It is perhaps too much 
to say that  it  is  impossible  to stop these prac- 
tices,  but any one who knows business will real- 
ize that it  is  extremely difficult  to stop any of 
them,  especially the second. 
Moreover,  it is not absolutely clear that they 
should be stopped; such discriminations at times 
may be beneficial  to society.  A rival of a great 
combination  often  makes  its  way  by  giving 
special  rates  on  certain  articles  used  as  lead- 
ers  and  by  discriminations  among  customers. 
The  principle  of  discrimination  in freight rates 
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on  railroads,  it  is  generally  conceded,  is  evil; 
but railroads  are natural monopolies.  It  is use- 
less to talk  of  encouraging  competition  among 
them.  On  the other hand, the so-called  Trusts 
are in industries which are normally competitive, 
and  ~eople  wish  to keep  them  so.  If,  then, 
rivals in competitive trade against the great cor- 
porations get their start by special rates to indi- 
vidual  customers  and  by  making  leaders  of 
special articles-to  compel  them  to sell  to all 
customers at the same  rate  is against free com- 
petition,  as the word  is  ordinarily used.  Will 
the  limitation  of  free  action  harm  most  the 
Trust or its rival? 
A small flouring mill  in southern New York 
sells flour, let us say, in its own town, in Owego 
and Elmira,  N.  Y.,  in Wilkesbarre  and Scran- 
ton,  Pa.,  and in Phillipsburg and Dover,  N.  J. 
It is engaged  in interstate commerce.  It  must 
sell  in  face  of  the  competition  of  the  great 
Minneapolis  mills  and  of  the  so-called  Flour 
Trust.  Freight rates from Minneapolis are sub- 
stantially the same to all  these points;  in them 
all flour of the same  brand  sells  at practically 
the same  price.  The local  New York miller 
must meet  these  prices,  freights  included.  In 
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consequence,  as his  freights  differ,  he  sells  to 
each town at a different rate.  His profits  from 
each differ.  He does not  sell to all at the same 
rate and then add  the  freight,  as does his great 
rival.  If the law of  no  discrimination  is  en- 
forced on him in the same way  as on the Trust 
-and  the law cannot be a respecter of  persons 
-he  is confined to his local New York market, 
cannot  sell  enough  to keep  his  mill  running, 
and stops.  The  act indicated, rigidly enforced, 
would  close  hundreds  of  small  mills in all sec- 
tions of the country,  and would  stop thousands 
of men in other lines.  Yet possibly this may be 
a less evil than the discriminations of the Trusts 
We  must,  however,  not blink the fact that in 
many individual cases such a law may strengthen 
instead of weaken the combination.  It would be 
a practical impossibility for any executive body to 
grant exceptions in special cases.  The  shippers 
are altogether too numerous. 
It is also true  that a law forbidding discrimi- 
nations,  as well  as one requiring publicity,  can 
be  easily  evaded.  It  is  impossible  in  many 
cases to get  evidence.  But  direct methods of 
evasion, like that indicated below,  are also even 
now employed. 
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It is proposed  to make  these laws apply only 
to interstate commerce.  A manufacturing tor- 
poration as such,  however large,  is not engaged 
in  interstate  commerce.  It is  at  times  even 
now the custom for a great  manufacturing cor- 
poration,  in order  to  evade  a  state law against 
combinations,  to sell its goods  in the first  place 
to a subordinate corporation  or to a CO-working 
individual,  who then transfers them to real pur- 
chasers.  This second  corporation  might,  of 
course,  be so organized as to be perfectly  ready 
and willing to meet any conditions, that of pub- 
licity or  non-discrimination or otherwise, with- 
out in any way opening  the  gate fgr inspection 
or  knowledge  of  the  workings  of  the  really 
monopolistic  manufacturing  corporation.  It 
would even be possible,  if  desirable,  for a sepa- 
rate  corporation  to be  formed  for  the  selling 
work of  each  several  State,  as  has  often  been 
suggested.  Of course  it  is  possible  that  the 
courts might hold  in an individual case that this 
method had been adopted simply for the purpose 
of evading the law,  and that for the purpose of 
that case the  transactions  should  be considered 
one.  It is scarcely probable, however,  that this 
would  be  held,  unless  in  very  rare  instances, 
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where  the  evidence  was  absolutely  clear;  and 
if the separate  corporations were organized and 
managed  with  entirely  separate  accounts,  as 
could readily be done, it does not at present ap- 
pear how the United States courts would obtain 
by  compulsion the jurisdiction  necessary  for the 
effective  carrying  out  of  the  law.  The law 
would be  still  more  difficult of enforcement if 
the intermediate selling agent were a natural per- 
son and not  a  corporation.  Similar difficulties 
would apparently be encountered in the enforce- 
ment of  the  laws suggested  in a bill introduced 
by Senator Cullom,  which  bars  the transporta- 
tion of  Trust-made  products from one State to 
another. 
2.  This brings  us  to the  discussion  of the 
second  remedy-one  suggested  and  recom- 
mended  by the  United  States  Industrial  Com- 
mission in its final  report.  The  plan is to im- 
pose  a  tax  upon  corporations  or  individuals 
engaged  in interstate commerce,  and thereby to 
secure a supervisory control of such business and 
the  opportunity  of  possible  direct  regulation. 
While there would doubtless be difficulty in im- 
posing a  direct  tax,  it  seems to be  the general 
opinion  among the most  competent  authorities 
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that a franchise tax,  or,  to use  another expres 
sion,  a license tax,  as a condition  preliminary to 
engaging in interstate commerce,would be clearly 
constitutional.  The  act of imposing a tax shows 
most strikingly the power of a government;  and 
the courts have been  inclined,  when a tax is in 
itself constitutional, to give to the Executive all 
the power needed  to enforce the tax.  Were a 
franchise  or  license  tax  imposed  annually  in 
proportion  to,  let  us  say,  the net receipts from 
interstate business,  the investigation of the busi- 
ness of each  corporation would  be of  necessity 
so thorough that the government would readily 
obtain all  the  knowledge  necessary for  holding 
the corporations  rigidly  to legal  action  and for 
prescribing  what  seemed  to be  wise  measures 
for future control. 
In order to obtain these  results,  the tax need 
not be heavy enough  to be  at all  burdensome, 
although  it would  be  of  such  a  nature  that it 
might readily  be  made  to yield  a  large income 
in case of need or even  to impose positive lim- 
itations in  any direction  desired  if  that should 
become  necessary.  The tax  might  probably 
even  be  devised  so as  directly to check stock 
watering.  The most  important  factor,  how- 
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ever, would be that when the machinery for the 
imposition  and  collection  of  the  tax was once 
thoroughly  in  order,  the  Government  would 
have  in  readiness  a  power  which  could  easily 
be adapted to the needs  of  the case.  It would 
naturally be  enforced  by  a  bureau  as indicated 
above  in  connection  with  the  plan  of  the 
Attorney-General. 
Were the tax  made  compulsory and burden- 
some, efforts to evade it and the difficulty of find- 
ing interstate commerce would  be of the nature 
of  those  indicated  in  the  first  ~lan;  but  here 
again, as in the preceding case, the decisions of 
the  courts  would  ultimately,  doubtless,  be  of 
great  assistance;  and  if  the  corporations  were 
compelled  to secure  first  their  permit,  evasion 
of the law would be more difficult. 
Such a  tax would  fit  well  into  our  general 
scheme of  taxation,  and would  be a useful bal- 
ance wheel in our entire revenue system.  The 
line of court decisions certain to be made within 
a comparatively short  time would  aid Congress 
in future legislation.  If need be, eventually the 
tax itself might be a means of control. 
3.  A  third  plan,  likewise  indicated  by  the 
Industrial  Commission,  but  most  extensively 
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and  emphatically  advocated,  perhaps,  by  Mr. 
James B.  Dill of New York, is the federal incor- 
poration  of  corporations  engaged  in  interstate 
commerce.  This plan is in line with both plans 
preceding,  but is one step further.  Should Con- 
gress make a voluntary corporation law too bur- 
densome or  rigid,  the manufacturing corporations 
would not organize under it.  If it were  made 
compulsory,  they would employ every device to 
avoid  doing  interstate  business,  and  compara- 
tively  little  would  be  accomplished.  Should 
Congress,  on  the  other  hand,  make  a  law  of 
sllch a nature that it would be advantageous for 
corporations  to  organize  under  it,  the  result 
might be quite different. 
The chief objections  that have been made to 
the plan are : 
(a) That it would  bring  about a high degree 
of centralization  in  all  of  our  important busi- 
ness,  and that  it would,  by the transference of 
much business  from the State courts, grievously 
overburden our federal judiciary ; and 
(6) That were Congress to propose the enact- 
ment of such a law, the influence of the corpor- 
ations would be  such that the law,  when made, 
instead  of  being  restrictive,  would  probably be 
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even more liberal  than  our  present  State laws. 
The  corporations,  then,  instead of  being under 
better  control,  would  be  practically  placed  be- 
yond control. 
If in such a Federal Corporation Act, follow- 
ing the precedent of the National  Banking Act, 
provision  were  made,  if  necessary,  that  suits 
might  be  brought  in  either  Federal  or  State 
courts,  there need be, and probably there would 
be,  no  great  increase  in  the activity or power 
of our Federal courts. 
If Congress  were  to follow  the  precedents 
already established with reference to corporations 
in Puerto Rico,  and in  the case of the national 
banks,  its  corporation  law  would  probably  not 
be  extremely  liberal.  It would  be  made,  of 
necessity,  under  the pressure  of  an6awakened 
public opinion,  and  attempts  to give  too great 
privileges would probably be checked. 
Such  a  law,  if  passed,  should  provide  for a 
high degree of publicity as regards the organiza- 
tion  and  management  of  corporations,  should 
impose rigid provisions  regarding capitalization 
and management, and might readily, if  it seemed 
wise,  forbid  discriminations  in prices  or  make 
any other conditions that seemed reasonable. 
332 
Compulsory severe legislation  is always hard 
to  enforce.  In the  present  difficult  case,  it 
would  be  extremely desirable  so  to legislate as 
to put on the side of  the law the great corpora- 
tions which  are  trying  to do  a  fair,  honorable 
business,  which  is  in  the public interest,  while 
stopping the evils of  the others.  An attractive 
measure would be to combine with the rigid re- 
strictions above mentioned, which would destroy 
many,  if not most, of the evils, a provision that 
federal corporations should be exempt from State 
taxation except  as to  property actually  situated 
within the several States.  Now  the  large  cor- 
porations fear and oppose and evade State corpor- 
ation  taxes.  The  variations and complications 
arising from different  systems are troublesome; 
in many cases,  lawyers say,  probably with some 
exaggeration, corporations are subject to  strike" 
bills  and  to  blackmail  where  discretion  is  left 
with minor officials.  They would be willing to 
pay a Federal tax even heavier than their present 
taxes,  if it were alike on all and fairly and hon- 
estly  levied.  Such  an  exemption  provision- 
and possibly others, which might check too hos- 
tile  legislation  by  separate  States,  for  unless 
Congress forbade it,  they might  attempt injuri- 
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ous regulation-might  easily prove so attractive 
that the sound corporatiolls would readily organ- 
ize  under  the  law  and aid in  its  just  enforce- 
ment. 
A Federal corporation law, if enacted, should 
certainly at first be made permissive rather than 
mandatory.  There would  thus  be  no danger 
of a revolution  in  business;  the courts and the 
industrial  community  would  adapt  themselves 
gradually to the  new line  of  organization.  If 
the law were reasonable,  even though very strict, 
the  best  corporations  would  come  under  it  at 
once.  The others would soon feel the pressure 
of public disapproval, if the Federal law were dis- 
tinctly the best.  If experience  showed  that it 
were necessary  to extend  the  scope of the act, 
though that  is  not  probable,  it would  be  com- 
paratively easy later on  to force,  by taxation or 
otherwise,  other  State  corporations engaged  in 
interstate traffic to incorporate under it. 
The  three plans  indicated  are not contradic- 
tory;  they are rather progressive along the same 
line.  Either act  could  be  passed  alone,  or all 
of them might be passed  together.  From pres- 
ent  indications,  it  seems  that  the  people  are 
rather inclined toward somewhat rigid,  although 
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not destructive,  measures.  If  the first law dis- 
cussed were enacted,  it would  doubtless give us 
valuable  experience  and  decisions,  and  would 
be,  with the  exception  of  one point,  a distinct 
step in advance, possibly all that should be taken 
at first.  But so far as has appeared,  it is prac- 
tically  entirely  compulsory  in  its  nature  and 
could be readily evaded.  The other two meas- 
ures seem  more drastic,  and doubtless would be 
more  rigid  in  many  ways;  but,  on the  other 
hand,  the  last  at  any rate  might  contain  pro- 
visions which would remove the hostility  of the 
better class of corporations.  These would then 
themselves  readily  aid  in  the  enforcement  of 
the  law;  while if  it were  made  optional,  even 
if combined with the other plans,  there certainly 
could be no charge of action hostile to the inter- 
ests of capital legitimately  invested and properly 
employed for the welfare of the public. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
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sugar combination in, 234. 
Going  concern,  capitaliza- 
tion upon value  as a, 99- 
107,  239  (see  capitaliza- 
tion, basis of). 
Gompers, Samuel, 178. 
Good  qualities  of  combina- 
tions, 212-213. 
Government  inspection  and 
control  of  corporations, 
223,  251-254,  258-259, 
264, 268. 
Grades  of  sugar explained, 
I 34. 
Greenhut, J.  B.,  171. 
Guthrie, Chas. S.,  36-37. 
H 
UANNIS Distilling Com- 
G 
GARY,  Judge E1ber.t  13.9 
184. 
Gates, John W.,  33, 47, 48, 
7.1,  158, 165, 176, 184. 
Genius, individual, indepen- 
II pany, purchase of, 93. 
Havemeyer,  Henry O., 34, 
39944,  459  74,  1429  1437 
192. 
Hereditary  business  in  Eu- 
rope checks  tendency to- 
ward  combination.  270- 
dent  of  monopoly,  iog- 
210. 
Germany, attitude of  courts 
toward  combination  in, 
250-251  ;  attitude of pub- 
lic toward  combinations, 
I 
ILLINOIS  Steel Company, 
122-123. 
Incorporation certificate, un- 
der New York Companies' 
Act, 274-276  ;  amendment 
of same, 277-258. 
Incorporation  fees, 276. 
Independence,  degree  of, 
granted managers of  Eng- 
lish combinations, 234. 
Independent  producers  of 
oil,  116, 15  1-152,  155 ;  of 
sugar, 137-140. 
Independent thought, oppor- 
tunities  for,  under  large 
combinations, 203-206  (see 
self-direction). 
Individual  genius, indepen- 
dent  of  monopoly,  209- 
z10;self-direction, whether 
destroyed  by  large  com- 
binations,  194-207,  216. 
Individuality,  developed  by 
the art of  managing one's 
superiors,  205. 
Industrial  combinations  in 
Europe, chapter xii., 228- 
254. 
Industrial  Commission  (see 
United  States  Industrial 
Commission). 
Industries,  character  of, 
adapted  to  combination, 
208-209. 
Influence,  improper, of  cor- 
porations  upon  legisla- 
tures and courts, 190-194, 
246 ; upon  political  or- 
ganizations  in  general, 
-215. 
Information, should be given 
.  - 
231. 
Howe,  Judge William  W., 
6 ; formulation  of  sug- 
gested methods  for solu- 
tion of  trust problem,  ap- 
pendix A, 257-260. 
to  investors  and  stock- 
holders, 105-106,126-129, 
222-227,  259,  262-263, 
267-268,  286,  291-296 
(see publicity:. 
Inspectors,  government,  of 
corporations, 223, 268 (see 
government  inspection 
and control). 
Intangible  property,  as  a 
basis of  capitalization, 79- 
8o(see capitalization, basis 
of). 
Interest charge, for carrying 
stock  of  raw  material, 
133. 
International  combinations, 
possibility of, 47-49,  222. 
International  influence  of 
certain combinations, 229. 
Intefstate  Commerce  Com- 
mlsslon,  extension  of 
power  of  recommended, 
219--220, 264. 
Interstate  Commerce  Law, 
52, 53, 217, 264. 
Introduction, 3-9. 
Investors,  concealment  of 
facts from, and deception 
of,  213-214  ; information 
should  be  given  to,  105- 
106,  222,  259,  262-263, 
286,  291-296  ;  organiza- 
tion of  corporations, form 
of, should  be studied by, 
128-129  ;  underwriting of 
stocks  by  banks  affects, 
96-97. 
Iron  Age,  157,  165,  16% 
169. 
Iron,  combinations  in,  in 
Austria  and  Germany, 
233,  243-244 ; increased 
351  350 Index 
cDONALD  oil  field,  M  156. 
McKinley tariff on tin plate, 
price  of, affects  price  of  industrial  combinations, 
oil, 154 ;  increased  wages /  ad~rocated  by many, 217. 
164. 
McNulta,  General  John, I 
in  iron  and  steel  indns- 
tries,  159, 167, 173 ; ore 
and  pig-iron,  increased 
price of, 159. 
J 
ARVIE.  J. N., 143.  J  Johnson Company, 122. 
Judiciary  Committee  of 
United  States  House  of 
Representatives,  constitu- 
tional  amendment  pro- 
posed  by, 225. 
L 
LABOR, how  affected  by 
combinations :  coalition 
between  employers  and 
employees  to  sustain 
prices,  187-188,  235-239 ; 
efficiency  of  labor  in- 
creased,  186 ;  publicity 
would  benefit,  224  ; rela- 
tionof Europeancombina- 
tions  to,  244-246 ; sales- 
men  and  superintendents 
dispensedwith, 24,  26-27, 
182-185 ;  steadiness  of 
employment, 186 ; wages, 
trusts  and,  chapter  ix., 
171-189, 215  (see  em- 
ployees, unions, wages). 
Labor  organizations  (see 
unions). 
Laissez  faire  policy  toward 
147. 
Machinery,  distribution  of, 
in  large  combinations, 
36-38, 230. 
Management,  methods  of 
organization  and, chapter 
vii.,  108-129. 
Margin  or differential  (see 
differential). 
Market,  difficulty of  secnr- 
ing,  22-23 ;  foreign  de- 
velopment  of,  through 
combinations,  75-76, 213. 
Massachusetts,  corporation 
law of, 99. 
Meetings  of  stockholders, 
provisions  of  New  York 
Companies'  Act  concern- 
Lake Superior  Consolidated 
Iron Mines, 312. 
Law,  common,  concerning 
restraint  of  trade,  218- 
z~g,  249 ; European  law 
In  certain  respects  favor- 
able to combinations, 232- 
233. 
Leather combinations, 37. 
Lee, J. W.,  152,  156. 
Legal  monopoly,  56,  59, 
170,  220--221  (see monop- 
oly). 
Legislation,  chapter  xi., 
212-227 ; evil  of  closing 
plants  may  be  reached 
by,  186  ; European, regu- 
lating  corporations  and 
combinations,  248 -  254 ; 
needed  to  properly  con- 
trol  trusts,  211,  257-269, 
306; State  and  federal, 
against trusts, 217-219. 
Legislatures,  improper  in- 
fluencing  of,  by  corpora- 
tions  and  combinations, 
19-194,  246. 
Let alone  policy toward in- 
dustrial combinations, ad- 
vocated  by  many,  217. 
License, corporations should 
be  required  to  secure, 
/  306.  ' Limit  of  field  of  combina- 
tion, 208-210. 
Loans  on  stock  forbidden 
under New York Compan- 
ies' Act, 288-289. 
Lorain  Steel  Company, 
122. 
Louisiana sugar crop,  144. 
352 
ing, 584-285. 
Merger  and  dissolution  of 
corporations,  under  New 
York  Companies'  Act, 
monopolistic,  should  be 
held  in check by  society, 
211,  269,  306;  prices,  22, 
59-72,  253 ;  tariff, in re- 
lation  to  monopolistic 
power,  242  -  243 ;  term 
monopoly  explained,  58, 
60, 64  ; what  constitutes 
a  binations,  virtual, 6-61  trusts).  (see  com- 
Moore, William  H., 88. 
Moral tone of  business, low- 
ering of  by combinations. 
216.- 
Morgan, J.  P.,  & Co.,  312- 
3'3. 
NAILS,  wire  (see  wire 
nails). 
National  Steel  Company, 
form  of  or~anization  of. 
117,  I24 ;  labor organiza- 
tions recognized  by, 176 ; 
part of  United States Steel 
Corporation, 311. 
National  Tube  Company, 
304. 
Milk,  combinations  in  cer- 
tain cities to control sup- 
ply of, 208. 
Millinery  trade,  why  com- 
bination  is impossible in, 
209. 
Minnesota  Iron  Company, 
121. 
Monopoly,  capitalistic,  58- 
76 ;  combination  and, 
chapter iv.,  56-76 ; legal, 
56,  59,  170,  220-221 ; 
natural,  57-58 ;  power, 
-  - 
311. 
Natural  monopoly,  57-58 
(see monopoly). 
Nepotism,  evil  of,  under 
large  combinations,  201- 
202. 
New  York,  Business  Com- 
panies'  Act,  6, 224, 270- 
305 ; Court  of  Appeals, 
decision  of,  against  trust 
form of  organization, 112- 
113  ; price  of  refined  oil 
in, 151-152,  and  diagram 
facing 150; State Bar As- 
23  353 Index  Index 
sociation,  plan  suggested 
for  capitalization  of  cor- 
porations,  106-107. 
Nominal  competition,  13 
(see competition). 
Normal price, basis of, 141 ; 
absence of, under certain 
conditions, 141-142,  145. 
Normal  rate,  legislative re- 
striction  of  profits  to a, 
189. 
NUrnberg,  combination  of 
brush  manufacturers  of. 
by  industrial  combina. 
tions, 33-36,  241, 246. 
Overreaching,  by  combina- 
tions  generally,  70-71  ; 
by  the whiskey combina- 
tions,  149. 
ACKAGES,  increased  P  price  of.  affects price 
of  oil, 154-155. 
Parent  corporation,  organ- 
ization of constituent con- 
cerns  under  a,  117-124, 
309- 
OFFICE,  registered,  of 
corporations, 272-273. 
Officers  of  comorations. 
Patents,  legal  monopolies 
made possible  by,  56, 59, 
170,  220-221 ; proposed 
substitute for. 220-221. 
under  New  ~6rk  ~om: 
panies'  Act,  282-283 ; 
liable  for  misrepresenta- 
tions, 284. 
Oil  (see  crude  oil,  petro- 
leum). 
Organization  and  manage- 
ment, methods of, chapter 
vii.,  108-129;  financiering 
and, of  combinations, 87- 
90 ; provisions  of  New 
York Companies' Act con- 
cerning  promotion,  291- 
296 ; social  organization, 
effect of  large  combina- 
tions upon,  194-206. 
Organizations  of  labor  (see 
unions). 
Over-capitalization, 98, 103- 
IO?,  239-240  (see  capi- 
tahzation). 
Over-production,  prevented 
binations,  34,  176-177, 
186-187,  196, 215. 
political and social effects  of 
industrial  combinations, 
chapter X., 190-211 ; evil, 
of  corruption  of  legis- 
latures  and  courts  by 
corporations,  IgC-194, 
246. 
pools, forms of, 108-112;  in 
coal,  IIC-111  ; in  pipe, 
109 ; in  whiskey,.  33-34, 
108-109,  147 ;  in  wlre 
nails,  61-62,  166  (see 
agreements limiting  com- 
petition). 
Post,  James  H..  140,  143, 
155. 
Potential  competition,  61- 
72 (see competition). 
Power  of  combinations,  as 
against  employees,  176- 
182 ; to  lower  moral  tone 
of  business,  216 ;  monop- 
olistic,  should  be  held  in 
check by society, 211, 269, 
306. 
Preferred  stock (see stock). 
Premiums, use of, in  adver- 
tising,  28-29. 
Press, exaggeration of  legis- 
lative  corruption  by  the, 
'92. 
I'nces,  chapter  viii.,  130- 
170; agreements affecting 
(see  agreements  limiting 
competition,  pools) ; dia- 
grams  illustrating  prices 
of  petroleum, steel, sugar, 
tin  plate, whiskey,  facing 
133,  146,  150,  157,  165 ; 
character of goods affects 
competition  in,  14-16 ; 
Pay of  promote;,  80-81,  87- 
96, 240, 248 ; of  financier 
or underwriter, 91-94  (see 
financier, promoter). 
Penalty  for  delinquent  of- 
ficials  under  New  York 
Companies' Act,  289-290. 
Petroleum,  discovery of  new 
fields of,  156-157  ;  prices 
of, 150-157,  and diagram 
facing 150 (see crude  oil, 
independent  producers of 
oil,  Standard  Oil  Com- 
pany). 
Pig-~ron,  increased  price of, 
159. 
Pipe lines,  arbitrary  action 
of  Standard Oil Company 
in  crushing  rival,  155 
(see  Standard  Oil  Com- 
pany). 
Plants,  closing of,  by  com- 
competition  does not  =l. 
ways fix, 11-14 ;  competi. 
tive,  and monopoly,  22 ; 
competitive, usually high, 
21 ; effect  of  European 
combinations upon,  240- 
241 ; export,  I!I,  241- 
243 ;  fluctuations In, under 
unrestricted  competition, 
140-141 ; monopoly,  fac- 
tors which determine,  59- 
72 ;  monopoly, checked by 
combination  court,  253; 
normal,  basis  of,  141 ; 
over-capitalization induces 
high, 105; petroleum, 150- 
157 ;  steel and wire,  165- 
170; sugar, 133-146;  tariff 
and,  241-244 ;  tin  plate, 
157-164  ; whiskey,  146- 
150. 
Production,  increase  of, 
under  combination,  186; 
restriction of, 33-36,  186- 
187,  241,  248  (see  agree- 
ments  limiting  competi- 
tion);  small scale produc- 
tion  no  longer  possible, 
200-206. 
Profits, legislative restriction 
of, to a normal  rate,  189 ; 
of  American Sugar Refin- 
ing  Company,  136 ; of 
Standard  Oil  Company, 
72, 173. 
Promoterandfinancier,chap- 
ter v., 77-97;  definition of 
promoter, 77; mlsrepresen- 
tationsof, 214; pay of, 80- 
8r, 87-96,  240,  248; pro- 
visions of  NewYork Com- 
panies'  Act  concerning. 
291-296  ;  responsibility of 
355  354 should be increased, 222, 
262-263  (see financier). 
Property,  issuance  of  stock 
for,  78-80  (see  capital- 
ization,  basis of). 
Prospectus,  contents  of, 
under  New  York  Com- 
panies'  Act, 291-296. 
Protective  tariff  (see  tariff). 
Publicity,degree of, in Euro- 
pean  combinations,  239- 
240, 248-249,  252; extent 
to which it should be car- 
ried  in  corporate  a8airs. 
126-129,  222-227,  259, 
262-264,  267-268,  286, 
291-296,  306 ; over-capi- 
talization  and  other  evils 
of  combinations would be 
remedied by, 105-106,222- 
227 ;  policy of, would ulti- 
mately lead to more rigor- 
ous  restriction,  226-227  ; 
provisions  of  New  York 
Companies'  Act designed 
to  secure,  272-276,  285- 
304. 
Public  opinion,  European, 
not hostile toward concen- 
tration  of  capital,  246 ; 
favors  organized  labor 
rather than organized capi- 
tal, 181 ;  hostile to trusts, 
I72 ;  may eventually bring 
about  restriction  of  rate 
of  profits,  189 ;  when en- 
lightened  may  compel 
lower  prices  and  higher 
wages,  227. 
Public, the, affected by stock 
watering,  103-104 ;  by 
over-capitalization,  105 ; 
by publicity,  224. 
356 
proposed  plans  for regu- 
lation  of  combinations,  ALARIES of  officers of 
a~~endices  A,  B,  C,  D,  corporations, under New 
bination  of  producers  of 
products at different stages 
of manufacture, 117-124, 
309 ; waste  of,  133,  144, 
154 (see by-products). 
Rebates  (see  freights,  dis- 
crimination~  in). 
Refining sugar, estimates of 
cost  of, 143. 
Registered office of  corpora- 
tions, 272-273. 
Registration  agent  of  cor- 
porations, 272-273. 
Regulation  of  corporations, 
attempted by United States 
and many States, 217-219; 
desirable,  222,  225-226  ; 
Puerto Rico, corporation law 
of, 99. 
Pure Oil Company, competi- 
tion  with  Standard  Oil 
Company,  152; why  or- 
ganized  as a voting  trust. 
116. 
Purpose of  book, 4-5. 
2, 
UALITIES,  good  and  Q  evil,  of  combinations, 
212-216  ; of  goods,  tests 
of, 14-15. 
R 
ADICALS,  attitude  of  R  French, toward combi- 
nations, 246. 
Railroads,  combination  of, 
204 ;  recommendation that 
Interstate Commerce Com- 
mission audit accounts and 
control  freight  rates  of, 
220, 264-265. 
Railway discriminations and 
rebates,  49-55,  zoo, 219- 
220,  264  (see freights). 
Raw  material,  combination 
between producers of, and 
manufacturers  of  finished 
product,  41-42  ;  effect  of 
combination  upon  pro- 
ducers of, 130. 215 ;  great 
increase  in  price  of,  in 
steel  and  iron  industry, 
158-159,  161 ;  interest 
charge for carrying,  133 ; 
supply of, assured by corn' 
law  concerning,  supple. 
mented  by  statutory pro- 
visions,  218-219  ;  legisla- 
tion against, needed, 258 ; 
theory O!  European courts 
concernlng, 232, 24~251. 
Restriction  of  production, 
33-36,  186-187,  241,  248 
(see  agreements  limiting 
competition); of profits, to 
a normal rate, 189. 
Retail  trade,  combination 
and competition in, 11-14. 




Reports of' corporations, of- I  154, i13,  229-230. 
ten  unsatisfactorv.  126 : Schwab.  Charles  M.,  314- 
E:  257-?07. 
Re~d,  Danlel E., I 58. 
Reincorporation,  provision 
for, 278. 
Remedy,  for  corruption  of 
legislatures  by  corpora- 
tions,  193-194  ;  for  evils 
of  industrial combinations, 
105-107,  217-227,  appen- 
dices A, B, C, D, E, 257- 
307. 
Reorganization of  the trusts, 
forms of. 112-116. 
YorkCompanies' Act, 283- 
284. 
Sale of  stock, usual  method 
of, 91-97. 
Salesmen, necessity of, when 
competition  prevails,  ?3- 
27 ; possible  saving  In, 
under  combination,  24, 
26-27,  182-183,  230 (see 
employees,  labor, wages). 
Savings of combination, dis- 
position of, 130-131,  171- 
18s ;  possible, 21-43,  153- 
..--  ..--  ~ 
suitable, needed to protect 
stockholders,  223,  259 ; 
under  New  York  Com- 
Restraint of  trade, common 1  Europe, 233. 
357 
315. 
Self  - direction,  individual, 
whether destroyed by large 
panies'  Act, 302-304. 
Responsibility  to superiors, 
the rule under present con- 
ditions.  204-205. 
combinations, 194-207, 
216.  I 
Selling  bureau,  the  usual 
form  of  combination  in Index  Index 
capitalization,  103.  State  legislation  against 
Speculative character of  in-  trusts,  217-219  ; statutes, 
dustrial  stocks, one cause  extend  common  law  rule 
358 
Services,  issuance  of  stock 
'for, 78-81,  87-96. 
Sherman act of  1890,  127. 
Shoddy  goods,  encourage- 
ment  of  manufacture of, 
by excessive  competition, 
198. 
Small scale  production, pre- 
vention  of,  by  combina- 
tions, 200-206. 
Smelters, strike by, in Colo- 
rado, 177. 
Smith, E. J., plan for avoid- 
ingstrikes, 187-188 ;  form 
of  combination originated 
by,  235-2399 245. 
Social,  control,  should  be 
exercised over trusts, 211  ; 
effect, resulting from ille- 
gitimate relations between 
bankersandcombinations, 
96-97 ; organization,  ef- 
fect of  large corporations 
upon,  194-206 ; political 
and social effects of  com- 
bination,  190-211,  246 ; 
social  standards  at fault, 
193. 
Society, monopolistic  power 
should  be  held  in  check 
by, 211,  269,  306. 
Sources  of  information,  of 
author,  3-4. 
South  Improvement  Com- 
pany, 156. 
Speculation, by directors, at 
expense  of  stockholders, 
214  ;  furthered by conceal- 
ment of  state of  business, 
126 : furthered  by  over-  l 
of. 94-95 ;  speculative or. 
ganization probably  wan- 
ipg, 95. 
Splr~ts,  price  of,  how  re. 
lated to price of  corn, 147. 
Spreckels, Claus, 137,  139. 
Standard Distilling and Dis- 
tributing Company, orwn- 
izationand financiering of, 
87,  92  (see Distilling Com- 
pany of  America). 
Standard  Oil  Company, ac- 
count  of,  in  connection 
with prices of oil, 152-156; 
advantages of : as a  capi- 
talistic monopoly, 72,  from 
location  of  refineries,  32, 
in  freight shipments, 52- 
55 ;  arbitrary actions of, in 
crushing  rival  pipe  lines 
and  controlling  price  of 
crude oil,  155-156  ; com- 
petitors  of,  form  voting 
trusts,  116  ; development 
of  foreign market by,  75 ; 
dividends of,  155  ; form, 
original  of.  111-112, nn- 
der  reorganization,  113- 
115 ;  natural  monopoly 
possessed by, through con- 
trol  of  pipe  lines,  58 ; 
prices of  oil furnished by. 
150 ;  Pure  Oil Company, 
competition  with,  152  ; 
utilization  of  by-products 
by,  153-154  ; wages  paid 
and treatment  of  employ- 
ees,  172-173  (see  inde- 
pendent  producers, petro- 
leum). 
with regard to restraint of 
trade, 218-219. 
States,  a  few  large,  could 
accomplish  much  toward 
proper  regulation  of  cor- 
porations.  225-226, 269. 
Statistics  of  prices, chapter 
viii.,  prices,  130-170. 
Statutes  in  various  States, 
extend  common-law  rule 
with regard to restraint of 
trade, 218-219. 
Steadiness  of  employment 
under  combinations,  186, 
241. 
Steadying prices, sugar trust 
has  done  little  toward, 
139-140. 
Steel  and  wire,  prices  of, 
165-170,  and  diagram 
facing  16j ; enormous in- 
crease in demand for steel, 
causes  increased  price, 
158-159. 
Stock,  assignment  of,  to 
trustees,  111-113,  115- 
117  ;  certificates of, issued 
for cash, 78,  for property, 
78-79,  for services.  79-81, 
87-96 ; common,  often 
used  to  pay  promoters, 
and as a  bonus  to effect 
combinations,  86-90,  92- 
94  ; ownership  of,  by  a 
single  large  corporation, 
114,  117-124,  309; power 
of  corporation to buy and 
sell,  290-291 ; preferred, 
issued in lieu of bonds, 84- 
86;  sale of, usual method 
of, 91-97  ;  suggested reg- 
ulation of issuance of, 259, 
285-288 ;  watered, 77, 83, 
86-88, 98, 103-104,  119, 
224,  239,  259,  306. 
Stockholders, degree of  con- 
trol which should be grant- 
ed to, 126-129;  injury  of, 
by directors, 214  ; protec- 
tion of, 223  (see publicity). 
"  Strike " bills  (see  black- 
mailing of  corporations). 
Strikes, plan of  E.  J.  Smith 
for  avoiding,  187-188 ; 
possibility of  defeating by 
closing certain plants, 177; 
result  of,  in  industries 
where labor is thoroughly 
organized,  178. 
Structural steel, use of, 158- 
159. 
Struggle,  will  determine 
manner  in  which  indus- 
trial savings shail  be  dis- 
posed of, 160-181. 
Sugar,  Austrian  and  Ger- 
man combinations in, 234; 
grades of, explained,  134  ; 
guarantee of  a fixed  price 
to producers of  raw, 234 ; 
industry,  competition  in 
leads to combination,  17, 
136 ;  prices  of  raw  and 
refined, in  England, Ger- 
many,  and  the  United 
States,  133-146, and  dia- 
gram facing 133 ;  raw, in- 
fluence of  combination  on 
price of, 145-146;  refining, 
estimates  of  cost of, 143, 
waste  in,  144 ;  trust  in 
(see  ~merican  Sugar Re- 
fining Company). 
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